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Abstract
Fisheries governance is about influencing multiple actors’ decisions and behaviours 
relative to an ocean area and the resources contained therein. How these behaviours and 
decisions are influenced is a matter of institutions. This research uses the Peruvian 
anchovy fishery as a case study. Landings of Peruvian anchovy represent almost 10 % 
of the worlds total fishery landings. Following the well known collapse of the anchovy 
fishery at the start of the 1970s, landings have recovered and have been sustained over 
the last two decades at around six to nine million tonnes per year. Despite this evidence 
of sustainability, key institutional requirements that are nowadays strongly 
recommended to achieve sustainable fisheries are absent in this fishery. These ‘missing’ 
requirements for sustainability include for instance individual fishing quota shares, 
decentralized bottom-up management and eco-labelling. In order to explore the 
institutional setting of this sustainable fishery, this study adopts a broad institutional 
approach that considers a range of institutions, including those mentioned above and 
others that have rarely been considered by fisheries research. 
The first article of this research looks at the role and evolution of formal fisheries 
institutions and their relation to sustainability. Results show that General Fisheries Acts 
in Peru were enacted independently of trends in anchovy landings. The three Peruvian 
Fisheries Acts were a reflection of broader national socio-political changes and were 
enacted mainly to define the role of the state and private investment and to delimit 
foreign involvement in the fishery industry. The base-level management to deal with 
landings was left to secondary legislation that evolved in response to different 
considerations including organizational functionality, the legitimacy of management 
agencies, advances in science and technological innovation. To guarantee stable 
landings, this secondary legislation operates adaptively, in response to environmental 
and ecological dynamics. The article concludes that general fisheries laws in Peru do 
not guarantee sustainable landings on their own. However they play an important role in 
access rights according to current local economic and political policies that function as 
an umbrella providing the appropriate environment for secondary legislation and other 
norms to evolve towards sustainability. 
The second article deals with informal institutions and the connection between 
sustainability and adaptation to environmental variability and climate change. As shown 
in this article, the sustainability of the Peruvian fishery relies heavily on institutions 
developed to cope with environmental change. A set of eight adaptive strategies are 
described. These included: decentralized installation of anchovy processing factories; 
simultaneous ownership of fishing fleet and processing factories (vertical integration); 
use of low-cost unloading facilities; opportunistic utilization of invading fish 
populations; low cost intensive monitoring; rapid responses and flexible management; 
reduction of price uncertainty by restricting supply of anchovy products (fishmeal) to 
match market demand; and decoupling of fishmeal prices from those of other substitute 
commodities. These coping strategies provide an example of how the fisheries sector 
and central government can act positively to reduce undesirable impacts of 
environmental variability and change. This experience is relevant to other fisheries, and 
other resource regimes, that are already being affected by global environmental change. 
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The third article deals with fish as a common pool resource (CPR). This article 
considers the extent to which institutional characteristics of the Peruvian fishery 
conform to design principles which are considered prerequisites for long-term 
successful community-based CPR. This study finds that clearly defined resource 
boundaries, monitoring rule enforcement and conflict resolution mechanisms among 
users and management authorities supported the transition towards sustainability. On 
the other hand, clearly defined user boundaries, collective choice arrangements and 
nested enterprises were in this case not required to achieve sustainability. The article 
analyses the strengths and limitations of current and past institutional arrangements in 
the Peruvian anchovy fishery. It comments on the extent to which design principles 
developed in local CPR systems are transferable to a national scale. 
This research gives an account of and explores the reasons behind recent efforts to 
prescribe standardized institutional arrangements to overcome fisheries 
overexploitation. However the results of this research highlight the fact that institutions 
develop in context specific directions and what is a solution in one fishery could have 
unexpected negative consequences in others. Furthermore, the findings suggest that, in 
general, fisheries sustainability cannot be achieved relying on one or two institutional 
changes. The sustainability of the Peruvian anchovy fishery is the result of a multi-
faceted and continuing process of historical transformation. Taken together, these 
results also suggest that rather than concentrating in a particular set of mostly economic 
institutions, a broad institutional approach is a more appropriate attitude to 
understanding and managing the complexity of fisheries systems. 
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Zusammenfassung
Die Steuerung der Fischerei wirkt durch ihren Einfluss auf mehrere Akteure und deren 
Entscheidungen und Verhaltensweisen in Bezug auf einen Meeresraum und die darin 
enthaltenen Ressourcen. Wie diese Verhaltensweisen und Entscheidungen beeinflusst 
werden, ist eine Frage des institutionellen Vorgehens. Dieses Forschungprojekt nutzt 
die peruanische Sardellenfischerei zur „case study“. Nach dem in der Wissenschaft 
häufig verwendeten Beispiels des Zusammenbruches der Sardellenfischerei zu Beginn 
der 70er Jahre haben sich die Anlandungen erholt und blieben in den letzten zwei 
Jahrzehnten nachhaltig bei etwa 6 Mio bis 9 Mio Tonnen pro Jahr. Die Anlandungen 
der peruanischen Sardellen repräsentieren ca. 10% der weltweiten 
Fischereianlandungen. Trotz dieser Hinweise auf Nachhaltigkeit wurden wichtige 
institutionelle Anforderungen, die heute für eine nachhaltige Fischerei dringend 
empfohlen werden, in der peruanischen Sardellenfischerei nicht angewandt. Zu diesen 
„fehlenden“ Anforderungen gehören zum Beispiel individuelle Fangquoten, dezentrales 
Bottom-up-Management und ein Öko-Umweltsiegel. Um den institutionellen 
Hintergrund dieser sich als nachhaltig erweisenden Fischerei zu erfassen, untersucht 
diese Studie den Regelungsrahmen einer großen Anzahl betroffener Institutionen. 
Der erste Artikel dieser Forschung beschäftigt sich mit der Rolle und Entwicklung der 
formellen Institutionen der Fischerei und ihrer Beziehung zur Nachhaltigkeit. Die 
Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Fischereigesetze in Peru unabhängig von Trends in der 
Sardellenanlandung verordnet wurden. Die bis heute erlassenen drei peruanischen 
Fischereigesetze sind ein Spiegelbild einer umfassenderen gesellschaftspolitischen 
Veränderung und wurden vor allem erlassen, um die Rolle des Staates und der privater 
Investoren zu definieren und ausländische Beteiligung an der Fischereiindustrie zu 
beschränken. Das Management im Umgang mit den Fischanlandungen wurde auf die 
untergesetzliche sekundäre Verwaltungsebene verschoben, die sich in Reaktion auf 
Veränderungen in den Bereichen Organisationsstruktur und Legitimität der 
Managementagenturen sowie Fortschritte in Wissenschaft und technologische 
Innovationen entwickelte. Um stabile Anlandungen zu garantieren, arbeitet diese 
sekundäre Gesetzgebung adaptiv, in Reaktion auf die Umwelt und ökologische 
Dynamik. Die Untersuchung zeigt, dass die allgemeinen Fischereigesetze der Fischerei 
in Peru allein keine nachhaltigen Anlandungen garantieren können. Dennoch spielen sie 
eine wichtige Rolle als übergeordnete Ebene und geben geeignete Rahmenbedingungen 
für die sekundäre Gesetzgebung und andere Normen in Richtung Nachhaltigkeit. 
Der zweite Artikel beschäftigt sich mit informellen Institutionen und den 
Zusammenhang zwischen Nachhaltigkeit und die Anpassung an Umweltvariabilität und 
Klimawandel. In diesem Artikel wird aufgezeigt, dass sich die Nachhaltigkeit der 
peruanischen Fischerei stark auf Institutionen stützt, die durch verschiedenste 
Maßnahmen auf Veränderungen der Umwelt reagieren. Acht Anpassungsstrategien 
werden beschrieben. Dazu gehören: die dezentrale Installation von Fischmehlfabriken, 
gleichzeitiger Besitz von Fischereiflotte und Fischmehlfabrik (vertikale Integration), 
Verwendung von Low-Cost-Entladeeinrichtungen, opportunistische Nutzung von 
eindringenden Fischpopulationen, intensive Low-Cost-Überwachung, schnelle 
Reaktionen und Flexibilität der Verwaltung, Herabsetzung von ökonomischer 
Unsicherheit durch Einschränkung des Angebots von Sardellenprodukten (Fischmehl) 
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und die Entkopplung von Fischmehlpreisen von jenen anderer 
Fischmehlersatzrohstoffe. Diese „coping-strategies“ sind ein Beispiel dafür, wie 
Fischerei und Zentralregierung positiv zusammen arbeiten können, um Nachhaltigkeit 
trotz Einwirkung von Umwelt- und Klimaveränderungen zu sichern. Diese Erfahrung ist 
relevant für andere Fischereien und andere Regime von Ressourcen, die bereits von 
globalen Umweltveränderungen betroffen sind. 
Der dritte Artikel befasst sich mit Fisch als Common Pool Ressource (CPR). Dieser 
Artikel betrachtet das Ausmaß, in dem institutionelle Merkmale der peruanischen 
Fischerei den Grundsätzen, die als Voraussetzungen für eine langfristig erfolgreiche 
‚community-based‘ CPR gelten, entsprechen. Diese Studie stellt fest, dass die 
Anwendung klar definierter Grenzen für die Nutzung von Ressourcen, intensiver 
Überwachung und der Durchsetzung der Mechanismen zur Konfliktlösung durch die 
Nutzer und die Verwaltung eine Entwicklung der Fischerei in Richtung Nachhaltigkeit 
unterstützt. Auf der anderen Seite sind klar definierte Nutzergrenzen, „collective 
choice“ Arrangements und verschachtelte Unternehmen nicht erforderlich, um 
Nachhaltigkeit zu erzielen. Die Untersuchung analysiert die Stärken und Grenzen der 
aktuellen und vergangenen institutionellen Arrangements in der peruanischen 
Sardellenfischerei. Der Artikel untersucht, ob „design principles“, die aus dem Studium 
der lokalen nachhaltigen CPR-Systeme entwickelt wurden, auf die nationale Ebene 
übertragen werden können. 
Diese Forschung untersucht die Gründe hinter den aktuellen Bemühungen um 
einheitliche institutionelle Regelungen, mit dem Ziel die Übernutzung der Fischerei zu 
überwinden. Allerdings zeigen die Ergebnisse dieser Forschung, dass Institutionen im 
Bezugsrahmen zu entwickeln sind und dass die Lösung der Probleme für die eine 
Fischerei unerwartete negative Auswirkungen für eine andere haben könnte. Darüber 
hinaus legen die Ergebnisse nahe, dass im Allgemeinen in der Fischerei Nachhaltigkeit 
nicht unter Berufung auf ein oder zwei institutionelle Veränderungen zu erreichen sein 
wird. Die Nachhaltigkeit der peruanischen Sardellenfischerei ist das Ergebnis eines 
vielschichtigen und anhaltenden Prozesses von Transformationen. 
Zusammengenommen weisen die Ergebnisse darauf hin, dass die Komplexität von 
Fischereisystemen erst durch Forschung, die weit über die Untersuchung von 
wirtschaftlichen Institutionen hinaus geht und unter Einbeziehung aller beteiligten 
Institutionen zu verstehen und zu managen ist. 
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1. Introduction 
Natural resources provide essential goods and services to humankind, support the 
livelihoods of much of the world's population and have considerable cultural 
significance in different locations around the globe (Charles 2004). Moreover the 
unsustainable exploitation of natural resources is a major problem worldwide. Current 
rates of deforestation in the world’s forests are at 13 million hectares per year (Chazdon 
2008), almost 75% of the world’s commercial fish stocks are currently being fished at, 
or above mean sustainable yields (FAO 2010), at least 25% of all mammals are 
threatened with extinction (Schipper et al. 2008) and the use of water resources 
worldwide has increased six-fold during the last century (Birol et al. 2006). 
Uncontrolled increases in natural resource extraction and consumption, probably as a 
result of current human population growth are threatening long-term ecological and 
human well-being. They thus pose a tremendous challenge that casts doubt on the 
ability of future generations to sustain their livelihoods and cultural heritages. 
As mentioned by Dovers (2001), virtually every discussion of sustainable use of natural 
resources concludes that our current institutional setting is undeniably part of the 
problem and that substantial reforms are required. Sustainability involves more than 
science and education, technological innovation and flexibility to adapt to unexpected 
and changing conditions; it also demands new outlooks, new world views and new 
institutional arrangements (Dovers 2001, Symes 2006, Schlüter et al. 2009, Vatn 2009). 
Thus a critical question for transdisciplinary1 research relies on which institutional 
arrangements are to be promoted and implemented (Dovers 2001). 
The research presented here discusses the relation between sustainability and social 
institutions of one of the most important sources of food, income and livelihoods for the 
current human’s population: fisheries. Globally, fish provides more than 1.5 billion 
people with almost 20 percent of their average per capita intake of animal protein, and 
three billion people with at least 15 percent of such protein (FAO 2010). As a source of 
livelihood, it is estimated that capture fisheries and aquaculture employed 44.9 million 
people in 2008 and 520 million people relied on income from seafood production in 
2006 (Smith et al. 2012).  
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Despite the importance of fisheries for food security and global livelihoods, fisheries 
provide probably the most conspicuous example of the unsustainable exploitation of 
natural resources. Many of the world’s fisheries are in a deplorable state (Beddington et 
al. 2007, Jackson 2010). Revealing that the unpleasant fisheries trend is not necessarily 
hot from the oven, fisheries collapses (defined as a 90% reduction of a wild fish stock) 
have been the reason for the declining global fish catches since the late 1980s (Pauly et 
al. 2003); and nearly one in four fisheries collapsed during the period 1950–2000 
(Mullon et al. 2005). Furthermore, in contrast to the successes experienced by 
conservation efforts to maintain terrestrial biodiversity (Hoffmann et al. 2010), the 
number of fishery collapses has been stable over time since the 1950s showing no signs 
of improvement in the overall management of fisheries (Mullon et al. 2005) 2.
Fisheries collapses and the concomitant ecological, social and economic crisis are 
evidently a widespread problem, involving a variety of marine species, fisheries systems 
and geographical areas. Examples of fisheries collapses can be found for small-scale 
fisheries like the Chilean abalone fishery in South America (Leiva and Castilla 2001) 
and in larger industrial-scale fisheries like the Atlantic cod fishery off Newfoundland 
and Labrador (Hutchings and Myers 1994, Roy 1996) and the cod and haddock fishery 
of the North Sea (Holden 1991). It seems that factors identified as contributing to the 
unsustainability of diverse fisheries have, in almost all cases, similar origins and causes, 
which differ only in the various scales and degrees of importance in which they are 
considered and displayed (Bodiguel et al. 2002). 
There is some disagreement among fisheries scholars on how to confront the global 
fisheries crisis. Indeed, there is even disagreement on the current status of global fish 
stocks and general ocean health (Hilborn 2007a, Bromley 2008). As explained by 
Bromley (2008), on one side, a group of mostly marine ecologist led by Daniel Pauly 
and more recently Boris Worm; continually report on the poor status and distressing 
future of the world’s oceans and their ecosystem services. D. Pauly and his colleagues 
speculated provocatively that with continued trends of overfishing, only jellyfish and 
plankton would remain to be harvested in a near future (Stokstad 2009). B. Worm and 
co-authors predicted the global collapse of all taxa currently fished by the year 2048 
(Worm et al. 2006). This article was apparently the last straw that broke the camel’s 
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back. After Worm’s article, various scholars started to call for a more accurate and 
rigorous analysis of the condition of world’s fisheries (Hilborn 2007a). These scholars 
were mainly fisheries biologists (Bromley 2008), who claimed that the alarmists were 
careless and misguided (Hilborn 2007a). Worm’s article was so heavily condemned that 
he wrote a revised version of his study, in cooperation with his disagreeing colleagues 
(Stokstad 2009, Worm et al. 2009). More recently, Pauly’s article on decreasing mean 
trophic levels has also been reported to present methodological problems (Branch et al. 
2010).
In order to analyse the world’s ocean crisis, ecologists pay more attention to the status 
and conditions of marine ecosystems where fisheries play an important role whereas  
fisheries biologists concentrate in the status of exploited fish stocks and actively support 
data gathering and modelling (Bromley 2008). According to this author, despite their 
mutual distrust, in the intense debate between ecologists and fisheries biologists, the 
two groups seem to have at least one thing in common. Neither view disputes the 
responsibility of flawed management and governance for the current and foreseen 
worrying situation. As stated by Bromley both sides attribute the problem to “a lack of 
political will to make the difficult decisions concerning the extraction of biomass from 
the oceans” (Bromley 2008: 8). This difficult decision requires social coordination or 
governance (Kemp et al. 2005) and can only be carried through by governing the 
oceans, understood to mean “the purposeful effort to steer, control or manage (sectors or 
facets) of society”(Kooiman 1993:2). It is also about guiding and promoting behaviour, 
public and private, individual and collective, relative to an ocean area and the resources 
and activities contained therein (Cicin-Sain and Knecht 1998). How this behaviour is 
influenced is a matter of institutions. 
Thus fisheries collapses have recently been often attributed to institutional failure or the 
persistence of inappropriate institutional arrangements (Bodiguel et al. 2002, Hilborn et 
al. 2005, Hilborn 2007b, Loucks 2007, Spagnolo and Sabatella 2007, 2010). Under this 
premise, those fishermen who overexploit and deplete fish stocks are simply responding 
rationally to the “institutions” or “rules of the game” presented to them (De Alessi 
2008). One of the most common inappropriate economic institutional settings leading to 
unsustainable fisheries identified until now, is the problem of weak or absence of 
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property rights (Beddington et al. 2007, Grafton et al. 2007, Costello et al. 2008, 
Griffith 2008, Bromley 2009, Ostrom 2009a). As stated by De Alessi “property rights 
define who has the right to do what with a resource, including whether to exploit, 
conserve or deplete it” (De Alessi 2008:4). In the case of fisheries, established rules on 
who can access the fish at sea are commonly missing and almost everyone has the right 
to go out to sea, go fishing and make a profit from it. Fisheries exploitation is thus 
usually open access (FAO 1998, Arnason et al. 2009). In these situations Hannesson 
(2004:1) writes “fish accessible to anyone will be captured as quickly as possible by 
those who first discover them, for otherwise they will be taken by somebody else”. As a 
result, Hanneson explains, something that seems rational for each individual fisher (to 
take the largest amount of fish at the shortest time possible) could turn into a frantic 
battle for the resource, with critical consequences to the fishermen and to the ecosystem 
providing the fish (Hannesson 2004). This author continues arguing that when 
fishermen fish as fast as they can, big and small fish are caught at the same time. This 
mainly leads to two problems: First, juveniles who have never spawned are caught, 
reducing the ability of the fish stock to repopulate. Second, since fish grow and 
generally gain weight with age, if fishermen could wait rather than race for the fish, it 
would be more effective for them to capture a few older and bigger fish than many 
small fish. But without being sure whether restricting their fishing in the future will 
bring larger benefits, no one has an incentive to leave anything behind (Hannesson 
2008). In that sense, clearly defined property rights over fish stocks would appear to be 
one institution that is necessary for sustainability (Grafton et al. 2006, Anderson and 
Holliday 2007, Costello et al. 2008).  
Related to the problem of property rights, the national jurisdiction over fishing stocks 
has been identified as playing an important role in fisheries sustainability (Morris 2008). 
The lack of institutional fit between a fish population and its management authority 
seems to have contributed to the collapse of the Canadian northern cod (Hannesson 
2008) and to be the reason for the critical state of many highly migratory fish stocks like 
some tuna and tuna-like species and other small pelagics (Sullivan 1998, Munro et al. 
2004, Allen et al. 2010). In this case, however, it has been argued that, while the full 
allocation of fish stocks to a national economic jurisdiction is a necessary condition for 
sustainability, it is not sufficient in itself (Hannesson 2008). 
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Co-management, or the participation of interested parties (stakeholders) in the 
management of the fishery (Jentoft et al. 1998, Wilson et al. 2003, Jentoft 2004), 
together with adaptive management (Hilborn and Sibert 1988, Mahon et al. 2008), have 
also been identified as further institutions promoting sustainable fisheries. Co-
management entails the participation of stakeholders other than governmental managers 
in the process of management. It allows a more adequate definition of the situation and 
enables the coordination and development of more refined and robust management 
responses (Westley 1995, Ebbin 1998). Adaptive management responds to the fact that 
sustainable management systems are inevitably confronted to surprises and have to 
relate and adjust to a complex, non-linear and ever-changing environment (Sandström 
and Rova 2010).
The present research seeks to complement our understanding of the various social 
institutions governing a sustainable fishery in a developing country. The study takes a 
“broad institutional approach” (de la Torre-Castro and Lindström 2010). It analyses a 
range of institutions, including those mentioned above (property rights, national 
jurisdiction, co-and adaptive management), and some others that have rarely been 
considered by other institutional analyses of fisheries such us legal frameworks and 
coping strategies to deal with climatic events. The first article looks at the role and 
evolution of formal institutions and their relation to fisheries sustainability. Its main aim 
is to understand the purpose of fisheries law and to evaluate, how “rigid” institutions are 
able to co-exist with ever-changing adaptive management decisions and practices. The 
second article deals with informal institutions and with the connection between 
sustainability and adaptation to environmental variability and climate change. As shown 
here, the sustainability of the Peruvian fishery relies heavily on institutions developed to 
cope with environmental change. A set of eight adapting strategies are described, 
providing an example of how the fisheries sector and central government can act 
positively to reduce undesirable impacts of environmental change. This experience is 
relevant to other fisheries, and other resource regimes, that are already being affected by 
global environmental change. Expanding institutional analysis to address theoretical 
advances in the study of common property resources (CPR), the third article considers 
the extent to which institutional characteristics of the Peruvian fishery conform to 
design principles which are considered prerequisites for long-term successful 
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community-based CPR (Ostrom 1990, Cox et al. 2010). The third article deals with fish 
as a common pool resource; where it is difficult to exclude users, and exploitation by 
one user reduces the resource availability for others (Ostrom 1990). The article analyses 
the strengths and limitations of current and past institutional arrangements in the 
Peruvian anchovy fishery, and considers how these experiences can inform 
understanding of institutional arrangements that encourage sustainability in the 
management of CPR. 
1.1 Research rationale and limits of the research 
Rationale
This research is about governance institutions of a sustainable commercial fishery: the 
Peruvian anchovy fishery (Mondoux et al. 2008, Arias Schreiber 2012). Governance, 
while sometimes defined as “what governments do” (Paavola and Adger 2005:354), has 
a broader meaning in recent social research which goes beyond the actions and 
decisions of government. Governance is defined as “the process of steering or guiding 
societies toward collective outcomes that are socially desirable and away from those 
that are socially undesirable” (King et al. 2008:xxi). Governance in this sense involves 
interaction between a wide range of actors, including private enterprises, civic 
organisations, communities, political parties, universities, the media, and the general 
public (Chuenpagdee and Jentoft 2009). In this case, the sustainability of the anchovy 
fishery is the socially desirable collective outcome steered by the process of 
governance; this process of governance includes interactions between, among others, 
private fishing companies and the Peruvian government. 
Institution, is a contested concept, that in one of its earlier and wider definitions, dating 
back to the sixteenth century, is described as “an established law, custom, usage, 
practice, organization, or other element in the political or social life of a people” 
(Henningham 1995 cited by Connor and Dovers 2004:10). Institutions may be formal 
(laws) or informal (customary), local, national or global, political or economic (Dovers 
2001, Adger 2003). In this regard, the present research deals with (1) the role of 
fisheries law and the achievement of sustainable landings in the anchovy fisheries; (2) 
the practices of fishing companies and the governmental management authorities aimed 
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at maintaining fishery catches in the presence of environmental (biophysical) variability 
and extreme climatic events; and (3) a comparison between the “elements [in political 
and social life] or design principles” (Ostrom 1990:90) that govern sustainable 
management of fisheries at the community level and those elements that have 
contributed to the sustainability at a national level of the Peruvian commercial anchovy 
fishery. Along the present research, institutions are defined as: 
An institution is a persistent, reasonably predictable arrangement, law, process, 
custom or organisation structuring aspects of the political, social, cultural or 
economic transactions and relationships in a society. Although by definition 
persistent, institutions constantly evolve (Dovers 2001:5).
The motives for devoting a study to fisheries institutions in Peru are various. Above all, 
“when it comes to the sustainability of marine resources, institutions matter” (Morris 
2008:1). Institutions are relevant when we consider the realm of human-nature 
interactions, where the laws of nature are fixed and predetermined, and any attempt to 
influence the outcomes of these interactions must be translated in the reform of rules 
governing human behaviour and social harmony. In the words of the Brundtland report:
The real world of interlocked economic and ecological systems will not change; 
the policies and institutions concerned must (WCED 1987:9).
Bearing in mind their normative and cultural-cognitive aspects, institutions appear “as 
manifestations of values, influence agents’ preferences, choices and actions as well as 
aggregate economic and environmental outcomes” (Paavola and Adger 2005:360). To 
explore the sustainability of the Peruvian anchovy fishery as an aggregate outcome of 
the choices and actions of the actors involved is one important motivation of the present 
research.
Although there is general agreement that institutional change is essential for the 
sustainable management of natural resources, there is no consensus on which 
institutions will provide the more appropriate and desirable results (Acheson 2006). The 
case of marine resources is not an exception. For instance, based on Vatn (2009), the 
problem of sustainable use of natural resources and institutions arises from the 
interdependencies of human behaviour and choice in a pervasive physical world that is 
all interconnected. “Interdependencies of human behaviour and choice” refers to the 
- 8 - 
situation, specifically in relation to environmental issues, where any action performed 
by rational and selfish humans affects inevitably other human beings. According to 
Vatn (2009), humans affect other humans’ lives, acting in accordance with institutions 
that arbitrarily separate the interconnected natural system and the responsibilities for 
dealing with it. They act in accordance with institutions that tend to separate and define 
boundaries in ways that provide incentives for investment to generate economic growth. 
Vatn advocates a substantial transformation of the current ill-fitted institutional 
framework (Vatn 2009). This scholar states that the establishment of property rights to 
foster fisheries sustainability will not constitute a sufficient or a necessary institutional 
setting. With these statements, Vatn presents a rationality that goes against the 
institutional reform of fisheries that has most often been advocated during the last 
decade, namely: the establishment of property rights to overcome the overfishing 
problem (Costello et al. 2008, Bromley 2009). Following Vatn’s logic, as an alternative, 
networking has been suggested as a desirable integrative institution. Networking 
stimulates beneficial collective action, especially when linked with strategic 
development, common knowledge and the evolution of common rules (Carlsson and 
Sandström 2008, Crona and Hubacek 2010, Parsram and McConney 2011). However, 
networking is difficult to implement since its underlying principles are currently not 
sufficiently understood (Carlsson and Sandström 2006). In many cases, including all 
people in an area with an interest in the same resources into one organisation is not 
feasible (Rydin and Falleth 2006). These debates highlight the complexity of the issues, 
particularly for an interconnected global resource such as fisheries. Which institutions 
could provide the basis for a sustainable, globalized, and purely commercial fishery, 
which is also a de facto open access fishery? Some possible answers to this question 
will be explored in this research by looking at different current and historical 
institutional settings of the Peruvian anchovy fishery. 
Institutions that are nowadays strongly recommended to achieve sustainable fisheries, 
such as quota shares, decentralized bottom-up management or eco-labelling, have not 
been implemented in the sustainable Peruvian anchovy fishery. In contrast to the stress 
that is often placed on to the importance of property rights or governmental regimes 
(Acheson 2006, Bromley 2009, de la Torre-Castro and Lindström 2010), the present 
study suggests that the balance of interests between different actors, mediated through 
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institutions, is crucial to maintain fisheries management and sustainability. As 
mentioned previously, this study adopts a broad institutional approach. The first two 
articles stem from the premise that environmental institutional arrangements develop as 
responses to events occurring in the social (first article) and biophysical (second article) 
settings in which they operate (Young 2010a). The inherent complexity of fisheries 
systems requires parallel efforts to improve the science on which resource management 
is based and to develop institutions to manage resources in the face of unexpected 
change and uncertainty (Miller et al. 2010, Dankel et al. 2012). 
A second motivation for the present study was to engage with institutions as an area of 
scientific research and as a reality shaping individual and collective behaviour; in both 
senses, institutions are problematic. Not only is the number of institutions vast, they 
develop and interact in horizontal and vertical multi-level and cross-sectorial domains. 
The interest in environmental institutions has produced a significant body of 
interdisciplinary research on local and international level institutions mainly focusing 
on local common property arrangements and international conventions (Ostrom 1990, 
Young 1996, Walker et al. 2009, Cox et al. 2010, Young 2010b). In the field of local 
use of natural resources, this body of research has identified a number of “design 
principles” that characterise successful local level governance institutions (Ostrom 
1990). On the international level, interdisciplinary research encompassing economics, 
political science, sociology, and anthropology has demonstrated under what 
circumstances international environmental institutions are likely to be effective (Paavola 
and Adger 2005, Walker et al. 2009). However, there is relatively little research on 
national level environmental governance institutions (Paavola and Adger 2005), which 
interact with but cannot simply be scaled up or down from local or international 
governance levels. Blueprint solutions for local governance challenges cannot simply be 
scaled up; they are inevitably tied to and influenced by other levels and areas of 
governance (Ostrom 2007, 2009a). Similarly, international action against ozone layer 
destruction, deforestation or global climate change cannot simply be transferred 
downward to national policy strategies (Paavola and Adger 2005). Research on national 
level of environmental governance is limited and understanding of interactions between 
the levels and contexts of governance remains to be developed (Paavola and Adger 
2006).
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The present research places emphasis on social institutions operating on the national 
level. These not only constitute a field of considerable theoretical interest; research at 
this level is also essential in order to understand and identify institutional reforms at the 
nation/territory level. Institutions at the national level play a crucial role in setting the 
framework for local action (Lehtonen 2004) and structure the arena where policies are 
decided. At the national level, this research is not directly about fisheries policy; it is 
about institutions that have been proven to enable better policy and governance and the 
idea that both of these are mediated through institutions.
A third motivation for this study was to address an imbalance in research on fisheries 
institutions. Despite the fact that developing countries have contributed to more than 
two-thirds of global fish production during the last decade (The World Bank 2009), 
lessons for large-scale sustainable fisheries come even today almost exclusively from 
western developed countries (Murawski 2010). Furthermore, with a few exceptions 
(Iceland, Norway, New Zealand), this research comes from countries where fisheries do 
not play an important role in national economies (see Hilborn et al. 2005, Table 1). The 
bulk of fisheries research in developing countries has been reduced to the field of 
artisanal small-scale fisheries rather than commercial fisheries, ignoring the crucial 
economic contribution of the later to the economies of countries like Chile, Peru, India, 
Indonesia, Thailand, Namibia; to name but a few. 
Finally; landings of the Peruvian anchovy fishery account for nearly 10% of the total 
world’s ocean landings (Sánchez and Gallo 2009). Peruvian anchovy is the world’s 
most exploited fish in terms of volume (Bertrand et al. 2010) and its fishery has been 
described as the as the most intense and successful fishery worldwide (Chavez et al. 
2008). Given this reputation, a study of this fishery appears to be important in itself. 
Limits of the research
Considering the scale and scope of the subject matter, this thesis is inevitably 
constrained in what it can cover. The first constraint in this research relates to the term 
sustainability and its contested nature (Jamieson 1998, Davison 2008). It is a fact that 
“while nearly everyone favours sustainability, few agree on what the term actually 
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means” (De Alessi 2008:1). The attention here is on institutions concerned with the 
environmental dimension of sustainability or “biological sustainability”, rather than the 
social, cultural and economic dimensions. In this context, an “unsustainable situation 
occurs when a natural capital (the sum total of nature's resources) is used up faster than 
it can be replenished” (Younes and Rostamzadeh 2011:3476). Biological sustainability 
requires that resource users limit the exploitation of natural resources at or below a rate 
at which they can be replenished naturally. As stated by Hindson and co-authors: 
Fishing can be said to be sustainable when it can be carried out over the long-
term at an acceptable level of biological and economic productivity, without 
leading to ecological changes that reduce options for future generations 
(Hindson et al. 2005:10).
Limiting the scope of the present research to this dimension allows an effective measure 
of sustainability. The lack of such a measure can undermine research on broader-based 
sustainability of natural resources. Secondly, restraining the scope to landings 
sustainability responds to the fact that, at least in the case of fisheries resources, 
biological sustainability of targeted species, must precede (but not preclude) all other 
measures of sustainability (Acheson 2006, Beddington et al. 2007). Pelagic fish stocks 
however are largely driven by environmental variability which makes young fish 
recruitment fluctuate by at least more than one order of magnitude every year (Lehodey 
et al. 2006). Sustainable exploitation in this context means adapting the annual catch 
volume in accordance with environmental conditions and the activity and capacity of 
the fishing fleet to the size of the stock at each particular time (Hannesson 2008). 
Dealing with pelagic fish stocks, declining landings and biomass stock levels do not 
necessarily indicate unsustainable exploitation; on the contrary this could be a 
reasonable adjustment to adverse environmental conditions (Mullon et al. 2005). 
A second limitation of the present study is related to institutional change and interplay. 
Institutional change, viewed either as the spontaneous emergence of institutions through 
evolutionary processes or as the deliberate creation of institutions through power 
dynamics in the political process (Vatn 2005, Hodgson 2006, Kingston and Caballero 
2009), is considered in this research only implicitly. Prior to understanding how 
institutional change happens and how to achieve changes that will promote sustainable 
management of natural resources, there is a need to know what kinds of institutions 
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could be most appropriate to achieve this aim. The latter question is the focus of this 
study. Thus the two first articles of this research focus on the historical evolution of 
fisheries institutions in relation to changes in the social and biophysical environment. 
The third article reviews the institutional history of the Peruvian anchovy fishery in the 
light of current theory on the institutional characteristics of sustainably managed 
common property resources. Processes or drivers that might have affected the historical 
development of the present Peruvian fisheries institutional setting are not explained and 
cause-effect relations are only suggested. Further analysis will be required to explain the 
processes that led towards the institutional transitions described. Institutional interplay,
i.e. the situation by which the content, operation and outcome of one institution interact 
and are significantly affected by other institutional arrangements (Stokke 2000), is 
another topic not considered in the present study. 
1.2 Objectives 
This research work has the general objective: 
? to explore and broaden our current knowledge of governance institutions that 
support biological sustainability of commercial fisheries in developing countries 
The specific objectives are as follows: 
? to qualify some institutions commonly drawn in fisheries research to promote 
sustainable outcomes 
? to investigate both the role played by fisheries legislation and possible factors 
influencing its development 
? to explore the tension arising from the need for laws that simultaneously provide 
for rigour/stability and adaptability/flexibility in governance of natural resources 
? to investigate coping strategies developed by the Peruvian anchovy fishery to 
deal with environmental variability and extreme climatic events 
? to assess the extent to which design principles proposed by scholars of long-term 
successful management of community-level natural resources explain the recent 
sustainability of the Peruvian fishery 
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2. Theoretical framework 
The following section provides a brief and summarized picture of various topics related 
to institutional theory. It was designed to provide readers unfamiliar with the field of 
institutional research, with a short literature review, outlining the different ideas and 
concepts behind the term “institution”. Various historical roots of the term institution 
and the pool of current schools of thought that characterize institutional analysis are also 
reviewed. The different theories and views reported in sections (2.1-2.3) were compiled 
from available literature and are not based on the results of the present research. 
2.1 Theorizing institutions – a review 
Institutions keep society from falling apart, provided that there is 
something to keep institutions from falling apart. 
Jon Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences, Chapter 15. 
Tracking institutional theory and analysis over time could turn into a very long and 
arduous task. Institutional research can be dated back to the Greeks and the foundations 
of western philosophy. As stated by Steinmo (2008) institutional theory is as old as the 
study of politics, dating from Plato’s Republic comparing different forms of government 
and Aristotele’s Politics, examining institutional structures that shape political 
incentives and normative values.  
But despite a very long interest in the study of institutions, the use of the term has 
become widespread in recent years, reflecting the use of the institution concept in 
several social disciplines, including anthropology, economics, history and geography 
(Vatn 2005) and the growth in one particular field known as institutional economics 
(March and Olsen 1984, Hodgson 2006) 
The use of the term institution is becoming more common; it is nowadays used by 
academic and general public in ways that mean a range of different things. In scholarly 
contexts but also in everyday language, the term institutions is used to refer to objects as 
seemingly dissimilar as a constitution, table manners, a political party, firms and 
organizations or even “an older member of the community reliably seated at the bar of a 
local pub” (Connor and Dovers 2001:4). There is hence general confusion on what 
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exactly the term means; and many scholars have noted that, despite its popular use, even 
today there is no unanimity on the definition of this term (Ostrom 1986, Immergut 
1998, Jentoft 2004, Vatn 2005, Hodgson 2006). The lack of a sole definition for the 
term “institution” is by no means new. During the earlier decades of the last century, at 
least two different ways to define institutions were recognized. One approach treated 
institutions as things in themselves which should be studied as such, and the other 
classified institutions as phases of human behaviour to be discovered by the study of the 
habits and attitudes of individuals (Allport 1927).  
The confusion with the term institution could be either the source or the result of the 
widely different ways in which the term is used in different branches of social sciences. 
Some scholars for example, attribute the confusion about the term to the division 
between political scientists, who see institutions more like organizations, and those who 
see them as “rules”, more typically anthropologists, economists and sociologists 
(Bouma 1998, Lowndes 2001, Vatn 2005, Hodgson 2006, Leftwich and Sen 2010). To 
complicate things further, there is also a fundamental division among scholars who 
consider institutions as rules. Here, the division is between those who base their position 
on “individualist” or “social constructivist” ontologies (Vatn 2005). For the 
individualist position, institutions are rules which set up the parameters for human 
action aimed at maximizing individual benefits. Individuals are seen as fundamental 
building blocks, and collective action is just the aggregation of individual actions 
(Shepsle 1989). In contrast to this position, social constructivist supporters share the 
idea that institutions not only constrain behavior, but influence individual values, 
perceptions and believes (Copeland 2000).
But, the confusion about the concept of “institution” could have several sources. 
DiMaggio and Powell have argued:
Institutionalists varied in their relative emphasis on micro and macro features, 
in their weightings of cognitive and normative aspects of institutions, and in the 
importance they attribute to interests and relational networks in the creation 
and diffusion of institutions (DiMaggio and Powell 1991:1).
According to these authors, an institutional theory based on such different roots and 
interests cannot be expected to converge on a single set of assumptions or research 
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discipline. However, some scholars have attempted to combine at least the main 
different emphases related to the concept of institutions in one single definition; Scott, 
(Scott 2001:48; 1995:33) for example defines institutions as: 
…social structures that have attained a high degree of resilience [and are] 
composed of cultural-cognitive, normative, and regulative elements that, 
together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning 
to social life. 
As argued by Scott, many of the confusions about institutions stem from their varying 
emphasis on three principal pillars or elements: cultural-cognitive, normative and 
regulative (Scott 2001). According to this author, institutions are cultural because they 
influence the individual through social processes by means of symbolic representations; 
they are cognitive in that they provide fundamental frameworks for shaping individual 
perceptions and choices. This cultural-cognitive element is about creating order in the 
way the world is viewed and understood, to standardize aspirations and ideas (Scott 
2001). As Jentoft points out, cultural order means that “things are not questioned 
because they are perceived as true and self-explanatory” (Jentoft 2004:145). Cognitive 
order means that “knowledge defines what is valid, what is true or false” (de la Torre-
Castro and Lindström 2010:78). 
Box 1. The three phases in the process of institutionalization under the constructivist 
approach (from Vatn 2005:31) 
? Externalization: the process where subjectively constructed routines take form 
and are expressed. The routines are visible and the actors know their origin and 
can easily change them if found convenient. 
? Objectivation: when others observe the routine as existing “facts”. They have 
acquired an existence independent of those creating them and stand out as 
“things”. What individuals subjectively choose has become objectively real for 
others.
? Internalization: the stage where the habit becomes the “natural order”, distant 
from its origin as social construct. The process is also called “socialization”. 
The normative element rejects the conception by which actors are viewed solely as 
independent rational calculators (Scott 2001). Individual choices are not taken 
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exclusively because they should provide an optimal utility but are influenced by 
perceptions and internalized commitments. According to this scholar, social persons 
care about their relations to others; their decisions are constrained by what is socially 
accepted or rejected. Decisions are responsive to “the logic of appropriateness” (see 
March and Olsen 2006). More recently, Scott posits: “interests are framed and 
circumscribed by identities” (Scott 2010:6). The normative element gives meaning to a 
situation, determines individual goals and objectives (values) and determines what 
means are socially appropriate to pursue them (de la Torre-Castro and Lindström 2010). 
From a normative perspective, March and Olsen define institutions as: 
…collections of interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate actions 
in terms of relations between roles and situations. The process involves 
determining what the situation is, what role is being fulfilled, and what the 
obligation of that role in that situation is (March and Olsen 1989:16).
Focus on regulative elements directs our attention to the individual as an autonomous 
entity and to human choice as the act of optimizing individual benefits (Scott 2001). 
Institutions are regarded as the “rules of the game” that posit external “constraints” to 
individual calculations (see North 1990). Individuals who interact socially, have their 
own well ordered sets of preferences which remain largely unaffected by any 
institutional involvement (Peters 2000). The role of institutions to protect and produce 
interests and power is emphasized. From this viewpoint, institutions can be formal or 
informal and are more easily planned and strategically manipulated. Rules and 
regulations are backed up by monitoring and sanctioned power (Vatn 2005, de la Torre-
Castro and Lindström 2010).  
Considering the three pillars, and the connection or sequential order between them; 
Scott has recently remarked:  
Cultural-cognitive elements provide the bedrock for normative prescriptions and 
regulative controls, because norms and rules must refer to institutionally 
constituted entities. However, they are also capable by themselves of providing a 
framework for order (Scott 2010:7).
In an attempt to encapsulate particular functions and concepts of institutions in one 
single definition, Vatn (2005:60) presents a similar definition: 
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Institutions are the conventions, norms and legal rules of a society. They provide 
expectations, stability and meaning essential to human existence and 
coordination. Institutions regularize life, support values and protect and 
produce interests. 
There is certain equivalence between Scot’s three pillars and the conventions, norms 
and legal rules considered by Vatn. However, in Vatn’s argument, the sequential order 
between conventions, norms and rules is associated to distinct sanctioning mechanisms 
and the role of power. A convention, defined as “a rule saying how a thing is” (Vatn 
2006:2), does not need a sanctioning mechanisms for enforcement. Examples of 
conventions are the use of a certain language, the Google search engine, or shaking 
hands when people greet one another. According to Vatn (2005), conventions are used 
by people in everyday life without prior self-conscious analysis and adoption; they are 
essential tools for coordinating activities in a social unity. Conventions can be also 
understood as rules channelling shared strategies (see Crawford and Ostrom 1995). 
Vatn’s “norms” are similar to Scott’s “normative pillar” of institutions. A norm, “is a 
rule saying how things should be” (Vatn 2006:2). Examples of normative rules can be: 
“hands should be washed before dining”, or “small children should go to bed before 8 
pm”. Vatn argues that, norms do not need a sanctioning mechanism when they become 
an expected order and are not perceived as social constructs any longer. However, a 
norm is also sanctioned by a mother not allowing the child to eat before washing hands 
or the child feeling guilt when staying out of bed after 8 pm, or when lying to his 
mother (Vatn 2006). Regarding defence of interests, norms harmonize interests through 
forming common values, or common ideas on what is important to individuals of the 
same culture. As Vatn notes in continuation, when interests cannot be harmonized, a 
formally sanctioned rule should be applied to avoid potential conflicts. This type of 
rules are called legal rules and are characterized mainly by being always backed up by a 
sanction procedure (imprisonment, penalties, fines, etc) accomplished by a legal 
authority (Vatn 2005). 
The second sequential interaction between conventions, norms and legal rules is related 
to their role in power relations. The role of power increases substantially from a 
convention to a legal rule, and even conventions may be based on mechanisms to 
protect or assist interests (Vatn 2005, Vatn 2006). According to this author, as an 
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example, the choice of a monetary currency (for instance the Euro) is not just a neutral 
convention to coordinate human relations. Thus, it is important to acknowledge the 
various facets or levels of human interactions; while some of them concern mere 
coordination, others add meaning to a situation; some emphasize common interests, 
while others defend the interests of a certain individual or group (Vatn 2006). However, 
clear dividing lines between the meaning of conventions, norms and legal rules become 
blurred when considering the complex and different facets and levels of human 
interactions.  
Presenting an optimistic view of institutional theory, Hodgson (2006) argues that it is 
possible to arrive at a consensual definition of institutions. For this purpose, this author 
explains, overgeneralizations based on institutions of a particular kind must be avoided. 
Institutions may be defined as “systems of established and embedded prevalent social 
rules that structure social interactions” (Hodgson 2006:18). As this author notes in 
continuation, institutions are: socially transmitted (their replication depends upon the 
existence of a social culture and reciprocal communication), normative or potentially 
normative, codifiable at least within a social group, constrained by natural laws, and 
enlarged by technological and other institutional developments. According to Hodgson 
(2006), other characteristics of institutions are: 
? Institutions generate stable expectations in the behaviour of others; they depend 
upon thoughts and activities of individuals
? Institutions not only constrain but also enable innovation and opportunities 
? Institutions can be only observable through manifested behaviour (however they 
are not behaviour themselves). Institutions are thus subject to different 
interpretations of behaviour, leading to different “institutional approaches”  
? Organizations are special institutions with a hierarchical structure, defined 
boundaries, membership rules, procedures and reward structures
? Institutions are self-reinforcing and self-perpetuating 
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The new institutionalism
In contrast to the disagreement or confusion over the definition of “institution”, there is 
common agreement in reporting the resurgence of institutional research, that has been 
expanding since the 1960s and 70s. This noticeable recent interest in institutional 
research developed as a reaction to the behavioural revolution (behaviouralism) and 
rational choice theories that explain social and political outcomes as the aggregate 
consequence of individual choices (March and Olsen 1989, Shepsle 1989, Crawford and 
Ostrom 1995). As reported by (Shepsle 1989:134) “for behaviourists, institutions 
emerged out of the aggregation of individual roles, statuses and learned responses”. 
Similarly, for classical rational theorists, institutions were a collection of individual 
choices based upon utility-maximising decisions. The term “new institutionalism” was 
coined to differentiate the current institutional approaches that emerged in reaction to 
these views and mark the return to a less atomistic, traditional institutional analysis. 
Marking a crucial point in political science towards a new institutionalism, March and 
Olsen’s seminal article argued that “the organisation of political life makes a 
difference” (1984:747); and by 1996, Goodin and Kingemann (1996:25) were 
describing the new institutionalism movement as “the next revolution in political 
science” (see Lowndes 2001). But not all new institutionalism was divorced from the 
rational choice movement. It was Coase’s article from 1937 on “The Nature of the 
Firm”, that revealed costly market transactions, which provided the bridge between 
rational choice theories and the new institutionalism (Vatn 2006). Among the books 
most frequently referenced by proponents of this merger are E. Ostrom’s Governing the 
Commons and D. C. North’s Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic 
Perfomance, both first published in 1990 (Goodin and Kingemann 1996). Followers of 
this new institutional analysis field identified themselves as New Economic 
Institutionalists (NIE). 
As stated by Lowndes (2001:1953): 
The “new institutionalists” concern themselves with informal conventions as 
well as formal rules and structures; they pay attention to the way in which 
institutions embody values and power relationships; and they study not just the 
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impact of institutions upon behaviour, but the interaction between individuals 
and institutions. 
In this, there are several branches with diverse approaches being developed that follow 
the traditions of different social science disciplines (DiMaggio and Powell 1991, 
Koelble 1995, Lowndes 1996, Nielsen 2001). Koelble (1995) argues that at the heart of 
the disagreement between different approaches of new institutionalisms is one of the 
core questions of the social sciences: whether, structure, culture or individual behaviour 
best explains social phenomena and change. Structural influences are analysed by 
historical political institutionalism, cultural influences by sociological institutionalism, 
and the influence of individual behaviour by economic or rational choice 
institutionalism (Koelble 1995). DiMaggio (1998) (cited by Nielsen 2001) distinguishes 
three new institutionalisms: social-constructivist neoinstitutionalism (SCN), mediated-
conflict neoinstitutionalism (MCN) and rational-action neoinstitutionalism (RAN). 
Even though this typology transcends disciplinary boundaries, the three fields are seen 
as originating from political science, sociology, and, economics respectively (Nielsen 
2001).
Box 2. Based on diverse social disciplines, Peters (2000) differentiates between four 
major current new approaches to institutional analysis: 
? The sociological approach—following the normative pillar. Here the most 
suitable method to understand human behaviour is through the “logic of 
appropriateness” (March and Olsen 2006) that individuals acquire through 
their social context.  
? The rational choice approach—where institutions are arrangements of rules: the 
“rules of the game” (the regulative pillar). For rationalist scholars, the central 
goal is first to uncover the laws of political behaviour and action; once these 
laws are discovered, models to understand and predict political behaviour can 
be constructed (Steinmo 2001).  
? The historical institutionalism approach. As the name implies it, historical 
institutionalism is interested in unveiling the centrality of “path dependency” 
that shape and sustains political outcomes. Historical institutionalists stand 
between the normative and the rational choice views; they allege that individual 
behaviour depends on the individual, the context and the institution involved 
(Steinmo 2008)). They do not deny that individuals attempt to calculate their 
benefits, but argue that outcomes are the product of human interactions and 
institutional structures. Preferences are not fixed and are influenced by 
institutional contexts (Koelble 1995). However, historical institutionalists 
normally associate institutions with organizations, and the conventions 
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promulgated by then (Hall and Taylor 1996). Historical institutionalists are 
firstly interested in explaining a political outcome; and then proceed to explore 
alternative explanations for the observed outcomes; they are engaged in 
developing a deep and contextualized understanding of politics (Steinmo 2001). 
? The empirical institutionalism approach. This term is employed to describe “a 
body of literature that asks the deceptively simple question of whether 
institutions make any difference in policy choices, or in political stability” 
(Peters 2000:3). Criticized for their minimal contribution to institutional theory, 
empirical institutionalists pay less attention to the meaning of the term 
institution; institutions are important no matter what they particularly are. 
Governments, which are systems created to regulate, control and direct 
resources, interact with social demands through institutions. The view, stemmed 
from the rational choice institutionalism, that institutions are conceptualized as 
exogenous to the individual is shared by empirical institutionalists. Individual 
behaviour is based on the assortment of opportunities and constraints provided 
by the institutional structure, while human values remain independent from the 
institutional context.
The term “new institutional economics” (NIE) was coined by economist Oliver 
Williamson in 1975 based on the analytic tradition initiated by Coase in 1937 and 1960 
(Vatn 2006) and adopted among others by economic historians (North 1981), game 
theorists (Schotter 1981, Harsanyi and Selten 1988) and political economists (Ostrom 
1986). Despite the temporal adjective, “new” institutionalism is built upon some old 
assumptions concerning the human agent as the basic building block in economic theory 
(Hodgson 1998 cited by Olsson 1999:17). In contradiction to neoclassical models, (Vatn 
2006) observes:
a) NIE envisages human beings as multi-rational and the normative function of 
institutions (evaluating what is right or wrong) is a rational action comparable to 
the calculus of an individual gain. An actor’s behaviour is likely to be guided, not 
by impersonal historical drivers, but by a strategic calculus; this calculus will be 
also affected by the actor’s expectations about how others are likely to behave 
(Hall and Taylor 1996).
b) NIE considers that preferences and values, including the evaluation of what is 
efficient, are not stable or given; they are influenced by institutional contexts. 
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c) In consequence, outcomes are not in equilibrium; they are subject to constantly 
evolving institutional settings; institutional arrangements are viewed as “adaptive 
solutions to problems of opportunism, imperfect or asymmetric information and 
costly monitoring” (DiMaggio and Powell 1991:9).  
Thus NIE has added a strong and healthy dose of realism to the standard assumption of 
neoclassical microeconomic theory (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). NIE proponents 
believe that institutions matter, but consider that “the determinants of institutions are 
susceptible to analysis with the tools of economic theory” (Matthews 1986:903). 
What are then the functions of institutions? Institutions are structures facilitating 
exchange, creating expectations that reduce uncertainty and lower transaction and 
transformation costs (North 1990). Lin and Nugent (1995) claim that institutions have 
two basic functions: economizing and redistributing. Economizing refers to the notion 
that institutions reduce or “economize” transaction costs of interactions and exchanges 
between agents. In this case, transaction costs include the costs of negotiation over a 
contract, of getting information about exchange opportunities, of monitoring the 
contract, and the costs of enforcement when one participant attempts to desert (Lin and 
Nugent 1995). The authors explain that redistribution is more connected to the concept 
of fairness rather than efficiency. Institutions like democracies, proportional income 
taxation or charity to the poor, cause resources to be redistributed for the sake of 
attaining a higher level of equality and justice (Lin and Nugent 1995). 
A great deal of NIE research concentrates on topics like property rights, rent seeking 
and agency theory. Within this approach, institutions can be divided into formal 
(judicial, political and economic rules and contracts) or informal constrains (Hotimsky 
et al. 2006). A clear distinction must be also made between institutions, which are “the 
rules of the game”, and organizations, which are envisaged as “the players” (North 
1990). Finally, even if the differences between old and new institutionalism have been 
traditionally substantial, some scholars are suggesting a tendency to merge with 
consequential benefits for institutional analysis (see Schlüter et al. 2009, Abrutyn and 
Turner 2011). In the words of Olsson (1999:3): 
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The road ahead for institutional theory appears to be a synthesis between 
microeconomics and cognitive science, i.e. an institutional microeconomics, 
which recognizes the path-dependence and evolutionary aspects of human 
thinking.
2.2 Institutions, the environment and sustainability 
We have modified our environment so radically  
that we must now modify ourselves to exist in this new environment. 
Norbert Wiener 
This section summarises the results of a selection of up-to-date literature concerned 
with the relation between institutions and environmental issues. A set of influential 
perspectives on how institutions should address current environmental problems, 
between and within different institutional approaches is presented. The majority of ideas 
and analysis presented here are rooted in the institutional economics approach. This was 
not intentional. But such partiality could nevertheless be expected, considering that 
institutional economics perspectives have been particularly attractive for understanding 
environmental policy design and implementation (Paavola and Adger 2005, Paavola 
2007)
The principles of successful local common pool resource institutions - E. 
Ostrom
Political scientist Elinor Ostrom’s work on the connection between institutions, local 
level environmental governance and policing is a pioneer and influential work. As 
mentioned by Ostrom, her work was underpinned by her “deep interest in how 
institutions were initially crafted and then how they affected the incentives and outcome 
of human interactions” (Ostrom 2010:2). Rooted in new institutional economics, 
Ostrom’s theoretical framework sees institutions as rules3. Ostrom defined seven broad 
types of rules that affected the working parts of an “action situation” (see Ostrom 1986). 
Soon after, being strongly influenced by the work of John R. Commons, Ostrom 
realized that the distinguishing characteristic of rules was whether they defined an 
action or an event to be required, forbidden or permitted. (Ostrom 1986). To overcome 
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the confusing and overlapping definitions of term like “rules”, “norm” and “strategies”, 
Crawford and Ostrom (1995) developed what the authors called a cumulative syntax for 
a common foundation of institutional analysis. In 1995, their article: “A grammar of 
institutions” was published. Ostrom’s definition of institutions is presented here as 
“enduring regularities of human action in a situation structured by rules, norms and 
strategies as well as by the physical world” (Crawford and Ostrom 1995:582).  
The book “Governing the Commons” is undoubtedly Elinor Ostrom’s first masterpiece. 
Through a comparative analysis of empirically derived characteristics of long-enduring 
common-pool resources (CPR), a conceptual extension of the concept of property rights 
was suggested and the “eight design principles” were introduced. Property rights were 
understood as “bundles of rights” within a hierarchy of possible rights; while the 
“design principles” were not specific rules but general institutional regularities that 
characterised successful local common property regimes (Ostrom 1990). Ostrom’s 
efforts showed that institutions did not only determine the way societies use their 
common natural resources; but that some of them are more effective (and some more 
detrimental) in terms of achieving desirable collective outcomes.  
More recent developments of Ostrom’s work involving various governance systems, 
and their effects on the sustainability of natural resources are presented in one of her 
latest productions: “A general framework for analyzing sustainability of social-
ecological systems (SES)4”. Ostrom argues here that science’s inability to understand 
the deterioration of natural resources is due to the incompatibility of the various 
concepts and languages used by different disciplines; and that “without a common 
framework to organize findings, isolated knowledge does not cumulate” and its efforts 
are diluted (Ostrom 2009b:419). In response to this need, this author presents an 
updated version of a multilevel, nested framework that identifies 10 subsystem variables 
which affect the likelihood of self-organization leading to sustainable outcomes in the 
management of SES. The widespread use of this framework should assist the general 
scientific community to develop better theories to confront environmental issues 
(Ostrom 2009b). In dealing with environmental policies, Ostrom also calls for the 
development of more complex approaches and criticizes “one-size-fits-all” institutional 
prescriptions (Ostrom et al. 2007, Ostrom 2008). In the author’s words:  
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I suggest that institutional theorists move from touting simple, optimal solutions 
to analysing adaptive, multi-level governance as related to complex, evolving 
resource systems (Ostrom 2008:24).
Environmental governance, conflict and interdependence - J. Paavola, O. 
Young and A. Vatn 
Linking institutional economics with ecological economics5 Paavola and Adger (2005), 
identify the concepts of “interdependence” and “positive transaction costs” as crucial 
for environmental governance. “Interdependence” refer to situations in which the choice 
of one individual influences that of another. According to these authors, attributes of 
resources that create interdependence divide goods into four main types known as: 
private good, common pool resources, toll goods and pure public goods. However 
attributes of resource users such as their number, heterogeneity and level of social 
capital should be also considered as additional sources of interdependence. As a result 
of their analysis of interdependencies, the authors argue that environmental solutions 
should consider attributes of both, i.e. on one hand the resources, and on the other their 
users. Furthermore, “when interdependence is complex, governance may need to be 
carried out at multiple levels or through multiple, overlapping governance institutions” 
(Paavola and Adjer 2005:357). Following this analysis, the authors explain that conflicts 
arise when interdependent agents cannot realise their incompatible interests in a world 
of scarce environmental resources. In such situations, conflict must be resolved through 
institutions, firstly by defining (or re-defining) initial endowments; and secondly, by 
specifying clear property rights or alternatively, by using environmental regulations 
which create other kinds of rights (Paavola and Adger 2005). Thus governance 
institutions have both allocative and distributive functions; they affirm or redefine initial 
endowments, and these are the key variables in environmental decisions (Paavola and 
Adger 2005). Furthermore, these authors argue that interdependence underlies the 
importance of social justice in environmental decisions (e.g. the need to consider losses 
both for present and future resources users), and of intra - and inter-generational equity 
within the sustainability discourse. Regarding positive transaction costs6, Paavola and 
Adger (2005) explain that transaction costs, which in environmental governance 
typically involve administrative costs, exist because information is imperfect and costly 
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to obtain. Their central significance has more implications in the process of institutional 
design.
J. Paavola (2007) acknowledges that new institutional approaches to tackle 
environmental governance have been extraordinarily successful in terms of academic 
research and policy impact. However he argues that multilevel features of governance 
have not yet been fully considered. Institutional analysis still has problems dealing with 
traditional national policies based on the enforcement of power of the state in 
conjunction with solutions based on voluntary cooperation (Paavola 2007). Considering 
what has been achieved by the study of common pool resources, J. Paavola calls for this 
analysis to be extended to other kinds of environmental resources. Paavola defines 
environmental governance as “the establishment, reaffirmation or change of institutions 
to resolve conflicts over environmental resources”, in which the power of the state is 
inevitably present (Paavola 2007:94). He analyses the role of the state; however, 
drawing attention to a common misinterpretation of the term “governance”, insists that 
“rather than a monolithic external actor, the government, and the state, should be 
understood as arenas and instruments of collective action, which are often pertinent in 
environmental governance” (Paavola 2007:95). Thus formal and state-centred 
environmental governance are a sort of collective ownership. This scholar further notes 
that design of governance institutions should be based on (i) functional and structural 
tiers, (ii) organization of governance functions; and (iii) formulation of key institutional 
rules (Paavola 2007). 
According to King and Young et al. (2008:1) “institutions have been critical forces in 
shaping real world environmental governance systems, and therefore are significant not 
only for scientific but also for policy advances”. The sustainable use of renewable 
resources is hence a consequence of the operation of systems of property or use rights 
that fail to give human users adequate incentives to devote energy and resources to 
conserve the natural environment. Consequently, strategies aimed at solving 
environmental problems frequently call for changes in prevailing structures of property 
rights, the introduction of new regulatory regimes, or the development of appropriate 
incentive mechanisms (e.g. charges or tradable permits) (King et al. 2008). For these 
authors, institutional change is needed to redirect the behaviour of those whose actions 
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lead to irreversible anthropogenic disturbances in natural systems. Following the 
regulative approach, institutions are defined by Young as: 
…sets of rules, decision-making procedures and programmes that define social 
practices, assign roles to the participants in this practices, and guide 
interactions among the occupants of relevant roles (Young 2002:5).
Institutions that deal explicitly with environmental or resource issues are commonly 
identified as environmental or “resource regimes”7, Exploring the dynamics and 
evaluating the problems associated with changing prevailing institutions, Young and co-
authors establish that institutional effects are nonlinear, that utilitarian and normative 
motivations work simultaneously and that institutional interplay and fit both have to be 
considered (King et al. 2008). Further conclusions in Young’s work are that:
(a) Institutional performance can be assessed through criteria like efficiency, 
equity and sustainability;
(b) Institutional design should be problem-oriented at levels that are identified 
through a political framing process, a process that itself changes the nature 
of the problem; and  
(c) Science and policy interfaces (gaps) must be always taken into account.  
For institutional economist Arild Vatn, environmental institutions “define the 
conventions, norms and legal rules that structure the relationships between people 
concerning their access to and use of resources” (Vatn 2006:8). This author argues that 
“institutions play a core role, not least in influencing how we perceive and use 
environmental resources but also how we are allowed and not allowed to intervene into 
each others’ lives” (Vatn 2006:1). Similarly to Young, this author advocates a 
“substantial reorientation of governing economic institutions to solve current and 
increasingly pressing environmental problems” (Vatn 2005:21). However, other crucial 
factors influencing environmental issues like population pressure, the science-policy 
interface or poverty should also be simultaneously addressed (Vatn 2009). 
Economist Vatn argues that, interconnectedness is an inherent characteristic of natural 
systems and it secures their quality and productivity. Due to this interconnectedness, the 
use of one natural resource necessarily influences other natural resources. Externalities 
- 28 - 
from economic activity are a product of the relationship, or lack of relationship, 
between the resource and the resource regime chosen (Vatn 2005). Vatn emphasises the 
need to evaluate the relation between resource characteristics and choice of policy 
regime to achieve compatibility between individual and collective rationality. To solve 
collective action problems, e.g. the “tragedy” resulting from open access, one possibility 
is to change the regime to common property among the people who use the resources 
(Vatn 2006). 
Vatn places emphasis on the need to adapt resource regimes to the attributes of the 
resource and the values of resource users; the idea that there is one institutional form 
that is the best solution to any problem is not only wrong, but damps creativity and 
reflection. This does not imply that institutional analysis is useless; on the contrary, it 
makes analysis of the resource attributes, the cultural views of participants and the rules 
themselves more important, since it is their complex interactions which determine the 
chances for a sustainable future (Vatn 2005). 
In his book chapter “Institutions, sustainability and behaviour” Vatn (2009) emphasizes 
the problem of economic growth whit sustainable development. The role of institutions 
here should be to address interdependencies between human actions rather than to 
continue creating nominal independencies (property rights) to promote investments and 
economic growth. From his perspective “sustainability demands a shift away from 
institutions exclusively fostering individual rationality towards those supporting 
cooperative rationality” (Vatn 2009:293). Here, environmental problems are a result of 
the ill-fitted institutional system that has evolved disrespectful of the interlinked 
environmental dynamics on which the economy so fundamentally rests. The prevailing 
institutional system has, in contrast to the environmental system, predominately a de-
linking function, that is, it divides up decisions and assigns nominal responsibilities that 
cut across interlinked structures in the real world (Vatn 2009). Thus “there is a 
fundamental inconsistency between our economic institutions demanding for growth 
and the demands for sustaining environmental and even to some extent social 
opportunities” (Vatn 2009:295). 
- 29 - 
Part of the problem, Vatn (2009) argues, is also the incomplete information humans 
have about the dynamic laws of the natural system. With complete information about 
the natural system, humans could impact this system avoiding unforeseen outcomes and 
increasing their opportunities in the short run. Vatn (2009:297-298) explains that 
current de-linking institutions promote “separation in space – creating high transaction 
costs”, “separation in interests” and “separation in time – when the consequences in the 
physical world become evident”. This scholar proposes two fundamental changes in the 
economic system: First, changing the operating principles of “the firm” as the basic unit 
of the economy; and second, building a communication channel between the new units 
at different levels to link their decisions and avoid undesirable impacts. Finally, Vatn 
(2009) asserts that the way to attain these reforms could be by reducing the power of 
corporations embedding them within social-political structures built on social 
rationality; or by institute social rationality between the firms themselves.  
No panaceas and the empowerment of concerned authors - J. Acheson 
and D. Bromley 
From a more anthropological perspective, Acheson (2006) argues that in the field of 
environmental conflict analysis, economic incentives (i.e. property rights) and central 
government control are both misleading institutional prescriptions that will prompt 
failure under certain conditions. Based on a range of different case studies, this scholar 
also shows that anthropological directives for local-level management are equally 
susceptible to failure. As a consequence of this analysis, Acheson concludes that in the 
field of natural resources management, there is no universal solution and that the precise 
combination of measures undertaken will have to vary with the specific resource 
concerned (Acheson 2006). This scholar also points to the fact that failures of resource 
management cannot be attributed to one or two factors but to a complex system of 
factors. Similar to J. Paavola, Acheson argues that rules to manage resources and the 
enforcement of those rules should be considered as public goods. In this case, resources 
and resource management are usually (but not necessarily) more easily handled when 
put in place by central governments (Acheson 2006). 
- 30 - 
Analysing current problems in environmental regulations, Bromley (2007) discusses 
two essential modifications needed to transform environmental institutions into a 
framework that is consistent with the imperatives of sustainability: First, environmental 
policy must be rescued from the “the tyranny of hubristic precision inherent in 
scientism8” (Bromley 2007:680). Second, environmental policy must be freed from the 
flawed demarcationist project that regards the economy as something distinct from the 
polity” (Bromley 2007). To alleviate the increasing environmental crisis, Bromley calls 
for a return to the original basic principles of societies, where collective problems are 
discussed and solved by authorities together with the concerned actors. This author 
remarks: 
Rescuing environmental policy requires that prescriptive conceit must now give 
way to public discourse, debate and the offering of reasons. Achieving 
sustainability in environmental policy reminds us that sustainability concerns 
human processes, not biological or ecological processes (Bromley 2007:681). 
2.3 Institutions and sustainable fisheries 
The fishermen find the practice as repugnant as Dr. Safina does, but, in spite of the fact  
that none of them (that we know of) are Ph.D.s, they are trying to do something positive to end it.
from the New York Times, April 14, 1998 
As in the case of the global crisis of resource degradation, the overexploitation of 
fisheries resources during the last decades has been often attributed to institutional 
failure. Phrases like “only through better governance and institutional change that 
encompasses the public good of the oceans and societal values will fisheries be 
sustainable” (Grafton et al. 2008:630) or “when it comes to sustainability of marine 
resources, institutions matter” (Morris 2008:1) are found more and more commonly 
within the fisheries literature. 
First attempts to explain the connection between sustainable fisheries and institutions 
were however vague and recommended courses of action often at a level of generality 
that stopped far short of practicability. Example of recommended course of actions that 
leave out all details of how to achieve the stated goals include advice to build 
institutions that allow the implementation of required fisheries management by 
legitimate authorities; and to reformulate institutions to decrease market pressures on 
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fishery resources (see Bodiguel et al. 2002). The same criticism could be made of 
Hilborn and collaborator’s article, where key issues for the successful management of 
marine resources are identified (Hilborn et al. 2005). These authors conclude that 
sustainable fisheries will be achieved with:  
…the establishment of appropriate institutions for governance that include a 
reward system, so that the individual welfare of fishermen, managers and 
scientists is maximized by actions that contribute to a societally desirable 
outcome (Hilborn et al. 2005:47). 
Over the last decades, empirical research on fisheries management has produced a large 
body of literature on what is indispensable for achieving fisheries sustainability. A 
recent review by the School of Management at the University of Ottawa in Canada lists 
at least fifty academic articles and reviews related to best practices in fisheries 
management published during the last two decades (see http://www.c-
foam.management.uottawa.ca/index.html). Despite this development, and “although 
experience is obviously the guide” (Powles 2008:5), case studies based on successful 
fisheries histories are still relatively rare. Furthermore, most research emphasises a 
specific aspect (or perhaps two) of fisheries management, despite almost universal 
agreement that success in fisheries management requires success on several dimensions 
(Pitcher and Preikshot 2001, Fujita et al. 2010, Gutierrez et al. 2011). Based on case 
studies of non-successful fisheries analyzed at meetings organized by FAO over the last 
decade, the unsustainability of fisheries has been attributed to seven main factors 
(Pitcher and Preikshot 2001, Caddy and Seijo 2005, Swan and Grevobal 2006):
(i) lack of solid governance structures 
(ii) partial knowledge of marine ecosystems 
(iii) the uncertainties associated with fisheries as complex systems 
(iv) inadequate incentives for sustainable resource use and subsidies that promote 
overcapacity
(v) stock fluctuations due to natural drivers and dynamics 
(vi) growing demand for limited fish resources 
(vii) poverty and lack of choices 
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Derived from FAO recommendations and other fisheries literature, best management 
fisheries practices include (1) the use of an ecosystem approach to fisheries, (2) the use 
of the precautionary approach, (3) adaptive management (4) proper incentives or user 
rights; and (5) participatory co-management.  
According to Charles (2001), fisheries conflicts and policies reflect tensions between 
three basic worldviews: conservation, rationalisation and social/community paradigms. 
The five principles for best management fisheries could be located in the three 
paradigms: the ecosystem and precautionary approaches and adaptive management 
correspond to the conservation paradigm, based on recognition of the dependence of 
fisheries on the state of fish stocks and its environment. Proper incentives and user 
rights belong to the rationalisation paradigm, based on the idea of rationalising 
economic performance, productivity and wealth created in fisheries. Co-management is 
based on the social/community paradigm and refers to the welfare of fisheries 
communities, their cultures, values norms and public policy debates. The three 
paradigms establish frameworks for proper fisheries management, and sustainability can 
be reached more easily if there is a balance between these three policy directions 
(Charles 2001). 
Complementary to these views, the well-known article by Beddington et al. (2007) 
identifies key instruments for successful fisheries management, including a competent 
and legitimate management authority, a formally adopted management plan or strategy 
with predefined adaptive rules, and incentives based on fishers’ rights and accesses. 
These authors note that “evidently it is currently recognized that fishery tools for 
appropriate management exist; unfortunately, they have not been implemented widely” 
(Beddington et al. 2007:1713); or in the words of Hauge et al.(2010:5): 
In fisheries management, the problem has, in general, not been not knowing 
[sic] what needs to be done in a technical sense. Rather, the problem has not 
known how to build the institutions that make people willing or able to 
implement the necessary measures. 
Some of those who agree with these statements (see Bromley 2009), focus on the 
challenges derived from changing institutional structures in general (Morris 2008) and 
consequently, from an economic viewpoint, see the problem as the result of a 
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transaction costs dilemma. Morris (2008) mentioning De Alessi’s arguments, explains 
the failure to implement adequate management tools as the result of: 
…the lack of acceptance by many of those with influence, specially in the realms 
of fisheries science, of the important role played by the institutions governing 
marine resources, combined with a bias on the part of government officials in 
favour of scientific management of fisheries (Morris 2008:1).
But in fact, even economists, who strongly emphasize the need to restrict unregulated 
access and create incentives to avoid fishery collapses, have to recognize that 
difficulties may arise in applying pre-determined formulas (Jentoft et al. 1998, Ostrom 
2007, de la Torre-Castro and Lindström 2010). While most fisheries scientists 
acknowledge that promising outcomes can be achieved through applying prescribed 
tools for institutional reform, empirical evidence suggests that these alone cannot 
guarantee fisheries sustainability (Ostrom 2008, Powles 2008). 
A vivid example of the current state of affairs in the field of institutional reforms for the 
improvement of fisheries management is the debate about the use of fishing rights in the 
form of individual fishing quotas (IFQs). This consists of an application of rights-based 
management, as a regulatory tool in order to prevent overcapitalization and economic 
inefficiency (see Bromley 2009). Depending on the prioritised objectives for the fishery, 
the system of IFQs can take various forms, including individual or community quotas, 
transferable or non transferable quotas for a limited or unlimited period, etc. In all their 
variants, IFQs provide and allocate the rights holder a certain share of the fishery catch 
quota. While it has been shown that IFQs can smooth the transition to a lower fishing 
capacity, the relationship between IFQs and the achievement of conservation objectives 
remains suggestive but unproven (Gibbs 2008). Iceland, for instance, was among the 
very first countries that introduced IFQs for its fisheries. This IFQ system has led to 
substantial increases in the economic efficiency of Iceland’s fisheries (Arnason 2005, 
2008), but also to quota concentrations, causing a biased distribution of wealth and 
marginalising fisheries-dependent coastal communities (Pálsson 1995). Alongside the 
acknowledged benefits from implementing IFQ systems, it is nowadays recognized that 
“IFQs have often the consequence of driving small fisherman out of business and 
concentrating the wealth in the hands of a few, large companies” (Arnason et al. 
2009:12). Bromley (2009) is strongly critical of the ideas that the use of IFQs will 
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produce a setting in which fishing firms become exemplary stewards and efficient, 
fishery incomes are maximized and society is better off. He argues that “those who offer 
this utopian vision are themselves confused about the necessary concepts they deploy to 
support their optimistic allegories” (Bromley 2009:280). 
A further controversial proposal to achieve fisheries sustainability is eco-labelling. Eco-
labelling was originally defined simply as “making relevant environmental information 
available to appropriate consumers” (U.S. EPA 1993 citaed by Wessells et al. 2001:3). 
Eco-labels are conferred on fishery products that are deemed to entail fewer negative 
impacts on the environment than functionally or competitively similar products (Deere 
1999), with the aim of mitigating the undesirable effects of unregulated markets on 
fisheries. Eco-labels are intended to induce fishermen and fisheries’ managers to 
comply with prescribed codes of practice in line with sustainable principles (Wessells et 
al. 2001).
Empirical research has shown that developing countries and small-scale fisheries have 
been marginalized by eco-labelling schemes. In the South African hake fishery, eco-
labelling stirred up internal divisions among the fishermen and entrenched the interests 
of the two large companies that dominated the industry (Ponte 2008). 
In overall terms, the current situation regarding institutions for sustainable fisheries is 
similar to that of institutions and policies to promote economic growth as described by 
Dixit (2007): 
There is no shortage of academic research that identifies institutions and 
policies to promote economic growth and development …the trouble is that for 
every paper that endorses one kind of institution or policy, one finds another 
that makes precisely the opposite claim. Each is written by a prominent 
economist, and contains impressive arguments and evidence to support the 
recommendation being made (Dixit 2007:137).
However, Hauge et al. (2010) present a list of difficulties that impede the 
implementation of appropriate economic institutions and suggest that these are 
responsible for the inability of the world’s fisheries to attain sustainability. Presenting a 
rather pessimistic view these authors state:  
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Unfortunately, the nature of fisheries as a common pool resource makes 
devising an effective governance regime particularly difficult, and thus 
increases the probability that some of the systemic risks associated with 
overfishing may eventuate (Hauge et al. 2010:4).
Box 3. Concerns with eco-labelling raised mostly from developing countries (from 
Gardiner and Viswanathan 2004:4). 
(1) the lack of both transparency and participation by local resource users in the 
development of product standards;
(2) the potential use of eco-labels by developed countries to protect domestic 
industries, restrict market access and erode the national competitiveness of those 
less able to meet foreign labelling and certification standards;
(3) fear of high costs of compliance with transnational or foreign eco-labelling 
schemes;
(4) the existence of institutional factors that may preclude developing countries 
from being sufficiently organized to institute effective, independent management 
schemes that comply with certification criteria; and
(5) the potential that criteria for certification schemes could have undesirable 
impacts on countries with differing environmental and socio-economic conditions 
and interests—especially given the wide gaps in income and in environmental 
conditions between developed and developing countries. 
As a reaction to the pragmatic rational choice approaches linked to common-pool 
resource analysis that have dominated the fisheries management literature, Jentoft 
(2004) and De la Torre Castro and Lindström (2010) have suggested a new approach 
that may be called “a broad institutional approach”. These authors emphasize the 
normative and cultural-cognitive aspects that influence complex human-nature 
dynamics for the development of institutional arrangements that have the potential to 
lead to sustainability. Institutional analysis based on a broad institutional approach 
“seeks to understand institutions as complex and multifaceted, shaping different 
behavioural outcomes, as well as being shaped and re-shaped by everyday human 
practice” (de la Torre-Castro and Lindström 2010:77). The ignorance of cultural 
settings could explain some failures of institutions such as co-management, that have 
been successful in other settings, in fisheries management (Jentoft et al. 1998). On the 
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other hand, top-down regulations, despite their general importance, are insufficient to 
promote sound management if they are not backed up by norms and cultural-cognitive 
institutions (de la Torre-Castro and Lindström 2010). Similarly, historical and socio-
political contexts in fisheries (Evans 2009, Fidelman et al. 2012) and local culture, 
including myths and taboos, have also been schown to have important implications on 
how marine institutions function (Phillips et al. 2002, Glaser et al. 2011). 
Box 4. Difficulties that are responsible for the unsustainable use of fishing resources 
(from Hauge et al. 2010:4): 
? The number of stakeholders involved in managing fish stocks is usually very 
large, with stakeholders sometimes being far apart geographically. This makes 
cooperation, agreeing on and enforcing rules, more difficult. 
? The size and carrying capacity of the resource system (the oceans) is extremely 
large. The larger the size of a commons, the more complicated it is to implement 
and enforce regulations. 
? Many fish and marine animals migrate over large distances. Fish stocks often do 
not remain within the jurisdiction of any one state. This means that clearly 
defined property rights cannot be easily assigned to all fish stocks. 
? The rates of regeneration of fish stocks vary. Therefore the type of governance 
regime required will depend on the type of fish stock in question, plus other 
local environmental factors; environmental factors and natural oscillations also 
affect the size of fish populations. Exogenous factors may cause fish populations 
to decline or fisheries to collapse because they influence the survival rate of 
offspring. These need to be identified and taken into account by any 
management regime, but it is difficult to do so. 
? Fishing technologies affect ecosystems in different ways. The type of ecosystem, 
how fish species assemble and mix plus the type of fishing technology employed 
all need to be taken into account in determining the best governance regime to 
promote the sustainability of fish stocks; 
? Fish stocks can be hard to measure and assess accurately. Inaccurate 
measurement of stocks can lead to catch quotas being set too high, compared to 
precautionary means, or too low, compared to what is acceptable for the 
fishermen. Discards and/or illegal fishing in several fisheries invalidate data 
and assessments. 
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2.4 Institutions and the sustainability of the Peruvian fishery 
“…sepa Usted., Sr Ministro, que a los empresarios pesqueros  
de tanto vivir en el mar, nos han crecido agallas”9
Luis Banchero Rossi 
The following sections provide an overview of the Peruvian anchovy fishery and its 
institutions that are analysed in detail in the three research papers of this thesis.  
2.4.1 Overview of the Peruvian fishery 
Peru is one of the major fishing countries in the world and provides more than 7% of 
total world fish catches (FAO 2010). Fishery in Peru is, after mining, the second most 
important economic sector in terms of foreign currency revenue. In 2010, fisheries 
contributed to 7.2 % of the Peru’s total exports valued at US $2.7 billion. The high 
production of fish in this region is due to the cold and nutrient rich waters of the 
Humboldt Current which is a major Eastern Boundary Upwelling Ecosystem (Bakun 
and Weeks 2008, Chavez et al. 2008, Montecino and Lange 2009) 
Marine fisheries in Peru take place all along almost 3100 km of coastline. The country 
has one of the longest archaeological fisheries records in South America (Reitz 2001, 
Bakun and Weeks 2008, Chavez et al. 2008). Data recorded from archaeological 
remains, prove that a fisheries tradition has been present in the area since at least 10,000 
years ago and that the diet of prehistoric Peruvian coastal communities relied heavily on 
marine products (Keefer et al. 1998, Sandweiss et al. 1998, deFrance et al. 2001, Reitz 
2001, Sandweiss et al. 2008). 
The fisheries sector in Peru currently includes marine and inland fisheries, and 
aquaculture. According to Peruvian law, the marine fishery sector is divided in two sub-
sectors: the industrial or large-scale and the artisanal or small-scale fishery. Any fishing 
vessel with more than 32.6 m3 of holding capacity belongs to the large-scale fishery. 
Fishermen who work for the artisanal sub-sector do not possess a fishing vessel or their 
vessel is less than 15 m in length and its holding capacity is less than 32.6 m3. Based on 
data from 2006, the large-scale or industrial fleet is made up of 1302 licensed vessels, 
representing a total holding capacity of 222,264 m3. The artisanal fishery is comprised 
of 5,950 vessels with a total holding capacity of 45,570 m3 and 24,150 registered fishers 
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(Sánchez and Gallo 2009). Both fishing fleets operate in an area along the northeast 
south Pacific between Lat. 4° and 19° south and within the Peruvian Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ). The industrial fishery targets pelagic and demersal fish while 
the artisanal sector targets diverse coastal fish and invertebrates (Table 1).
With the exception of 2010, when pelagic catches where negatively affected by intense 
warming of the local fishing areas, between 2002 and 2010 the industrial Peruvian 
pelagic fishery has accounted for 85 to 93 % of the country’s total marine landings. This 
pelagic fishery is mono-specific (Bertrand et al. 2008, Checkley et al. 2009), as 99% of 
the catches consist of only one species, the Peruvian anchovy or “anchoveta” (Engraulis
ringens).
The anchovy fishery 
The Peruvian anchovy fishery has been described as the largest fishery that has ever 
existed on earth (Bakun and Weeks 2008, Aranda 2009b) and as the most intense and 
successful fishery worldwide (Chavez et al. 2008). Historical landings statistics show 
that the fishery started during the mid 1950s and that catches over the years have 
fluctuated between 22,000 tonnes in 1983 to more than 11 million tonnes in 1971 and 
1994. Current annual catches are around 7 to 8 million tonnes (Barange et al. 2009).
The anchovy fishing fleet has the capacity to land in three days what fishing fleets from 
countries like Colombia, Germany, Australia, Panama, Poland and Sweden usually land 
in one year. The amount of anchovy landed daily during the first expansion of the 
fishery along the 1960s is unfortunately unknown (see Castillo and Mendo 1987), but 
on 16 November 2005, around thousand fishing vessels broke a new record in this 
fishery with almost 120 thousand tonnes landed in one day (Ñiquen and Freon 2006). 
Peruvian anchovy is a small, short-lived, fast growing surface dweller widely 
distributed along the coast of South America. Anchovies are generally found in waters 
with temperatures ranging between 14 and 22 °C, with an average temperature of 19.5 
°C, salinity between 34.9 and 35 ppt and depths ranging from the surface down to 70 m 
(Sánchez and Gallo 2009). In the spring and summer, anchovies concentrate in shoals 
located within 30 nautical miles offshore from the coast. In autumn and winter, they are 
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dispersed along a broader coastal strip, which can extend as far out as 100 miles from 
the coast if the water temperature is low. Off Peru, two anchovy population units are 
recognized: the north-central stock between parallels 3°S and 16˚S; and the southern 
stock, from 16°S to the southern limit of the Peruvian maritime domain. The north-
central anchovy stock is by far the largest (Alheit and Niquen 2004). 
Anchovies in Peru are captured by around 1135 purse seiners, of which 562 are steel 
vessels with more than 110 tonnes of holding capacities, and 573 are made of wood and 
possess diverse holding capacities between 30 and 110 tonnes. None of these vessels 
have preservation systems on board and the length of their nets are limited by law to 
between 220 and 550 m, depending on the vessel holding capacity. The fleet of steel 
vessels is predominantly owned by large vertically integrated companies, while the fleet 
of wooden vessels comprises mostly individual boat owners. This fleet employs some 
18,000 fishermen (Aranda 2009b). 
Table 1. Marine fisheries landings in Peru by subsector between 2002 and 2010. 
Subsector Resources type Fishing gear Landings 2004-2010 (t) 
Industrial Pelagic Purse seine 3.5 to 9 million  
 Demersal Bottom trawl 20 to 60 thousand  
Artisanal Jumbo Flying Squid Jig gear 150 to 500 thousand  
 Other fish + invertebrates Diverse gears 200 to 300 thousand  
Source: Peru Ministry of Production, Online Fishery Statistics 2012. 
Anchovy landings are 98% processed to fishmeal and fish oil to be exported at the 
international market. After strong political pressure from Peruvian non-governmental 
organizations during the last decade, about 120,000 tonnes of anchovy annually (2% of 
total landings) are currently canned or frozen for human consumption. 
Between 2000 and 2008 Peru has been the largest world’s fishmeal producer, exporting 
between 1.2 and 2.3 million tonnes annually. Peru is followed by Chile, with a yearly 
production of ca. 1 million tonnes, China, USA, Thailand and Japan, with 300 to 700 
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thousand tonnes, and Denmark, Norway and Iceland with 150 to 350 thousand tonnes. 
Primary markets for fishmeal are the manufacturers of feeds for aquaculture (65%), pigs 
(24%) and poultry (7%). The principal importing markets are in Asia and Europe, where 
China, Japan, and Germany, respectively, are the most important importing countries. 
Combined purchases by these three countries account for at least 60 % of total annual 
production. Fish oil is sold principally for the aquaculture feed market in Europe 
(Denmark and Norway) and Chile; its richness in long chain omega-3 fatty acids also 
makes it attractive as a product for direct human consumption. In 2008 fishmeal and 
fish oil exports reached 1.81 million tonnes, valued at $2.01 billion US dollars, of which 
fishmeal represented $1.61 billion (FOB basis) and fish oil $397 million (IFFO 2009). 
Anchovies are reduced to fishmeal by around 150 processing plants with a processing 
capacity exceeding 9000 tonnes/hour and at an average conversion rate of 4.5 tonnes of 
anchovy to one tonne of fishmeal. The anchovy processing industry offers a variety of 
fishmeal products to the international market. Among the most important fishmeal 
products are the steam dried fishmeal and “fair average quality” or FAQ fishmeal. 
Steam dried or “high protein fishmeal” is an improved quality fishmeal principally used 
to supply the aquaculture market. This fishmeal, commercially known as prime meal, 
super prime meal or LT-94 (low temperature, 94% digestibility), is made from fresh 
anchovies, and dried using indirect steam or vacuum dryers. It has protein contents 
between 68 and 72% and digestibility values between 92 and 94%. Conventional or 
standard FAQ fishmeal is dried using hot air and has protein contents between 65 and 
67%. Processing plants produce mainly the traditional FAQ fishmeal (57% of the total), 
although with current investments made in new processing machinery and equipment, 
there is a growing trend towards the production of high quality fishmeal (Sánchez and 
Gallo 2009). 
Around 45 fishing companies are involved in fishmeal processing and marketing. 
During the last decade there has been an ongoing consolidation process in the fishing 
industry. In 2009 the seven largest fishing companies in Peru accounted for 50% of the 
fishing fleet and 78% of the fishmeal production (Galarza 2010) 
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2.4.2 Institutions and the Peruvian fishery 
The Vice-Ministry of Fisheries is the central government authority for fisheries in Peru. 
It is headed by a Fisheries Vice-minister and since 2001 has been one of the two vice-
ministries within the Peruvian Ministry of Production (PRODUCE). The Vice Minister 
of Fisheries has five sectors under his/her supervision, the General Directorate of: (1) 
fisheries and processing, (2) aquaculture, (3) artisanal fisheries, (4) fisheries 
environmental issues, and (5) monitoring, control and surveillance.
Legally, Peruvian fisheries policy and management come under the umbrella of the 
1992 Peruvian General Fisheries Law. Its primary aim is to regulate fishing activities in 
order to promote its sustainable development and ensure its continuity as an important 
source of food, employment and income. This act has also the aim to ensure the 
responsible use of marine resources and optimize economic profits in harmony with 
environmental and biodiversity conservation. 
The main objectives of fisheries policy in Peru for the period 2011 to 2016 are as 
follows (Revista Pesca 2011, online at: http://revistapesca.blogspot.de/2011/09/peru-
objetivos-estrategicos-y-politicas.html. Last accessed. 14.04.12) 
? To achieve sustainable fisheries based on the best scientific information 
available and according to principles of ecosystem management 
? To strengthen management plans for fishing and aquaculture 
? To ensure food security and increment consumption of abundant fish species, 
especially in areas of extreme poverty 
? To protected the quality of the environment 
? To manage and develop fisheries competitively 
? To organize and develop artisanal fisheries competitively 
? To increase Peruvian participation in international fisheries 
Industrial fishing in Peru is by law administered through management plans (Planes de 
Ordenamiento). The anchovy fishery is an exception and is managed in accordance to 
“provisional fishing regimes”. Since 1994, all management regulations have been 
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promulgated by the Vice-Ministry of Production based on scientific reports from the 
Peruvian Research Marine Institute (IMARPE). IMARPE is a government scientific 
agency, officially defined as a specialized technical organization of the Production 
Ministry. In the case of the anchovy fishery, IMARPE conducts acoustic surveys to 
assess fish populations at least twice a year together with plankton surveys to estimate 
fish abundance based on egg and larvae density in situ. The Vice-Ministry of Fisheries 
uses this information to regulate fishing. All managerial decisions are signed by the 
Minister of Production. 
The Peruvian government applies a range of management tools to the anchovy fishery 
including (Jackson and Shepherd 2010, Evans and Tveteras 2011):
? Closed entry for new fishing boats (by law since 1992). Old vessels can only be 
replaced by new ones only if they possess an equivalent holding capacity
? Statutory seasons when the fisheries are open and closed, published in the 
Peruvian official newspaper and online through the Ministry’s internet website 
? Seasonal total catch limits based on IMARPE’s recommendations 
? Minimum mesh size of 1/2 inch (13mm) of net aperture 
? Spatial restriction allowing only artisanal boats to operate within five miles of 
the coast 
? Temporal restrictions and ports closures when landings report more than 10% of 
juvenile by-catch 
? 24 hour independent recording and reporting of landings at 134 unloading points 
? Fines and revoking of licences for breaches of rules
Fishing companies and fishing vessels owners are required to: 
? Possess fishing licences to fish within the 200 mile limit 
? Present formal declarations of holding capacity 
? Pay a fishing fee and a fishing duty to finance monitoring operations, both 
calculated according to the landings of the previous fishing season 
? Install and operate security sealed satellite tracking devices when at sea  
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There are additional controls for the processing industry: 
? Fishmeal plants must possess a working permit conferred by the Ministry of 
Production and a health certification from Peruvian Technological Institute 
(Instituto Tecnológico Pesquero or ITP)
? Anchovy processing plants are not authorised to receive fish coming from 
vessels without a valid license or not listed in the Ministries’ website. The 
Ministry of Production will publish every day on its internet web site 
(www.produce.gob.pe) the name of the vessels authorised to go out fishing as 
well as the vessels prohibited to do so 
? Processing plants must stop receiving fish if there is any failure in their 
processing equipment as well as in their equipment to protect the environment 
? Processing plants are not allowed to operate outside the fishing season 
Total Allowable Quotas and the Precautionary Approach
10
A system of fishing quotas has been applied to regulate the anchovy fishery since 1967. 
However, during these early years, fishing quotas were not complied with (Roemer 
1970). Reasons for breaking the rules were mainly (1) ineffective control of landings 
(Castillo and Mendo 1987) and (2) the self-doubt expressed in the scientific reports 
recommending the quotas. Phrases like “lack of important data constrains our 
evaluations, however we recommend…” were commonly used in scientific reports, 
which were distorted by the press to support the rebellious behaviour by fishermen 
against fishing quotas. 
Fishing quotas for the north-central anchovy stock are currently calculated on the basis 
of strong scientific evidence. Since 1983, scientific evaluation cruises to gather the 
information needed to set a fishing quota have been carried out at least once a year 
(Ganoza et al. 2000). Cruises are used to estimate anchovy biomass (through acoustic 
methods) and anchovy spawning biomass (through eggs and larvae counts in the water 
column). Total allowable quotas (TAQs) are then established considering mainly two 
parameters: the level of recruitment11 and environmental conditions. As a rule of thumb, 
the level of exploitation or the amount of fish which can be taken must ensure that at 
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least around 5 million tonnes of spawning biomass remains at sea. This limit of five 
million is based on historical relations between the anchovy spawning biomass and 
recruitment as shown in Figure 1. Following a precautionary approach, maintaining a 
spawning biomass at levels close to five million will not ensure a good recruitment for 
the next fishing season, but will “for sure” not jeopardise it. This rule of thumb is 
broken only when environmental conditions indicate the occurrence of an El Niño in 
Peruvian waters. In that case, fishing is prohibited regardless of the spawning biomass. 
The second rule of thumb is the assumption that the recruitment level is not high (which 
could be the case as shown in Fig. 1). Recruitment is estimated to be either be low or 
medium and, together with environmental conditions, is used to calculate the 
exploitation level, which is also always set at a ‘low’ or ‘medium’ rate. 
Ecosystem-based Management
Ecosystem-based Management is an integrated approach to management that 
considers the entire ecosystem, including humans. The goal of ecosystem-based 
management is to maintain an ecosystem in a healthy, productive and resilient 
condition so that it can provide the services humans want and need. Ecosystem-
based management differs from current approaches that usually focus on a 
single species, sector, activity or concern; it considers cumulative impacts of 
different sectors (McLeod et al. 2005:2).
The anchovy fishery is managed by the Peruvian government based on methods applied 
for single-species fisheries. There are however some practices within the Peruvian 
management system which appear to consider and monitor the impacts of the fishery on 
the ecosystem. Worldwide, the Peruvian Marine Research Institute (IMARPE) is 
probably one of few governmental scientific agencies to include two departments (‘Sub-
directorates’) responsible for carrying out research on top predators: the Sub-
directorates of marine mammals and seabirds. These two departments work under the 
supervision of the Pelagic Resources Department which is in charge of recommending 
the anchovy quotas. Censuses to monitor populations of seals and guano bird species 
that feed mainly on anchovies are carried out annually. But more important, although 
informally, the opinion of the researchers of marine mammals and seabirds is at least 
solicited when the establishment of an anchovy quota is discussed (M. Arias Schreiber 
pers. obs.) 
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Eco- labelling 
By definition, eco-labelling is “the practice of marking products with a distinctive label 
so that consumers know that their manufacture conforms to recognized environmental 
standards” (Eco-labelling Oxford English Dictionary). The Peruvian anchovy fishery 
started in 2009 with the procedures to apply for certification from the Marine 
Stewardship Council (MSC). The certification award is nowadays still in process, but if 
granted the anchovy fishery will be the first commercial fishery worldwide holding an 
MSC certification. 
Overcapitalization and individual vessel quotas (IVQ) 
The last General Fisheries Act of 1982 (Ley General de Pesca No. 25977) mandates that 
building of new vessels for fishing anchovies requires decommissioning of existing 
ones (Aranda 2009a). However, during the last two decades, oceanographic favourable 
conditions at sea followed by a recovered anchovy population and increasing 
international demand for fishmeal and fish oil has given the privatized fishmeal industry 
incentives to expand capacity (Tveteras et al. 2011). Despite the regulations, the 
numbers of anchovy fishing vessels and processing plants expanded during the 1990s. 
The number of fishing vessels increased from 950 to 1250 between 1986 and 2007 
leading, for the second time in the history of the fishery, to a situation of overcapacity 
(Freon et al. 2008, Evans and Tveteras 2011). 
Freon et al. (2008), estimated the anchovy fleet overcapacity, expressed as the 
proportion of unemployed present capacity, at 72% and processing overcapacity at 89%. 
Based on current average anchovy biomass and landings, Paredes and Gutierrez (2008), 
also estimated the anchovy fisheries overcapacity in 2007 and concluded that fishing 
fleet overcapacity was between 2.5 and 4.6 times its optimal size. For fishmeal and fish 
oil processing, capacity was calculated to be 3 to 5 times its optimal size. This 
overcapacity promoted what in fisheries management is known as the “race for fish”, 
i.e. behaviour aiming to capture as much fish as fast as possible during the fishing 
season. An effect of the “race for fish” is that the number of fishing days required to 
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achieve a fixed TAQ is reduced. Accordingly, the annual number of fishing days in the 
Peruvian anchovy fishery decreased from 336 in 1987 to 49 in 2006 (Freon et al. 2008).
Introduced formally by Legislative Decree Nr. 1084 of June 2008, a management 
system of Individual Vessel Quotas (IVQ), locally referred to as Maximum Catch 
Limits per Vessel (MCLV), came into effect in January 2009 (Tveteras et al. 2011). The 
fix percentage of the overall allowable catch assigned to each vessel is established for 
each fishing season on the basis of the vessel’s holding capacity and its average 
historical landings. Vessel quotas are a percentage of the TAC recommended by 
IMARPE for each fishing season. As a result of the new management system, the 
number of fishing days has increased from 52 in 2008 to 189 in 2009; and appears to 
have put an end to the “race for fish” in the anchovy fishery (Galarza 2010). Although it 
is still early to evaluate the impacts of the new IVQ system, the new system seems to 
have increased profitability of the fisheries by providing a more predictable operating 
environment. Knowing beforehand how much fish will be landed provides incentives to 
improve the production system and subsequently the quality of fish landings. Better 
quality landed anchovies allow investment in value-added production such as high 
quality fishmeal or human consumption products (canned or frozen anchovies) 
(Tveteras et al. 2011). The largest integrated fishmeal company in Peru reported for 
example that its share of steam dried (i.e., high-quality) fishmeal increased from 51% in 
2008 to 76% in 2009, while its share of Fair and Average Quality (FAQ) fishmeal 
decreased correspondingly from 49% to 24% the same two years (Evans and Tveteras 
2011). Another recorded impact of the implementation of the IVQ system has been an 
increase in the price of landed anchovy by almost 40% from 2008 to 2009 (Galarza 
2010). Independent vessel owners who had a quota were able to get increased prices 
from the fishmeal companies for their catches. This shift in the balance of price 
negotiation power from fishmeal companies to vessel owners was largely unexpected. 
In this new situation, artisanal vessels that have quota permits to catch anchovies only 
for human consumption are sometimes caught illegally supplying fishmeal processing 
plants with raw material (Tveteras et al. 2011). 
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Figure 1. Section of a PowerPoint presentation made by the scientific personnel at 
IMARPE to explain the rationale for maintaining spawning biomass around five million 
tonnes based on historical spawning biomass data versus recruitment of the Peruvian 
north-central anchovy stock. This PowerPoint slide was presented to the Fisheries 
National Society (SNP) in November 2008 (Source: Erich Diaz, IMARPE)
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3. Concluding remarks 
This research confirms the central importance of institutions in achieving desirable 
social-ecological outcomes, in this case the sustainability of fishery landings. The 
results qualify some conclusions commonly drawn in fisheries research regarding the 
relation between institutions to promote sustainability. Specifically: 
? The establishment of property rights in the form of quota shares was not an 
indispensable institution to achieve sustainable landings in the case of the 
Peruvian anchovy fishery. The enforcement of scientifically based precautionary 
fishing quotas was found to be an effective substitute for economic incentives to 
guide the behaviour of resource users. 
? Overcapitalization in the Peruvian anchovy, especially in the case of processing 
factories was, at least partially, a strategy to cope with environmental variability 
and fish migration. Reasons to overcapitalize were not always the product of 
irresponsible economic decisions. 
? The centralized top-down management regime of the anchovy fishery did not 
hamper sustainability. A top-down regime of this sort may be the most 
appropriate institution for large-scale commercial fisheries, where fishing 
companies aim to maximize profits and cooperation might be difficult to 
implement. 
? Flexible, adaptive and rapid management together with robust monitoring of the 
resource and resource users played a crucial role in achieving sustainable 
landings in Peru. Rapid management seems to be especially relevant for 
fisheries targeting small pelagic species, in accordance with suggestions to 
promote the fitness between institutional and ecological settings. 
This study has gone some way towards enhancing our understanding of the role of a 
variety of other institutions. In this regard, the study concludes that: 
? Formal institutions in particular Peruvian Fisheries Acts provided the basis for 
sustainable management by clearly establishing user boundaries, i.e. determining 
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who is permitted to participate in the fishery, considering both national and 
international resource users. 
? Base-level management to deal with sustainable landings was left to secondary 
legislation that evolved in response to different considerations including 
organizational functionality, the legitimacy of management agencies, advances 
in science, technology and innovation. Management agencies enacting 
secondary legislation also demonstrated learning capacity including the ability to 
learn from experience.  
? The development of institutions in the Peruvian anchovy fishery was 
significantly influenced by environmental variability and uncertainty; however 
physical system characteristics were not only a source of restrictions but also 
provide opportunities such us the legitimacy of the scientific agency. 
The results of this research support the idea that institutional arrangements develop as 
responses to events occurring in the social and biophysical settings. They have also 
shown that not all institutions that have been identified as relevant for the success of 
community-based fisheries management played a role in a state regulated national level 
fisheries. Further research on institutions for sustainable national-level resources is 
required to improve understanding of this key issue for the management of the world’s 
fisheries.
In addition, the effects of export markets, the legitimacy of research agencies, the 
individual contribution of certain decision makers along the history of the fishery; the 
resource user’s ability to learn from experience, are the most conspicuous examples of 
institutions that play an important role in this fishery. Further investigation into these 
topics is strongly recommended. 
This research also gives an account of and explores the reasons behind recent efforts to 
prescribe standardized institutional arrangements to overcome fisheries 
overexploitation. It highlights that institutions develop in context specific directions and 
what is a solution in one fishery could have unexpected negative consequences in 
others. These findings suggest that fisheries sustainability will not be achieved by 
relying on one or two institutional changes. The case of the Peruvian anchovy fishery 
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indicates that the achievement of sustainable landings has been the culmination of a 
long, and continuing historical process of transformation. The study identifies no one 
organization, rule, belief, custom or other type of institution that can explain the current 
situation of this Peruvian fishery.
Taken together, these results also suggest that, rather than concentrating on a particular 
set of mostly economic, institutions; a broad institutional approach is a more appropriate 
tool to better understand and manage the complexity of fisheries systems. In doing so, 
the attributes of both the resources and the resource users should be considered. In 
regard to the resources, their abundance, rate of renewal, distribution boundaries, etc; 
but also their cultural value and the local ecological knowledge of the resource should 
be regarded as influential settings. The management of pelagic fish, for example, clearly 
needs extensive monitoring linked to adaptive and rapid management. This simple rule 
has been institutionalized in the Peruvian anchovy fishery (see Box 1). The rule together 
with appropriate modern technology seems to be a crucial reform in the trajectory 
towards its current sustainable landings.
“… I've finally understood the trick for managing anchovy. Since the 
anchovy is quick, and adapts rapidly to the conditions at sea and only lives 
three years, its management has to be rapid too” (M. Ñiquen, Director of 
the Pelagic Resources Research Department at IMARPE, October 2007). 
“…the anchovy fishery is the only Peruvian fishery not managed on the 
basis of Management Plans but on the basis of so-called Provisional 
Management Regimes” (R. Gallo, Vice-Ministry of Fisheries, November 
2008).
“…the extraction of anchovy has to be rapid because the anchovy you 
don't catch today, you’ll never catch” (J. Sarmiento, Fishing Company 
Pesquera Austral, November 2008). 
Box 5. The institutionalized rule: rapid and adaptive management 
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In the case of the resource users, the need for a broad approach is even more obvious. 
Institutions that work for a fishery in which fishermen livelihoods depend on their daily 
catch, do not necessarily work for a fishery in which transnational fishing companies 
work to maximise wealth. As shown by this research, the influence of the state in the 
latter case is central. If fisheries sustainability relies on institutional reforms, in the case 
of commercial industrial fisheries, these reforms should be kept under state control in 
order to balance different and conflicting interests. 
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Notes
1 Transdisciplinary research is defined here as a holistic type of research that includes the intersection of 
various disciplines from the natural and social sciences, and also stakeholders knowledge.  
2 Fisheries collapses considered in this study are an effect of overfishing; it is acknowledged however, 
that depletion of fish stocks cannot be attributed to fishing alone. Natural driven ecosystem regime shifts 
as well as anthropogenic sources like pollution, habitat destruction and human introduced invasive 
species in ecosystems also have an impact upon fish populations. 
3 Rules are defined as “potentially linguistic entities that refer to prescriptions commonly known and used 
by a set of participants to order repetitive, interdependent relationships. Prescriptions refer to which 
actions (or states of the world) are required, prohibited, or permitted” (Ostrom 1986:5). 
4 Ostrom explains the term SES as follows: “All humanly used resources are embedded in complex, 
social-ecological systems (SESs). SESs are composed of multiple subsystems and internal variables 
within these subsystems at multiple levels analogous to organisms composed of organs, organs of tissues, 
tissues of cells, cells of proteins, etc” (Ostrom 2009b:419). 
5 Ecological economics is an interdisciplinary field of academic research that aims to address the 
interactions and co-evolution of human economies embedded in  natural ecosystems over time and space 
(Xepapadeas 2008). Much of what ecological economists do involves understanding sustainability in the 
context of preserving natural capital based on economic, rational approaches. 
6 see Coase. (1937), The Theory of the Firm, Economica, vol. 4, 386-405; Coase (1960), The Problem of 
Social Cost, Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 3, 1-44. 
7 Resource regime is defined as “consisting two main points: (1) The property regime that governs the use 
and the transfer of the right to a resource, (2) The rules that govern transactions resulting from the use of 
the resource. There are four kinds of property regimes: private property, common property, state 
property and open access. While the three first regimes are varieties of ownership, in the latter there is no 
property – everybody has the right to use the resource”(Vatn 2005:260). 
8 Scientism is the idea that “the approaches and attributes of the natural sciences constitute the proper 
model of guiding other actions; it sequesters and mocks reasoned dialogue and seeks to trump reason-
giving with reductionist truth claims (Bromley 2007:680). 
9 Unfortunately a straightforward translation of this sentence to English is problematic. The literary 
translation is: “You should know, respectable Minster, that anchovy business people in Peru have grown 
gills, from spending too much time at sea”. To “have gills” in Spanish means “to have the guts for doing 
something“.
10 According to FAO, the precautionary approach for fisheries is defined as: A set of agreed cost-effective 
measures and actions, including future courses of action, which ensures prudent foresight, reduces or 
avoids risk to the resources, the environment, and the people, to the extent possible, taking explicitly into 
account existing uncertainties and the potential consequences of being wrong (FAO 1996:4) 
11 In fisheries biology, recruitment can be defined as the amount of fish added to the exploitable stock 
each year due to growth and/or migration into the fishing area.  
Source: http://www.nefsc.noaa.gov/fbi/age-man/gl
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a b s t r a c t
Landings statistics of the Peruvian anchovy fishery show that the fishery went through a phase of
explosive and uncontrolled growth from its establishment in the mid-fifties until its collapse in 1972.
After the collapse, a second phase from 1973 to 1984 was characterized by unfavorable warm ocean
conditions and low catches. A third phase, from 1984 to the present, with propitious ocean-
environmental conditions and modern governance, can be further divided into a controlled growth
period (1985–1994) and a sustainable landings’ period (1995 to present). The most recent period of the
third phase has enabled the fishery to maintain its catches and be labeled as one of the most
sustainable fisheries worldwide. This article highlights the evolution of the legal system that provides
for the current sustainable landings and governance of this fishery. Results show that General Fisheries
Acts were enacted independently of failures to sustain anchovy landings. The three Peruvian Fisheries
Acts were a reflection of broader national socio-political changes and were enacted mainly to define the
role of the state and private investment and to delimit foreign involvement in the fishery industry. By
contrast, the enactment of secondary legislation to control quotas and fishing seasons increased as the
fishery moved towards stable landings. During this phase, enacted secondary legislation showed also a
clear peak during strong positive sea surface anomalies driven by the El Nin˜o Southern Oscillation
(ENSO) 1997–1998, providing evidence of rapid adaptive management. The role of Fisheries Acts in
defining access rights at the national level from a multilevel governance approach is discussed and
further key elements that contributed to the transition towards sustainability are suggested.
& 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Nearly one in four fisheries has collapsed during the period
1950–2000 with no apparent sign of improvement in this
trend [1]. To confront these crises in fisheries and improve the
management of fish stocks, twenty-first century approaches have
recognized the importance of complex adaptive social–ecological
system concepts [2–7]. However analysis of linked social and
ecological processes has revealed shortcomings of sustainable
resource management based on purely ecological and economic
foundations [8]. During the last decade, a multi- and transdisci-
plinary perspective has been deemed necessary if fisheries are to
become sustainable [9–13]. The role of fisheries governance,
based on both legal and informal institutions, in the attainment
of sustainable fisheries is one of the new research areas identified.
An empirical approach to dealing with some of these issues, is to
analyze legal instruments employed in successful cases of fish-
eries management that have evaded the conventional pattern of
overfishing and non-recovery after a collapse [7,13–16].
One exceptional contemporary example of successful fisheries
governance system is the Peruvian commercial anchovy fishery.
This fishery represents almost 10% of worldwide marine fisheries
landings [17] and 80% of all Peruvian landings [18]. It has been
described as the largest mono-specific fishery that has ever
existed on earth [19,20] and as the most intense and successful
fishery worldwide [21]. Recently the fishery has allowed Peru to
be placed first in a report ranking 53 marine countries by the
sustainability of their fisheries [22].
Current annual anchovy catches by around 1200 purse seine
vessels, usually operating within 60 miles from the coast, are
around 7–8 million tonnes [23]. This fishery represents at least 7%
of Peru’s total foreign exchange earnings and employs some
18,000 fishermen [24]. About 140 factories process anchovy into
fishmeal and fish oil for export to the international market. In
2008 fishmeal and fish oil exports reached 1.81 million tonnes,
valued at US $2.01 billion, of which fishmeal represented $1.61
billion (FOB basis) and fish oil $397 million [25].
Like most pelagic fisheries, since its establishment, the anchovy
fishery has been highly vulnerable to drastic natural stock fluctua-
tions, due to the sensitivity of these fish species to ocean-climate
variability [26]. Historical anchovy landings show significant varia-
tion between years, mostly due to inter-annual climate variability,
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of which the warm phase of ENSO or El Nin˜o is the most critical
component [27,28]. On top of inter-annual variation, inter-decadal
ecosystem regime shifts, caused by lasting periods of warm or cold
sea temperature anomalies have been also identified [29–31]. These
anomalies are related to the approach or retreat of warm subtropical
oceanic waters to the coast of Peru and Chile. Dramatic decreases in
anchovy landings registered in 1972–1973, 1982–1983 and 1997–
1998 have been attributed to the impacts of severe ENSO occurrences
[27,28] (although the 1972–1973 decline was most likely caused by a
combination of overfishing and ENSO conditions [32,33,37,55]);
while, natural inter-decadal ecosystem regime shifts produce
switches from anchovy dominated to sardine dominated configura-
tions, reflected in the long-term historical landings trends of the
fishery [28–30].
Thus a learning process has occurred, and anchovy fishery
policies have developed from a highly fragmented, reactive
decision making system, ignorant of resource management issues,
during the first two decades of the fishery [35–37], to the current
governance system that is able to cope with at least inter-annual
variability [25,38] and ensure the ecological and economic sus-
tainability of the fishery. This last governance system or resource
regime has allowed annual anchovy landings during non-ENSO
years, to stabilize between 23 and 48 t/m3 annual catch per unit
effort (CPUE), expressed in tonnes of anchovy per total fleet
holding capacity (Fig. 1); and between six and ten million tonnes
of catches from 1995 to the present (Fig. 2a).
This article explores the evolution of the legal system that
provides the basis for the current sustainable landings and
governance of the anchovy fishery. Based on analysis of historical
legal material, fishery statistics and environmental data, the
article aims to investigate both the role played by fisheries laws
and possible factors influencing its development, and the con-
tribution of other key elements that contributed to the transition
towards sustainability. First, the section with Materials and
methods and the current anchovy fishery management as a
background information is described. The Results section presents
the relation between law and fisheries landings development, and
the structure and content of the principles of the three Peruvian
Fisheries Acts are examined. The role of secondary legislation1
establishing quotas and temporal/spatial fishing restrictions is
also considered in this section. Following Winter’s analytical
framework for fisheries laws originally named the ‘‘legal clinic
for fisheries’’ [12, p. 319], the Peruvian acts are reviewed in the
light of available literature on sustainable fisheries law. The
Discussion section suggests key legal and non-legal institutional
elements that contribute to sustainable fisheries landings from a
multilevel governance perspective. This section also briefly dis-
cusses the use of Winter’s analytical framework; and the tension
between the need for a degree of legal certainty that simulta-
neously provides for adaptability and flexibility in governance of
natural resources (see [39]). The article finishes with a section
with Conclusions and a final remark.
2. Materials and methods
Legal material, from the establishment of the anchovy fishery
until 2007, was collected and reviewed together with fishery
statistics and environmental data from the Peruvian coast. Legal
material included principal legislation prior to the enactment of
the first General Fishery Act in 1971, the three General Fisheries
Acts and their implementing regulations; and a historical data-
base on the enactment of secondary legislation setting up quotas
and limiting fishing effort through closed seasons, areas and
prohibitions to fish during some days of the week. This database
consisted of law enacted between 1965 and 2007. After 2007, the
establishment of a system of individual vessel quotas for the
anchovy fishery radically changed the regulation of management,
and the situation after 2007 is not covered by this paper.
Oceanographic data consisted of sea surface temperature (SST)
anomalies and occurrence of strong ENSOs, while fishery data
included annual landings, fishing fleet and processing capacity of
fishmeal factories. These data series covered the period between 1960
and 2007.
To explore the relation between the developments of legal
instruments and the fishery transition towards sustainability, the
enactment of fisheries acts was plotted against fishery landings
and the occurrence of strong ENSO events. Further, numbers of
enacted secondary legislation were plotted also against landings,
ENSOs and SST anomalies. In both cases, oceanographic data
(strong ENSO occurrences and SST anomalies) were used to clarify
the environmental influence on the fishery and filter our visua-
lization of possible legal impacts.
Structure and principles (‘‘basic norms’’) from the three fisheries
acts were compared and a semi-quantitative application of Winter’s
analytical framework [12] was performed. This framework consists
of a list of 60 questions on topics to be covered by a national fishing
law, which enables a diagnosis of the fitness of this law for the
regulation and management of a sustainable fishery. To analyze
the potential management failures of the Peruvian Fishery Acts,
a ranking point system between three and zero was adapted to the
framework. The ranking system assigned points to each answer of
the list according to the following scale: three points: the content of
the law covers this topic ‘‘clearly or in depth’’; two points: the law
covers this topic ‘‘basically’’; one point: the law does not cover this
topic at all; and zero point when the question was not applicable.
Under this ranking system a law that ensures good practices of
fisheries management should score between 120 and 180 points
(two and three points times sixty questions, respectively).
2.1. Background setting—current management of the
Peruvian anchovy fishery
Government management and control of fisheries in Peru is
the responsibility of the Vice-Ministry of Fisheries in the Ministry
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Fig. 1. Catch per unit effort of anchovies and average sea surface temperature (SST)
in northern Peru for the period 1995 and 2007. Impacts of the ENSO 1997–1998 on
the fisheries and the environment are shown.
(Source: IMARPE).
1 Secondary or delegated legislation refers to law made by an executive
authority under powers given to them by primary legislation. For the Peruvian
legal system, executive acts consist of five different administrative dispositions,
including in order of precedence: Supreme Decrees, Supreme Resolutions, Minis-
terial Resolutions, Directorate Resolutions, and a fifth level containing several
miscellaneous written regulations.
M. Arias Schreiber / Marine Policy 36 (2012) 78–89 79
of Production (PRODUCE, by its Spanish acronym).2 Within the Vice-
Ministry of Fisheries, the General Directorates of Fishing Extraction
and Processing, and Monitoring, Control and Surveillance share
responsibility for anchovy fisheries management. Both offices are
kept informed and advised by the Peruvian Marine Research
Institute (IMARPE), whose institutional objective is to provide the
scientific basis for the sustainable management of marine resources.
The Peruvian anchovy is a small, short-lived, fast growing
pelagic fish widely distributed along the coast of South America.
Off Peru, two population units are recognized: the north-central
stock between parallels 31S and 151S; and the southern stock,
from 151S to the southern limit of the Peruvian maritime domain
[40,55]. The north-central anchovy stock is by far the larger [23].
The government applies two different management schemes for
the northern-central and the southern stock, the latter being
exploited simultaneously by Peru and Chile.
Fishing of the northern stock is closed twice annually, during
the austral summer and winter, in order to protect fish spawning
peaks and recruitment periods respectively. Since 1983, one to
four surveys to assess the abundance and spatial distribution of
pelagic fish populations have been carried out each year by
IMARPE [41]. The Total Allowable Catch (TAC) for both the
north-central and southern anchovy stocks is estimated based
on the results of these surveys. PRODUCE publishes TACs for each
fishing season based on current biomass estimations and drawing
on the results of biological and oceanographic monitoring carried
out by IMARPE personnel simultaneously at almost 100 landing
sites. During 2009 for example, a TAC of 2 million tonnes was
established for the second fishing season of the northern-central
stock (Ministerial Resolution 446-2009-PRODUCE), based on
IMARPE’s biomass estimation of 6.7 million tonnes [42]. Landings
for this season were 1.9 million tonnes [43]. Temporary closures
of fishing areas, for a minimum of three days, are also imposed
when the reported presence of juveniles (fish length less than
12 cm) exceeds 10% of total landings. Reports of catches and
lengths come from real-time verification of landings carried out
by IMARPE and dispatched daily to the Vice-Ministry. Based on
these daily reports, once the TAC has been reached, the Ministry
of Production orders the closure of the fishing season, banning not
only anchovy fishing and landings but also fishmeal processing. In
the case of the southern anchovy stock, although some efforts
have been made in the past to coordinate its management in
cooperation with Chilean authorities, usually no TAC is applied
and the fishing season is open all year around.
Measures to control fishing effort by reducing or limiting the
number of anchovy vessels have been enacted by secondary
legislation since 1971, and in 1992 the most recent General
Fishing Law stopped the issue of new licenses. Licenses for new
fishing vessels are authorized only to replace broken-up units,
taking care that total holding capacity remains the same.
On a daily basis during the fishing season, the Vice-Ministry of
Fisheries publishes online the list of vessels with authorization to
fish for anchovy, as well as the ones that are prohibited to do so.
Fishmeal processing plants also need to be certified by the
Ministry and are not allowed to receive catches from unauthor-
ized vessels or from the artisanal fleet (vessels with less than
30 tonnes of holding capacity). Further regulations to manage the
fisheries include a ban on the use of purse seines with mesh sizes
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Fig. 2. (a) Historical annual anchovy landings, fisheries phases, strong ENSO events and enactment of General Peruvian Fisheries Acts and (b) number of enacted secondary
legislation regulating anchovy quotas and close seasons, versus sea surface temperature anomalies in northern Peru between 1959 and 2007.
2 In July 2002 the Peruvian congress decreed Law 27799 reorganizing the
nation’s administration system and merging the Industry and Fisheries Ministries
in a single institution. This new institution is named Production Ministry or
PRODUCE and the highest fisheries governing agency inside it is the Vice-Ministry
of Fisheries.
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smaller than half an inch (13 mm), and the obligation for all
anchovy vessels to carry onboard sealed satellite positioning
systems. Carrying out more than one fishing trip per vessel per
day and fishing the northern anchovy stock within 5 miles of the
coast are both prohibited.
Since 2004, monitoring and control of landings and of com-
pliance with fishery regulations have been carried out by an
independent Swiss company (SGS), which records landings 24 h a
day at 134 unloading points. The costs of uploading and landing
inspections are met by the fishing industry through a system of
payments equivalent to 1.40 US dollars per metric tonne of
landed anchovy. The ban on fishing within five miles of the coast
is controlled by the General Monitoring, Control and Surveillance
Directorate using a Satellite Monitoring System (Sistema de
Seguimiento Satelital or SISESAT).
A management system of Individual Vessel Quotas (IVQ),
locally referred to as Maximum Catch Limits per Vessel (MCLV),
was established in July 2008 (Legislative Decree 1086) and is
currently being implemented for both anchovy stocks. The fixed
percentage of the overall allowable catch assigned to each vessel
is established for each fishing season on the basis of the vessel’s
holding capacity and its average historical landings between 2004
and 2007. Vessel quotas are a percentage of the TAC recom-
mended by IMARPE for each fishing season.
3. Results
3.1. Fisheries acts and fishing phases
Starting in the mid-fifties, the anchovy fishery in Peru went
through a first phase of explosive and uncontrolled growth
coupled with favorable ocean conditions, until its collapse in
1972 (Fig. 2a). By 1960, the annual catch reached 2 million tonnes
of anchovies and since then three General Peruvian Fisheries Acts
have been enacted in 1971 (Decree Law3 18810), 1987 (Law
24790) and 1992 (Decree Law 25977). Regulations before the First
Act were directed towards taxing profits and the assignment of
competences to new fishing agencies. Table 1 summarizes the
principal fisheries regulations enacted by the Peruvian govern-
ment during the phase of explosive and uncontrolled growth
(period 1959–1971).
At the end of the first phase, a revolutionary military left-wing
government took office establishing the Ministry of Fisheries and
enacting the First General Fisheries Act. The principal motivation was
the government’s desire to exercise more direct control over impor-
tant sectors of the economy, especially those in the hands of strong
private groups or with substantial foreign capital investment [36].4
Following the anchovy collapse, a second phase between 1973
and 1984 was characterized by an environmental regime shift
with unfavorable warm water conditions and low catches. No
fisheries acts were enacted during this phase.
A third phase from 1984 to the present, characterized by
propitious environmental conditions and modern management
has enabled the anchovy fishery to maintain its catches and be
sustainable. This third period can be further divided yet into a
growth period (1985–1994) and a sustainable period (1995 to
present). During the growth period the second and third General
Fisheries Acts were enacted.
3.2. Structure and principles of fisheries acts
The first General Fishery Act was organized in 12 sections and
129 articles, whiles the second and third consisted of 10 and 12
sections and 112 and 90 articles, respectively. As shown in
Table 2, all the three Fisheries Acts followed basically the same
structure with some minor changes. The section on fishing
communities and foreign capital guidelines was left out following
the more liberal policies of the last acts. On the other hand,
sections regarding aquaculture and fishing by foreign flag vessels
had to be added according to the development of these fishing
activities in Peru. Institutional coordination was included as a
chapter in the second section of the First and Second Act, but was
included as a section in the Third Act. Artisanal fishing was almost
excluded in the First Act (Article 26 allowed only Peruvian fishers
and vessels to have access to artisanal fisheries). This fishery was
extensively regulated by the Second Act (Section 4, Chapter 6 of
the act, plus 16 articles in the respective implementation regula-
tion) and was devoted an entire section in the Third Act.
Basic norms or principles of the three Fisheries Acts are
presented in Table 3. According to the three laws, marine resources
from the coastline and within 200 nautical miles of the coast
are the property of the Peruvian state. This jurisdiction was
Table 1
Summary of legal instruments to regulate the Peruvian anchovy fishery before enactment of the first General Fisheries Act.
Year Legal instrument Issue
1961 Law Nr. 13825 Apply 14% tax on fishmeal exports
1962 Decree Law 14195 Regulating installment of fishmeal factories
Decree Law 14228 Fishmeal exports allowed only through cooperatives
1963 Supreme Decree 16 Setting up the National Fisheries Council
Supreme Decree 18 Establishing exporting quotas and a new licenses’ system for fishmeal processing plants
Supreme Decree 77 Officially recognizing the Peruvian Fishmeal Consortium
1964 Law Nr. 15048 New tax system for fishmeal exports
Supreme Decree 7 Establishment of Peruvian Marine Research Institute
1965 Supreme Decree 05-65 First anchovy closed season
1967 Law Nr. 16694 Law for Fisheries Promotion
1968 Law Nr. 17403 Setting import free taxes for fishmeal equipment
1969 Decree Law 180261 Establishment of Ministry of Fisheries
1970 Decree Law 18196 Establishment of Fisheries Development Fund
Decree Law 18253 Establishment of State Company for commercialization of fishmeal and fish oil
3 Decree Laws are laws promulgated by the executive in de facto exercise of
the legislative prerogative.
4 By 1971, the fishing industry was responsible for 35% of the total foreign
currency revenue of Peru and only four fishing companies were annually produ-
cing more than 100,000 tonnes of fishmeal, from which two were foreign capital
enterprises [45].
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underpinned by the ‘‘Declaration of the 200 nautical mile Maritime
Zone’’, jointly proclaimed and signed by Chile, Peru and Ecuador at
the First Conference on the Exploitation and Conservation of the
Maritime Resources of the South Pacific in August 1952.
It is worth noting here also that the term ‘‘rational exploita-
tion’’ is a synonym for ‘‘sustainable use’’ and was widely used in
Peru before the latter term gained worldwide currency after the
Rio Declaration in 1992. This term is still often used commonly to
avoid what are regarded as unsuitable Spanish translations of the
word ‘‘sustainable’’ (‘‘sostenible’’ or ‘‘sustentable’’). Thus rational
exploitation was understood by the authors of the First Act to
mean exploiting natural resources in a way that ensures it can be
maintained in the future. The contrary term ‘‘irrational exploita-
tion’’ is frequently used to describe the unsustainable harvest of
Peruvian guano (seabird’s excrement used as a fertilizer) during
the 19th century. The overexploitation of guano led to the
establishment in 1909 of the national Guano Administration
Company with the aim of managing and restoring guano produc-
tion. This represents one of the first and most effective examples
of sustainable exploitation of a natural resource undertaken by
a government [50] and has had a profound influence on subsequent
natural resource legislation, including the three fisheries acts.
Table 2
Comparison of structure between the three General Peruvian Fisheries Acts from 1971, 1987 and 1992.
First Fishery Act Second Fishery Act Third Fishery Act
1. Basic norms
2. The fishing sector
3. The fishing process
4. Fishing rights
5. Fishing incentives system
6. Foreign capital guidelines
7. Fishing communities
8. Authorizations, permits, licenses and
concessions
9. Bans and sanctions
10. Contracts fishing and records
11. Final provisions
1. Basic norms
2. The fishing sector
3. Aquaculture
4. Fishing practices
5. Fishing rights and the fishing communities
6. Procedures
7. Infringement and sanctions
8. Contracts and fishing records
9. Fishing incentives system
10. Special, complementary, transitory
provisions
1. Basic rules
2. Fisheries management
3. Fisheries practices
4. Artisanal fishing
5. Aquaculture
6. Concessions, authorizations, permits and fishing
licenses
7. Fishing by foreign flag vessels
8. Fishing general records
9. Fishing incentives system
10. Institutional coordination
11. Bans, infringements and sanctions
12. Transitory and final provisions
Table 3
Comparison of principles or ‘‘basic norms’’ between the three General Peruvian Fisheries Acts.
Basic norm Fishery Act
(year)
Statement
Marine resources ownership 1971 State domain—from the coastline and within 200 miles.
1987 State property—from the coastline and within 200 miles.
1992 Nation assets—from the coastline and within 200 miles.
National fisheries tasks 1971 Integral use of marine resources as a public good and for the interest of society.
1987 Rational exploitation of marine resources and aquaculture; to address mainly direct human
consumption fisheries.
1992 Source of food and employment ensuring responsible use of marine resources.
State role 1971 To manage marine resources promoting, supervising and controlling fishing activities.
1987 To assess, protect, plan and manage marine resources considering social welfare.
1992 To regulate integral management and rational exploitation of marine resources.
Use rights 1971 The state promotes maximum national involvement deciding limits and procedures for foreign
participation.
1987 The state promotes the involvement of any corporate or company organization concordant with the
democratic principles of the national constitution. It encourages the contribution of national
investment to the industry, while foreign investment remains subject to pertinent Peruvian
legislation.
1992 The state promotes ample involvement and encourages foreign investment in the fisheries sector
subject to pertinent Peruvian legislation.
Economic units 1971 Any person working for a fishing company providing capital or labor represents one single economic
unit. The state promotes their involvement in the company’s property, management and profits.
1987 Article omitted.
1992 Article omitted.
Marine resources exploitation 1971 Involves research, withdrawal, processing and marketing phases.
1987 Involves research, withdrawal, processing, marketing and services phases. It is carried out after
obtaining a granted license from the Fisheries Ministry.
1992 It is recognized to be a permanent but an irregular occupation given the random nature of marine
resources.
Fisheries Ministry role 1971 To regulate, guide, and control marine resources exploitation to ensure species conservation,
economic efficiency and maximize social welfare.
1987 To be responsible for the management of marine resources and guide fishing policies.
1992 To decide according to available scientific and socio-economic information on the management,
quotas, fishing bans, fishing gears and further management tools to ensure protection and rational
exploitation of marine resources.
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With the exception of a basic norm related to use or access
rights, minor differences are shown between most of the princi-
ples stated by the three acts. Access rights were a reflection of
broader national socio-political changes and were intended to
regulate the role of the state and private investment and to
delimit foreign involvement in the fishery industry. The first
Peruvian Fisheries Act was enacted in March 1971 under a
dictatorial military government. This regime (1968–1975) was
characterized by left-leaning policies and was driven by a desire
for radical structural economic, political and social change to give
justice to the poor of Peru. It nationalized entire industries,
expropriating companies to consolidate them into single indus-
try-wide government-run entities. The aim was to increase
government control over economic activities by enforcing the
monopolistic status of these entities and preventing any private
and foreign activity in those sectors. This government brought to
an end a long Peruvian tradition of limited government involve-
ment in economic and social development and at the same time
altered the relative political influence of those participating in
policymaking [36]. The 1971 General Fishery Act was a reflection
of the socio-political changes introduced during this period. The
Act promotes maximum national involvement in the fishery
sector, setting limits on foreign participation. The law aims to
‘‘obtain the optimal development of the Peruvian fisheries com-
patible to the rational exploitation of marine resources’’. The first
Fisheries Act has the following specific objectives:
a. Optimal use of marine resources.
b. High productivity.
c. Improved nutritional status of the Peruvian population.
d. Fair distribution of economic income obtained from the exploi-
tation of marine resources between the state, labor and capital.
Among the purposes of the Fisheries Ministry, the fishing
industry reorganization to permit fair participation by workers
in the management of the industry’s organization and the
distribution of profits, the reduction of salary differentials among
workers in the industry, in accordance with the then govern-
ment’s revolutionary policies, and the promotion of a ‘‘peruaniza-
tion’’ of the fishing industry were established.
For the pelagic fishery, the main changes introduced by this
law were in Article 37, which decrees that fishmeal marketing is
carried out exclusively by the state; Articles 64 and 70, which
establish the so-called ‘‘fishing communities’’ to represent the
employees in any fishing company, with the right to receive 20%
of the net income of each company; and finally in a transitory
regulation requiring anchovy fishing companies to reduce their
foreign capital to at least 51% of their total capital.
Two years after this Act, the government passed Decree Law
19999 setting up the State Company for Fish Meal and Oil
Production known as PESCA PERU, which was given exclusively
responsible for the fishery and processing of anchovy in Peru. In
line with this law, the entire anchovy industry was expropriated
by Decree Law 20000. One thousand two hundred and fifty-six
fishing vessels and 105 anchovy processing plants passed to the
administration of PESCA PERU. The new state company was now
also responsible for around 27,000 workers including vessel
crews and employees of processing plants [36]. Government
bonds were given to ship and factory owners in exchange for
their property. At the same time the fishery collapsed and land-
ings in 1973 were less than 1.5 million tonnes, compared to 10
million tonnes in 1971 [35,36] (Fig. 2a). The assets of the industry
at the time of collapse were estimated at 120 million US dollars,
compared to debts of 227.5 million US dollars [45].
The second Peruvian Fisheries Act was enacted in 1987 by the
second democratically elected government following 12 years of
military dictatorship. This left-wing government was controlled
by a populist social democratic political party with President Alan
Garcia as the head of the country. Article 3 of this Act stresses the
promotion and control by the state of the rational exploitation of
marine resources considering social welfare (Table 3). Nationa-
lized anchovy vessels had been returned to the private sector
in 1976 by Decree Law 21558; and the rights of the fishermen
to participate in company ownership, management and profits
according to the First Act (the ‘‘fishing communities’’) had been
also repealed in the late 1978 (Decree Law 22329). Both laws had
been enacted to make private capital investment in the industry
more attractive [51] and the need to ensure that national
social and democratic principles guided the fishery policy
had to be emphasized. President Alain Garcia’s administration
(1985–1990), recognizing that these state-private sector conflicts
were gradually undermining fisheries management, emphasized
the importance of cooperation in formulating sectoral develop-
ment priorities [37].
Considering use rights, again here, close to the start of the
document, Article 4 declares that the state exploits marine
resources, promoting the involvement of any individual, corpo-
rate entity or company, encourages the contribution of national
investment to the industry, while foreign investment remains
subject to pertinent Peruvian legislation (Table 3). However, the
specific objectives of this new law remain literally the same as in
First Act. New purposes of the Fisheries Ministry related to the
anchovy fisheries included: (a) to carry out scientific and tech-
nological research to address the best species exploitation rate
and environmental potential and (b) to integrate different fishing
activities within all the companies involved. Government
attempts to express its concerns for the development of the
fisheries sector for human consumption, besides the establish-
ment of policies for the anchovy industry, were exposed in further
purposes of the Ministry of Fisheries, as: (a) to regulate with-
drawal, industrialization, diversification and production and yield
enhancement of fish products for human consumption, (b) to
develop and promote aquaculture and artisanal fisheries, and (c)
to supervise and control fish supply for internal markets limiting
exportation and advertise regularly nutritional advantages of fish
to enhance its consumption. A novel purpose related to the
supervision and control of entrance and use of marine resources
in natural reserves was also introduced.
The third General Fisheries Act was enacted in 1992 by a right-
wing democratically elected government. Here, Article 3 under-
lines the promotion by the state of foreign investment in the
fisheries sector under the regulations established by Peruvian
legislation. The law adopts a neo-liberal perspective and empha-
sizes the application of free-market policies. It aims to regulate
the fishing sector to promote its sustainable development as a
source of food, employment and income; guarantee responsible
use of marine resources, optimizing economic profits in harmony
with environmental protection and biodiversity conservation.
No special functions are defined for the Ministry of Fisheries;
however, the basic norms insert an article to protect the environ-
ment from pollution, and a second one to regulate foreign flag
vessels operations.
3.3. Secondary legislation and fishing phases
During the first phase of uncontrollable growth of the fishery,
the first legal regulation to set up a closed season was declared in
1965. According to Supreme Decree 05-65 the fishery was closed
for the month of August 1965 and fishing was banned during
weekends. In January 1966, a three-month winter closed season
was declared, lasting from mid-May to mid-August (Supreme
Decree 05-66-PE), and the first TAC of seven million tonnes for
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one year was established. Additionally, the landing of catches
with more than 50% of juvenile anchovy by-catch was prohibited.
In 1967, a closed season was declared from July to September.
Two reasons have been identified for the acceptance and
enforcement of the closed season ban by the industry at this
point. First, the closed season was planned for southern winter
months, when anchovy shoals were more dispersed and difficult
to fish [46] and weather and sea conditions were also adverse.
Second, the fishermen and plant processing owners could make
use of this closed season to repair and maintain their vessels,
fishing gears, equipment and facilities [36]. Scientists from
IMARPE also welcomed this regulation enthusiastically, since
research on anchovy reproduction had already identified a major
spawning peak during winter months [47,48]. On the other
hand, quota limits were not complied with and anchovy landings
at the end of the sixties greatly exceeded the annual limits of
8 and 9 million tonnes that were recommended by IMARPE
[21,46,49]. Annual number of enacted secondary legislation
regulating quotas and close seasons increased from one in
1965 to a maximum of 10 in 1972 simultaneously to the ENSO
1972–1973 (Fig. 2b).
During the collapse phase of the fishery, succeeding the
establishment of the Ministry of Fisheries and the enactment of
the first Fisheries Act, specific regulations for the management of
the anchovy fishery for closed seasons and quota limits were all
established by means of Ministerial Resolutions. This procedure
was grounded legally on a Supreme decree enacted in 1977
(Supreme Decree 03-77-PE). During this collapse period of low
catches (1973–1984), the number of enacted secondary legisla-
tion fluctuated between five and ten with a very slight increment
during the moderate ENSO of 1976, but no relation with positive
SST anomalies during the strong 1982–1983 ENSO event.
An increasing trend in the number of secondary legislation can
be observed between 1994 and 2007, which coincides with the
sustainable landings phase of the fishery. In this phase, the
exceptional peak of 28 enacted secondary legislation establishing
quotas and/or fishing areas during the most recent strong ENSO
event in 1997–1998 was recorded (Fig. 2b).
3.4. The analytical framework towards a sustainable fisheries’ law
The results of applying Winter’s framework are presented in
Table 4. Almost no differences were observed between the First
and the Second Act, while the Third Act improved coverage of
topics like management and its guidelines and tools, surveillance
and enforcement (due in part to new available technologies), and
control of fisheries. According to these results, only the third
Fisheries Act (121 points) scored just enough to guarantee good
management practices for this fishery.
4. Discussion
Anecdotal evidence suggests that it was the passing a new law
that set off the development of the anchovy fishery. Law 12283,
passed in April 1955, extended the application of Law 10753,
which reduced the export tax applied to mineral and agricultural
companies, to fishery exports [44]. It was probably this law that
triggered the expansion of the anchovy fishery. However it was
probably also favored by other concurrent factors, including the
replacement of cotton fishing nets by nylon ones in 1956, the
availability of low cost second-hand vessels and fishmeal proces-
sing plants following the collapse of the Californian sardine
fishery, and an increasing fishmeal demand from the USA and
European countries [35,45].
4.1. Legal instruments and the transition to sustainable landings
The transition towards sustainable landings in the case of the
Peruvian anchovy fishery has been a result of co-evolutionary
processes of alternating slow and rapid change occurring at
different scales. According to Loorbach [52], this is the way
transitions occur, leading from one relatively stable state to
another. Legal instruments to manage the fisheries have been
part of this change process and have contributed to the sustain-
able state in which the fishery is currently placed. When con-
sidering also secondary legislation, this case study coincides with
formal institutions of long-lasting resource use systems where
operational rules had been devised and modified over time
according to a set of higher level rules; these higher-level rules
might themselves be modified slowly over time [53].
Peruvian fishing law evolution has followed socio-political and
economic policies transformation in the country. With the partial
exception of the third Fisheries Act and the establishment of
management systems for different marine resources and fisheries,
the structure, basic principles and contents (according to Winter’s
framework, see 3.4) showed no significant differences to explain a
transition towards sustainable fisheries based merely on new
regulations. Fisheries acts have apparently had little direct influ-
ence on the way the anchovy fishery has been managed on the
operational level. The acts were a manifestation of broader
national socio-political changes and expressed general attitudes
towards the exploitation of natural resources that mirrored the
political ideologies of the governments of the day. The three
General Peruvian Fisheries Acts were not changed or adapted in
response to crises in the fishing sector or their economic and
social consequences. In fact the anchovy fishery collapsed shortly
after the enactment of the first General Fisheries Act in 1971
(Fig. 2a). No relation is observed between the enactment of
fisheries acts and the occurrence of extreme ENSO events of
1971–1972, 1982–1983 and 1997–1998, which dramatically
impacted anchovy’s fishmeal production and marketing [27,28].
When new management measures were introduced, for example
the adoption of Geographical Positioning Systems (GPSs) to
control compliance of restricted fishing areas in 2001, or the
introduction in 2007 of new procedures for inter-sectoral colla-
boration in response to a request by the newly established
Ministry of the Environment, this was achieved by amending
the implementing regulations, while in each case the act itself
remained in force.
This apparently minor influence of fisheries acts on the
sustainability of the fishery is explained by the fact their principal
role was to define rules of access to the resource at a sectoral and
national level. Fisheries acts were used to outline the role of the
state and private investment and to delimit foreign involvement
in the fishery industry. In the case of common pool property
resources like fisheries, the definition of clear access boundaries
has been described as the first design principle for robust
institutions in adapting complex social–ecological systems [53].
Boundary rules relate to who can enter the area, harvest and
manage the resource, and potentially exclude others from doing
so. Although typically enforced by external officials, such rules
impact on the presumption that a participant has about the likely
levels of trustworthiness and cooperation of the others involved
[53]. The vast current literature on the benefits of implementation
of Individual Transferable Quotas and community fishing rights at
local (household) levels is a reflection of the importance accorded
to this thesis by the international scientific community. However,
there has been very little work done to clarify access rights
needed at different and higher levels of governance. This example
relating to the impact of laws on the anchovy fishery provides
new insights into this key element of fisheries governance.
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Table 4
Winter’s analytical framework applied to the three General Peruvian Fisheries Acts.
Checklists of potential management failures 1971 1987 1992
Is the law taken seriously? 0 0 0
Are binding rules of international fisheries law transposed and applicable in the country?a 0 0 2
Does the constitution contain rules relevant for fisheries? 2 2 2
What is the formal quality of the relevant laws?
Is there a specific law on fisheries? 3 3 3
Is the legal language precise and in line with general legal doctrine? 3 3 3
Does the law cover all elements of fisheries management?
Principles 2 2 3
Instruments of promotion 3 3 3
Instruments of management 1 1 3
Structures and competences of institutions 3 3 3
Delegation of powers for specified issues 2 2 2
Definitions of infringements and sanctions 2 2 3
Access to courts for affected parties and NGOs 1 1 1
Subtotal fisheries management 14 14 17
Was the law properly promulgated and disseminated? 3 3 3
Is the law’s relationship (hierarchy, lex specialis) with other laws unambiguous? 2 2 2
Is the law compatible with constitutional requirements? 1 3 3
Is the law compatible with principles of international law?n 0 0 2
What is the formal quality and content of any sub-legal norm?
Are they based on and consistent with higher ranking law? 2 3 3
Are they compatible with other sub-legal norms? 3 3 3
Are they appropriated promulgated and disseminated? 3 3 3
Do they impose sanctions for infringement? 2 2 3
Subtotal sub-legal norms 10 11 12
What material standards guide the application of fisheries management instruments?
Are fish resources defined as a common good? 2 2 2
Is sustainable use of fish resources defined? 2 2 2
Are ecosystems effects to be considered? 1 2 3
Is the precautionary principle to be applied? 0 0 2
Do measures have to be based on best available scientific knowledge? 2 3 3
Subtotal guides for fisheries management 7 9 12
How are responsible institutions shaped?
Is allocation of competences to legislate and administer between the levels of government clearly defined? 3 3 3
Is the environment ministry involved in decision making on fisheries management?b 0 0 0
Does the law provide for participation of fishermen’s associations and environmental NGOs? 3 1 1
Have self-regulatory structures been established? 1 1 1
Is transparency of decision making ensured? 1 1 1
Subtotal institutions 8 6 6
Is distribution justice ensured?
Are inshore areas reserved for artisanal fishing? 1 1 3
Is fishing in the EEZ nationalized? 3 3 3
Are quota for individual effort and catch allocated according to fair criteria? 1 1 1
What informational resources are provided on?
Is there research on stocks and ecosystems? 3 3 3
Monitoring of catch in the EEZ? 2 2 3
Monitoring of fishing capacity? 1 1 1
Data banks? 2 2 3
Access to stakeholders and the public to fisheries related information? 1 1 2
What promotional measures are taken?
In the case of under-capacity: are promotion policies in line with sustainable catch limits? 2 2 2
In the case of overcapacity: are promotion policies re-orienting towards reducing capacity? 1 1 1
What management tools are applied?
Catch limitation 2 2 2
Effort limitation 2 2 2
Technical measures: prohibition of destructive methods, selectivity of nets, reduction of by-catch, etc. 2 2 2
Marine protected areas: pollution prevention, nature protection, recovery and species management zones 1 2 2
Time and area limitation protecting spawning and nursery 3 3 3
Organization: bottom-up in the coastal zone, participatory top-down in EEZ and high seas 2 2 2
Subtotal management tools 12 13 13
How effective are surveillance and enforcement mechanisms?
Does surveillance cover strategic topics (catch, by-catch, landings, transhipments, foreign catch)? 2 2 3
Do fishermen, buyers and port authorities have recording duties? Are they reliable, and cost-effective? 1 1 1
What safeguards are in place against corruption? 1 1 1
How qualified is the inspection personnel? 1 1 3
Are technical equipment is available? 1 1 3
Are legal remedies available for affected parties? 1 1 1
Are legal remedies available for public interest groups? 1 1 1
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Evidence suggests that both restriction of access and main-
tenance of biological productivity are necessary conditions to
achieve sustainability [16]. The reason why the anchovy fishery
did not enter a sustainable phase after the first Fishery Act can be
explained with respect to these conditions and suggests two
possible non-exclusive propositions, which are discussed below.
First, although the acts defined access limits at national levels,
Peruvian restrictions to limit access at local (fishing companies),
operational levels have been generally poorly implemented. Thus,
within the broad boundaries to participation defined by law, vessels
entering the fishery have operated under a de facto open-access
regime [56]. As shown in Fig. 3, there is a strong relation between the
historical evolution of total holding capacity of the anchovy fleet and
fluctuations in landings, implying failures to limit the activity of
vessels authorized to take part in the fishery. Overcapacity of the
anchovy fleet and processing capacity has been a consistent feature of
this fishery [20,45,49,54,55] and this condition did not change when
the fishery entered the sustainable phase in 1994. Due to new neo-
liberal policies and the recovery of pelagic stocks between 1990 and
1995, the private sector found optimal conditions to invest in vessels
and plant modernization and construction. As a result, the anchovy
fleet capacity experienced a fast expansion [56]. The General Fisheries
Act of 1992 required vessel construction for anchovies to be balanced
by decommissioning older boats. Many firms were authorized to
build vessels for the sardine and jack-mackerel fisheries but means
were finally found to access the anchovy fisheries as well [56].
Furthermore, in 1998, the government passed Law 26920 which
authorized owners of wooden boats larger than 30m3 to join the
anchovy fleet. Around 600 wooden artisanal vessels were legally
incorporated into the anchovy fishing fleet adding 35,000 tonnes to
the total holding capacity.
However, there is no broad evidence that open access regimes are
largely incompatible with sustainable management of fisheries [14].
Maintenance of biological productivity depends more on the man-
agement agencies’ choice of harvest levels and their ability to enforce
these limits; thus defining property and access rights will not
automatically lead to full efficiency in fishing; for that to happen
the path of TACs over time must also be optimal [13]. That seems to
be the case of the Peruvian fishery, where TAC allocation has
improved since the implementation of seasonal acoustical cruises
to estimate pelagic fish biomass in 1983 [41]. After attainment of the
cumulative TAC, the manner in which recent secondary legislation
not only ban further fishing activities but simultaneously also fish-
meal processing is also important. The clearly identifiable smell of
burning fish, detectable even some miles away from the factories,
makes it impossible for illegal fishmeal reduction to go unnoticed,
and supports compliance of processing bans. The prompt recovery of
the anchovy fishery after the last ENSO of 1997–1998 could also be
an indicator of healthy maintenance of biological productivity during
the sustainable landings period. As reported by Gulland [57] and
Table 4 (continued )
Checklists of potential management failures 1971 1987 1992
Subtotal enforcement 8 8 13
Is there flag state control over fisheries in the high seas and foreign EEZs? 0 0 0
Participation in regional fisheries commissions 0 0 0
Licensing of vessels 3 3 3
Catch limitations 0 0 0
Control of landings 0 0 0
Vessel monitoring systems 0 0 0
Subtotal fisheries in the high seas 3 3 3
Is there port state control of landings from vessels flying foreign flags and fishing in high seas and foreign EEZs? 1 2 3
Total score 94 99 121
a Only applicable for the Third Fishery Act from 1992.
b Peru did not have a Ministry of the Environment until 2008.
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Fig. 3. Historical total holding capacity of the Peruvian anchovy commercial purse seines, and processing capacity of fishmeal plants between 1960 and 2008.
(Source: IMARPE).
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later confirmed by Caviedes and Fik [33], only when ENSO events are
associated with extremely high fishing levels, do significant barriers
exist to a recovery in anchovy landings. Gulland’s claims are based
on the little discernible impact of the two ENSOs of 1957 and 1965;
after which the anchovy fishery recovered a few months of their
onset. Caviedes’s conclusions are based on a model comparison
between ENSO impacts on Peruvian and Chilean fisheries. In both
cases, the negative impacts of ENSO events on the biomass of
anchovies are not disputed; the studies focus on the time-span
required for its recovery to pre-ENSO levels and subsequent resur-
gence of the fishery.
Second, contrary to the enactment of fisheries acts, secondary
legislation in the form of ministerial resolutions has noticeably
increased in number during the sustainable landings phase of the
fishery. The higher number of regulations related to quotas and
closed periods or areas during the ENSO 1997–1998 is a reflection of
the adaptive approach to management adopted during this phase.
During the 1972–1973 ENSO, a similar pattern could be observed to
a minor extent, however, the lack of strong scientific evidence at that
time [57] coupled with policy decisions that feared social discontent
and unemployment and an important source of foreign capital for
the country [33],5 prevented the success of such regulations to avoid
the collapse of the fishery. During the sustainable phase, not only
were policy and practice modified in accordance with new ecological
knowledge as required by adaptive management practices [58], but
updates in the allowable catch by IMARPE were made in a timely
fashion consistent with the biology of the species [15] (anchovy is a
short-lived fish species with a short life span of around three years
and age at first maturity at one year [47]).
In the context of efforts to attain the sustainability of the anchovy
fishery, a major challenge has been to develop the ability to respond
to rapidly changing conditions and uncertainty both in the natural
environment and in socio-economic and political systems. More-
over, although the impacts of ENSO are now relatively well under-
stood, the frequency and intensity of its occurrence remain a source
of uncertainty for fishermen andmanagers [28,34,35]. Even less well
understood are the impacts of natural driven inter-decadal regime
shifts which were first reported by scientists only after 50 years of
commercial fishing [29–31]. Thus for the Peruvian fishery, the
adoption of adaptive and rapid management in accordance with
ecological conditions should also be considered as a key element to
the transition towards sustainability.
4.2. Multilevel fisheries governance
Multilevel governance has been described as a ‘‘system of con-
tinuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial
tiers—supranational, national, regional and local’’ [59]. It is practised
not only in Europe, from where it originates, but also in the current
management of resources in distant developing countries. This case
study, showing the role of the Peruvian state defining national
policies towards use of natural resources, reinforces the theory that
power of central governments under multilevel governance systems
has not been eviscerated and remains the primary governance level
[60]. According to Pierre and Peters [61, p. 68], ‘‘the new [multilevel]
governance y does not mean the end or decline of the state but its
transformation and adaptation to the society it is currently embedded in’’.
Nevertheless, under the multilevel governance approach, economic-
fishery policies in Peru have evolved, both ceding power to suprana-
tional institutions and adopting new policy instruments that involve
partnerships with the private sector [62]. Supranational institutions
like the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations
(FAO) have played a role in influencing the most recent Peruvian
Fishery Act, for instance by putting pressure on the government to
adopt fishery management plans and environmental protection
measures (see Table 4). These themes were included in the law but
to enact a new fisheries’ act was taken by the Peruvian state alone.
Not even the Rome Declaration on the implementation of the Code of
Conduct for Responsible Fisheries adopted by Peru in 1999 had a
straightforward effect on fisheries legislation.
Regarding other institutional arrangements beyond the state
like networks, informal norms or agreements between actors,
there is no doubt of their key role in fisheries governance in Peru;
however, these kinds of arrays take place under existing legal and
structural frameworks that remain in place. As shown in this
study, the function of the state and its political administrative
system should not be neglected in the study of multilevel
governance of sustainable fisheries.
4.3. Winter’s analytical framework for fisheries law
Although the knowledge of the role of laws to support fisheries
sustainability is limited or has been restricted to analyze non-
compliance, Winter [12] identifies good laws in fisheries as the ones
that create legal certainty, integrate higher rank human rights and
resource protection obligations, clarify objectives, set out rights and
duties of fishers, determine governmental competences, limit
administrative discretion, provide enforcement tools and allow for
judicial review of administrative measures. Some of these features
are covered by the current Peruvian Fisheries Act, as reflected in the
score obtained, but some potential management failures remain a
threat under the current legislation. The top-down management of
the fishery, no legal remedies for affected parties, general public
and NGOs, and no safeguards in place against corruption, are worth
mentioning here. It is understandable, however that the availability
of new technologies like satellite positioning systems, and even text
messages and the internet has improved enforcement of surveil-
lance and control. This fact explains the major score obtained by the
third Fisheries Act and has certainly contributed to ensure appro-
priate fisheries management practices during the sustainable land-
ings phase of the fishery.
Regarding the potential use of this innovative semi-quantitative
tool, some difficulties appeared when comparing laws over such a
long period of time. Many terms, principles, fishing practices and
technologies were not available at the time the first Peruvian act was
enacted, causing some problems for interpretation of results. Only
the first question: is the law taking seriously; appears unfeasible to
answer without a specific research to address this topic. Considering
this question, already in the First Act some sections of the law were
definitely taken seriously. The implementation of the ‘‘fishing com-
munities’’ and the limitations towards foreign participation in the
fishing industry are some examples, while the increment of the
nutritional index of the Peruvian population or the requirement for
which each fisherman should be registered and in possession of
a boarding permit was not really compelled.
Winter’s framework is nevertheless a worthy and promising
first attempt to quantify the potential of a fisheries’ law; and
further development of the methodology should be encouraged.
The tool could be used for instance for semi-quantitative compar-
isons of national fisheries laws between countries.
4.4. Legal certainty and adaptability
Laws are the governmental instruments that provide frame-
works for many of the interactions between the members of our
society, and legal relations are fundamental to creating order in
societies, not least in the form of economic relations [63].
Complex social–ecological fisheries systems are shaped by laws
5 By 1971 the anchovy industry was responsible for 35% of all Peruvian foreign
currency supplies [45].
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of nature and simultaneously by human-made laws. According to
Ebbesson [39] legal certainty is an important virtue of law; and
does not as such necessarily prevent adequate flexibility in
administrative decision-making concerning health, the environ-
ment or the use of natural resources. In the case of the anchovy
fishery, the law not only does not contest flexible adaptive
management but supports the settings in which this adaptability
takes place. The name given to the Fisheries Acts, as ‘‘General Acts’’,
mirrors the intention to enact fisheries principles leaving opera-
tional management issues to secondary legislation or non-legal
norms. Finally, legal human-made certainty added to environmen-
tal uncertainty appears to reduce the total system uncertainty and
promote sustainable transitions.
5. Conclusions
Although specific lessons for fisheries management do not come
in black and white and in fisheries management we should never
claim successes, only achievements [7], the future of fisheries
sustainability will depend on our ability to understand the key
elements of these achievements and apply them well [14]. This
study provides some insights in key elements of achievements of the
Peruvian anchovy fishery, and does not purport to fully explain the
complex dynamics that have steered the anchovy fishery towards
sustainable landings in recent years. However, legal instruments in
this case have been certainly part of the broad range of activities
that fisheries management has consisted of, many of which are
often overlooked by outsiders [16]. Fisheries acts in Peru define
access rights to the fishery and regulate the fisheries sector within
national, economic and political dimensions. To achieve sustainable
landings goes beyond the tasks of these acts and should be
addressed by sub national governance levels. The base-level govern-
ance to manage landings is left to secondary legislation that evolves
according to different tools like institutional and organizational
functioning, agencies legitimacy, science, technologies and innova-
tions, or even experience and learning capacities. This secondary
legislation and further institutions should operate linked to envir-
onmental and ecological settings and be adaptive to guarantee
stable landings. Following this analysis fisheries laws in Peru cannot
guarantee sustainable landings on its own. After defining access
rights and political strategies, what Gerd Winter does define as ‘‘a
sustainable fisheries law’’ works as an umbrella to allow secondary
legislation and other norms to evolve towards sustainability. Further
research is necessary to reveal if specific secondary legislation and
informal institutions, once established to undertake sustainable
landings, are robust to national, political or economic adjustments.
It seems also important to mention here that similar studies that
have provided material for the discussions above are all taken from
fisheries research with detailed data from developed countries like
the US northeast Atlantic, Australian and New Zealand fisheries [64].
However, current worldwide fishery statistics show that nine of the
top twelve top fishing countries are developing countries [17] and
these countries have contributed to more than two-thirds of total
fish production during the last decade [65]. Under these conditions
it appears imperative to direct more efforts towards case studies in
developing countries, where not only artisanal but also important
commercial fisheries take place. South Africa, Mexico, Indonesia,
Chile are just some examples to be mentioned.
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Abstract: The Peruvian anchovy fishery is the largest worldwide in terms of catches. The 
fishery started during the mid 1950s, and since then it has been highly dependent on natural 
stock fluctuations, due to the sensitivity of anchovy stocks to ocean-climate variability. The 
main driver of anchovy stock variability is the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO), and 
three extreme ENSO warm events were recorded in 1972–1973, 1983–1984 and 1997–1998. 
This study investigates the evolution of coping strategies developed by the anchovy fisheries 
to deal with climate variability and extreme ENSO events. Results showed eight coping 
strategies to reduce impacts on the fishery. These included: decentralized installation of 
anchovy processing factories; simultaneous ownership of fishing fleet and processing 
factories; use of low-cost unloading facilities; opportunistic utilization of invading fish 
populations; low cost intensive monitoring; rapid flexible management; reduction of 
fishmeal price uncertainty through controlled production based on market demand; and 
decoupling of fishmeal prices from those of other protein-rich feed substitutes like soybean. 
This research shows that there are concrete lessons to be learned from successful 
adaptations to cope with climate change-related extreme climatic events that impact the 
supply of natural resources. The lessons can contribute to improved policies for coping with 
climate change in the commercial fishery sector.  
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1. Introduction  
Capture fisheries and aquaculture supplied the world with about 142 million tons of fish food in 
2008 and provided 3 billion people with at least 15% of their average per capita animal protein  
intake [1] These fishery activities, so important for nourishing and ensuring the livelihoods of large 
sectors of the world population, are closely linked to weather and climate dynamics, and are more 
affected by these than any other category of food production [2]. While weather conditions directly 
affect fishing, environmental climate variability determines the distribution, migration and abundance 
of fish [3]. Fisheries-climate links have been the subject of research since at least the establishment of 
the International Council of the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) in 1902 [4]. More than a century later, 
the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) states that “the fisheries sector is not 
unfamiliar with the issue of climate variability and it is experienced in dealing with variability on a 
range of time scales” [5]. 
The Peruvian anchovy fishery has been described as the largest fishery that has ever existed on 
earth [6-8] and as the most intense and successful fishery worldwide [9]. Annual current catches are 
around 7–8 million tons [10] captured by almost 1200 purse seiners locally known as bolicheras [11]. 
Ninety nine percent of anchovy catches are reduced to fishmeal and fish oil by around 140 processing 
factories [6,12]. The fishery is mono-specific [13,14]; since at least 90% of the catches consist of one 
fish species: anchovy or anchoveta (Engraulis ringens).  
Peruvian anchovy, like any other pelagic fish species, are highly sensitive to ocean-climate 
variability and show drastic stock fluctuations [9,15-17]. Historical landings statistics show that the 
fishery went through a first phase of frenzy and uncontrolled growth from its establishment in the  
mid-1950s until its collapse in 1972. After the collapse, a second phase from 1973 to 1984 was 
characterized by unfavorable warm ocean conditions and low catches. A third phase, from 1984 to the 
present, with propitious ocean-environmental conditions and modern governance, can be further divided 
into a second growth period (1984–1994) and a sustainable landings period (1995 to present) [10,18,19]. 
Thus, anchovy catches in Peru are dependant on inter-annual and multi-decadal variability driven 
by climatic conditions in the Pacific Ocean [9]. The most important climatic factor affecting this 
geographical area is the Pacific coupled ocean-atmospheric circulation pattern known as El Niño 
Southern Oscillation (ENSO) [3,20]. The ENSO cycle consists of a warm period (El Niño) and a cold 
period (La Niña) and is characterized by respectively anomalous cooling or warming of the eastern 
Pacific. In Peruvian waters, El Niño (the warm ENSO period) usually lasts for a few weeks to a few 
months. Sometimes an extremely warm event can develop lasting for a much longer time [21]. The 
effects of El Niño events in Peru have long been observed and three major impacts have been 
identified: (i) it increases coastal sea temperature by up to 8 °C, (ii) it reduces plankton productivity 
and (iii) it creates a more tropical predator-prey environment [3]. As a result, anchovy catches are, 
broadly, negatively correlated to sea surface temperature (SST) anomalies; SST is the principal 
indicator used to measure the duration and intensity of El Niño events in Peruvian waters (Figure 1a). 
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Figure 1. (a) Peruvian anchovy landings, sea surface temperature (SST) anomalies and 
three El Niño extreme events since 1956 and (b) Evolution of coping strategies to reduce 
impacts of climate variability and extreme events.  
 
Unfortunately for purposes of prediction, the interval between El Niño events is very irregular. It is 
not uncommon to have six or seven years’ interval, but some events have been separated by as little as 
one year [22] Although current understanding and modeling of El Niño has improved remarkably over 
the last decade [23,24], the predictability of El Niño is still an open question [25]; and our ability to 
forecast its evolution is far from perfect [24]. 
Three El Niño episodes of exceptional intensity and duration were recorded in 1972–1973,  
1982–1983 and 1997–1998 [3,14,26] (Figure 1a). Although the relation between climate change and El 
Niño events has been debated during the last decades [27-32], recent research has revealed that 43% of 
extreme El Niño events have occurred since the start of the 20th century and 30% during the post-1940 
period [33]. These results suggest that ENSO may operate differently under natural (pre-industrial) and 
anthropogenic background states [33]. The aim of this study is to investigate the evolution of coping 
strategies developed by the Peruvian anchovy fishery to deal with environmental variability and 
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extreme El Niño events, whose frequency can be expected to increase under current climate change 
scenarios [33,34]. 
2. Field Study Methodology 
The study area was the Peruvian coast between latitudes 03°30’ S to 18°20’ S and longitudes 72°W 
to 84°W, which is dominated by the Humboldt–Peru eastern boundary current system. The coastal 
ecosystem is characterized on the marine side by intense upwelling and associated high productivity, 
which however are variable between years and decades [35]; and on the land side by an almost 
2,250 km long narrow desert strip. 
Semi-structured interviews with key informants were carried out during October 2008 and 
November 2009. Interviews were carried out at the Vice-Ministry of Fisheries (10 interviews), the 
Instituto del Mar del Perú or IMARPE (8 interviews) and the private fishery sector (9 interviews) 
(Annex 1). Interviewees were selected on the basis of length of experience and period of time in post, 
in order to obtain information covering at least the period during and between the last two strong 
ENSO events in 1982–1983 and 1997–1998. Since the interviewer herself worked for IMARPE 
between 1994 and 2001, interviewees were approached via email or telephone with support from  
ex-colleagues currently working directly for the government or the fishing industry. All government 
officials were interviewed at their offices with previous permission from their superiors. 
Extensive documentary analysis based mainly on internal reports, yearbooks, fishery magazines and 
grey literature was also undertaken. Historical fishery data was gathered from the anchovy database at 
the Pelagic Resources Department of IMARPE. 
As an output of the interviews, four impacts of extreme El Niño events on the anchovy fishery were 
identified and used to analyze the evolution of coping strategies. These impacts were as follows:  
First Impact:  Changes in distribution of anchovy shoals with consequent relocation of anchovy 
fishing grounds 
Second Impact: Decrease in anchovy biomass and invasion of foreign tropical species into 
anchovy fishing grounds 
Third Impact:  Management regulations rapidly out-of-date 
Fourth Impact:  Uncertain changes in fishmeal prices 
3. Results and Discussion 
The fishery system can be broken down into three interacting subsystems: resource, resource users 
and resource management [36] or resource units produced by the fishery, the users of that system and 
the governance system [37]. Our results show that Peruvian fishing companies (resource users) and 
anchovy management authorities (resource management) have together developed at least eight 
strategies to cope with the impacts of climate variability and extreme El Niño events (Table 1). 
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Table 1. Strategies developed by the Peruvian anchovy fishery to deal with environmental 
variability and extreme climatic events. 
Impact Coping strategy Implementation 
Changes in the distribution of 
anchovy shoals 
Scatter geographical distribution of 
fishmeal plants along the coast 
Fishery companies 
 Simultaneous ownership of fishing 
vessels and processing factories 
Fishery companies 
 Low-cost uploading facilities Fishery companies 
Invasion of foreign species 
into anchovy fishing grounds 
Fishmeal production based on 
invading fish 
Fishery companies 
Management regulations 
rapidly out-of-date 
EUREKA program Management authorities 
 Rapid and flexible management Management authorities 
Uncertain changes in fishmeal 
prices 
Fishmeal production based on 
market demand 
Fishery companies 
 Reducing price dependence from 
soybean production 
Fishery companies 
Five of the eight strategies were developed at the start of the rapid growth phase of the fishery 
during the 1960s (Figure 1b). These strategies were a response to seasonal stock variability and the 
impacts of minor El Niño events in 1965 and 1969 [22,38]; however, they played an important role in 
diminishing the effects of subsequent, more extreme events. One strategy was put in place as the 
fishery started to collapse during the extreme 1972–1973 El Niño event. The remaining two strategies 
have been developed since 1994, during the sustainable landings phase of the fishery [18]. 
3.1. First Impact: Changes in Distribution of Anchovy Shoals with Consequent Relocation of Anchovy 
Fishing Grounds 
The sensibility of anchovy shoals to climate variability was identified on a very early stage of the 
fishery and was documented in the second “historical report” of Instituto de Investigaciones de 
Recursos Marinos or IREMAR in 1962. This report records a sharp decline in landings in ports of 
northern Peru during January 1962, and suggests this was likely due to the migration of anchovy shoals 
or to changes in local sea temperature [39]. Some years later Roemer [40] noted that “anchovy fishing 
is not uniformly good along the coast and the fortunes of any one zone vary from season to season or 
even from month to month”. As a result of this observed variability, before the onset of the first 
extreme 1972–1973 El Niño and even prior to the minor events of 1965 and 1969, three coping 
strategies to deal with changes in the relocation of anchovy fishing grounds were early on put in place. 
3.1.1. Coping Strategy 1: Scatter Geographical Distribution of Fishmeal Plants along the Coast 
The Peruvian anchovy is a small, short-living, fast growing surface dweller widely distributed along 
the coast of South America [35]. Off Peru two population units are recognized: the north-central stock, 
from about latitude 4° S to 15° S, and the southern stock from 15° S to the southern limit of the 
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Peruvian maritime domain [10,35,41]. Fishing usually takes place between latitudes 5° S and 14° S, 
targeting on the north-central anchovy stock, which is by far the most productive [10] (Figure 2). 
Figure 2. North-central and southern stock Peruvian anchovy landings between 1959 and 
2008 (Source: IMARPE). 
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Anchovy fishing and processing started in 1955 in the port of Chimbote (09°05' S), and in Callao 
(12°05' S), the port that serves Lima [42]. In 1960, when anchovy landings started to increase rapidly, 
fishmeal processing was concentrated around Callao, where 31 factories (of a total of 85) were in 
operation [40]. Two years later, the first official census of fishmeal factories carried out by IREMAR 
reported 110 fishmeal plants operating at 15 different locations. Only three of the 110 factories were 
situated south of latitude 14° S (southern Peru) but a tendency to decentralize towards the south was 
observed [43,44]. In 1963, the number of processing plants increased to 149, with eight located south 
of 14° S. At that time, 15 fishing companies were responsible for 52% of total fishmeal production, of 
which 11 owned at least two factories in different locations [45]. 
The El Niño 1965 caused the number of fishmeal factories in operation to decrease from 157 in 
1964 to 131 in 1967 [40] but the number increased again to 185 in 1968 [46]. This year, ten out of 63 
fishing companies were responsible for 50% of total fishmeal production, and all of them owned at 
least two factories located in different areas [42]. The largest fishing company, which produced 15.3% 
of total fishmeal, owned nine fishmeal plants, which were located in the ports of Chicama (07°50' S), 
Chimbote (09°05' S), Supe (10°48' S), Callao (12°05' S) and Pisco (13°42' S) [42]. 
Thus, unpredictable changes in fishing grounds motivated fishing companies to own more than one 
fishmeal plant and to locate them strategically at different sites along the coast. The companies 
recognized that the only long-run protection against poor fishing as a result of anchovy stock 
movements was to spread the risk by operating plants in two or more zones [40]. The flat Peruvian 
desert provided spacious building sites for factories and space for huge inventories, which need little or 
no protection due to the stable arid weather [47]. On the other hand, lack of water supply, electricity, 
manpower and landing facilities were important factors that limited the expansion [48]. Nevertheless 
fishmeal plants increased from 27 in 1956 to 171 in 1966, and when the first fishing quota limit of  
9.5 million ton of anchovy was set up by the government in 1967, total processing capacity was able to 
Sustainability 2011, 3                            
 
 
829 
handle 3.8 times the given quota. Excess capacity had clearly become a problem [40]. Since then, 
overcapacity of the anchovy fleet and processing capacity has been a consistent feature of the anchovy 
fishery [11,12,46,49]. 
During El Niño 1972–1973, when anchovy availability decreased in the north fishing grounds, the 
fishery migrated to the south. This was made possible by the availability of fishmeal processing 
facilities along the entire coast. As shown in Figure 3, landings in the south (1972) and in the center 
grounds (1973) increased when anchovy moved from their northern fishing grounds. In 1984, anchovy 
landings in the north of Peru were banned; and 90% of landings were reported in southern Peru. The 
same pattern was observed in 1998 when 94% of the landings came from south latitude 10° S. 
Figure 3. Anchovy landings in percentages from the northern (5° S–9° S), central  
(10° S–14° S) and southern (15° S–18° S) fishing grounds during the 1971–1972,  
1982–1983 and 1997–1998 extreme El Niño events (Source: IMARPE).  
 
3.1.2. Coping Strategy 2: Simultaneous Ownership of Fishing Fleet and Processing Factories 
In response to the high risk element inherent in the availability of fish, anchovy processing 
companies attempted to achieve greater control over raw material supply by operating their own 
fishing fleets [40]. This practice of vertical integration also developed during the 1960s and, by 1962, 
61% of fishing vessels were fishing to supply fishmeal plants owned by the same company [44]. In 
1966, a sample of 51 fishmeal plants processing 60% of the catch revealed that 70% of the anchovy 
caught were landed by boats belonging to fishmeal plants [40]. An important consideration was the 
desire to avoid being reliant on independent fishermen. Fishermen could otherwise make life difficult 
for processing companies by taking a hard line in the negotiation of landed anchovy prices. They could 
decide to sell their catches to other companies or, even more critically, to migrate away from areas of 
poor fishing. Roemer [40] states that: 
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The consensus among plant owners is that they would prefer not to worry about the 
additional organization and higher fixed costs involved in operating individual fleets. 
However the independent fishermen have proved unreliable, not always keeping to their 
contracts and quickly deserting areas of poor fishing. Thus a plant maintains a fleet to 
guard against low capacity utilization or shut down in case the fishing in its area worsens. 
3.1.3. Coping Strategy 3: Low Cost Uploading Facilities
In places where harbor facilities were in bad condition, not sufficient or did not exist at all, which 
was the case at most of the ports locations, a system of unloading barges known locally as chatas was 
set up to assist the transport of anchovy from the fishing vessel. A chata consists of a floating platform 
about 20 m long, which supports a long pipeline that is used to transport the anchovy from a fishing 
vessel offshore to the factory (Figure 4) The longest pipeline attached to a chata in Peru is 1 km long 
and was built in Puerto Chicama (07°42’ S), where rough sea conditions are unfavorable for unloading 
procedures. By 1962, 36% of the fishing vessels used chatas to unload their anchovy catches [44]. 
Figure 4. Unloading barge or chata transporting anchovy from the fishing vessel to the 
fishmeal factory on the Peruvian coast. 
 
3.2. Second Impact: Decrease in Anchovy Biomass and Invasion of Foreign Tropical Species into 
Anchovy Fishing Grounds 
As reported by Ñiquen and Bouchón (2004) [14], a remarkable decrease in anchovy biomass and 
increase in the biomass of other pelagic species was observed in Peruvian waters during the 
1972–1973, 1982–1983, 1997–1998 events. During extreme events, two important anchovy predators 
migrate deeper into the anchovy area, horse mackerel (Trachurus murphyyi) [22] and jack mackerel 
(Scomber japonicus) [50]. The biomass of both species in the anchovy habitat more than doubles; at 
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the peak of the 1972 and 1976 El Niño events it increased 3.5-fold [3]. At the same time, sardines 
(Sardinops sagax) move closer to the coast [51] and seem to do well or even thrive during El Niño 
events [3]. 
3.2.1. Coping Strategy 4: Diversification within and beyond Fishmeal Production 
As a result of decreases in anchovy biomass, the fishery is forced to diversify its catches to target other 
pelagic resources like sardine, jack or Pacific mackerel, and long-nose anchovy (Anchoa nasus) [14], and 
use these foreign species to produce fishmeal. 
This behavior was first recorded later than the previous strategies described, during the onset of the 
extreme event of 1972–1973 (Figure 1b). In 1962, less than 1% of the fishmeal production came from 
fish species other than anchovy [48]. This percentage did not change until 1973, when landings of 
other pelagic fish suddenly increased [52] (Table 2). During the El Niño 1972–1973, three million tons 
of sardines, horse and jack mackerel were reduced to fishmeal to prop up the industry [53]. 
Table 2. Percentages of anchovy and other spp. contribution to total small pelagic fisheries 
production, before, during and after the three extreme El Niño events. 
Year Anchovy Sardines 
Horse 
mackerel 
Jack 
Mackerel 
Long-nose 
anchovy 
1969 99.9 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 
1970 99.9 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 
1971 99.8 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 
1972 99.2 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.0 
1973 86.3 7.5 2.4 3.7 0.0 
1974 93.1 1.9 3.4 1.6 0.0 
      
1980 30.2 62.1 5.2 2.5 0.0 
1981 47.5 49.8 1.5 1.3 0.0 
1982 52.1 45.7 1.5 0.7 0.0 
1983 9.4 82.8 6.1 1.8 0.0 
1984 0.8 90.4 6.0 2.8 0.0 
1985 19.9 76.7 2.0 1.4 0.0 
      
1996 83.3 11.6 4.2 0.6 0.3 
1997 80.9 11.1 5.3 2.5 0.2 
1998 30.7 36.9 9.5 11.5 11.5 
1999 88.9 4.4 1.1 5.2 0.4 
2000 94.8 1.5 2.5 1.1 0.1 
2001 83.8 0.6 10.7 4.3 0.5 
Between 1980 and 1985, anchovy stocks were at their lowest carrying capacity, the results of a 
regime shift that turned the ecosystem from an anchovy to a sardine dominated environment [54]. This 
period lasted from 1970 to 1985, when anchovy landings started to recover, and is linked to an 
ecosystem dynamic related to the movement of warm subtropical oceanic waters towards or away from 
the coasts of Peru and Chile [26]. Under these circumstances, a new sardine fishery developed in Peru 
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from 1977 to 1990 with a landing peak of 3.5 million tons of sardines in 1988 [19]. The sardine fishery 
was only for human consumption and the high percentage of sardine landings during El Niño  
1982–1983 (Table 2) is due to this fishery. Following the 1982–1983 El Niño, anchovy landings 
reached a historical low of 25,000 tons in 1984 (Figure 1a), but there is no evidence that other pelagic 
species were exploited to maintain the collapsed fishery during this period. 
During the extreme 1997–1998 El Niño sardines and mackerels again contributed to sustaining the 
fishmeal industry (Dioses and Cárdenas, pers. comm.). Sardines were illegally used for fishmeal 
production in preference to the long-nose anchovy, which is not considered an edible fish in Peru. 
Higher percentages of mackerel landings from 1999 to the present (Table 2) are a response to the 
efforts of the government and Peruvian fishing companies to promote diversification towards fishing 
for the human consumption market. 
Thus the strategies of the fishing companies to cope with dramatic resource variability have been to 
first keep the fishmeal industry supplied with tropical fish species that invade anchovy fishing grounds 
during extreme El Niño events. Fishmeal production, in contrast to the seafood fishery, does not 
depend on the abundance of specific species and can opportunistically switch from anchovy to other 
fish when necessary. Secondly, fishmeal companies will diversify and direct their fishing activities to 
human consumption target species. 
3.3. Third Impact: Management Regulations Rapidly Out-of-Date 
From 1965, the management of the anchovy fishery in Peru was based on a system of fishing 
quotas, closed seasons and other restrictions on fishing effort [12,55,56]. Government management 
and control is responsibility of the Ministry of Production (PRODUCE) and the Vice-Ministry of 
Fisheries. Management decisions are taken based on reports from the government’ S marine research 
institute IMARPE, whose institutional objective is to provide scientific support for the sustainable 
management of marine resources. The government applies two different management schemes for the  
northern-central and the southern anchovy stock, the latter being exploited simultaneously by Peru and 
Chile [57]. 
Between two and four acoustic surveys to assess the abundance and distribution of pelagic fish 
populations and to estimate the quota or Total Allowable Catch (TAC) for both anchovy stocks have 
been carried out yearly by IMARPE since 1983 [13]. TACs are calculated from current biomass 
estimations and draw upon the results of biological monitoring that is carried out at all landing  
sites [10]. Once the TAC is reached, the Vice-Ministry of Fisheries orders the closure of the fishing 
season, banning not only anchovy fishing but also fishmeal processing. Fishing of the northern stock is 
usually divided into two fishing seasons, each with its own quota: a summer season from October to 
March and a winter season from April to September [12]. In the case of the southern anchovy stock, 
usually no TAC is applied and the fishing season is open almost all year around. Temporary closures 
of landing ports, for a minimum of three days, are also imposed when the reported presence of 
juveniles (<10 cm long) exceeds 10% of total catches [18]. Reports come from daily real-time 
verification of landings.  
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A management system of Individual Vessel Quotas (IVQ), locally referred to as Maximum Catch 
Limits per Vessel (MCLV), was established in July 2008 (Legislative Decree Nr. 1086) and is currently 
being implemented for both anchovy stocks [6,9]. 
During extreme El Niño events, routine application of catch quotas and fishing closures is no longer 
effective and management regulations have to adjust fast to rapidly changing conditions. For example, 
the El Niño 1997–1998 developed so rapidly that each month from June to December 1997 a new 
monthly record high was set for SST in the eastern equatorial Pacific [58]. In response to such rapid 
change in the environment, the management and governance system is forced to mirror the dynamics 
of the ecosystem and become just as rapid in order to increase the chances of survival of the fishing 
industry. Two strategies have been developed by the Peruvian fisheries management agencies to deal 
with such fast changing situations: low cost additional monitoring and flexible fisheries regulations. 
3.3.1. Coping Strategy 5: Low Cost Monitoring 
The first strategy developed to cope with rapidly changing conditions at sea was to attain additional 
monitoring capacity. This was achieved through the establishment of the so-called EUREKA cruises in 
1966 [41,59] (Figure 1b). Revenues from taxes imposed on the industry based on the value of landed 
anchovy are, by law, allocated to directly cover operational and research costs of the Vice-Ministry of 
Fisheries and IMARPE. When anchovy shoals suddenly decrease, tax collection also falls and is not 
enough to cover the additional monitoring that is required to determine when fishing can restart. In 
these circumstances, so-called EUREKA cruises are undertaken. EUREKA cruises are based on legal 
agreements by which the fishing companies allow IMARPE to use their fleet as scientific platforms in 
order to monitor biological conditions and anchovy stocks in real time [10]. Scientific and technical 
personnel from IMARPE are sent to the main fishing ports, from where anchovy vessels set sail 
simultaneously to perform oceanographic sampling and carry out experimental fishing. Fishing 
companies that take part are selected from among those entitled to sign an agreement by drawing lots. 
The costs of these cruises are totally covered by the companies, thus notably reducing not only 
governmental expenses but also the delays involved in planning and implementing conventional large 
scale research cruises. The fishing companies involved are allowed to process the anchovy catches 
obtained from the experimental fishing to recover some of the associated financial costs.  
The first EUREKA program was carried out in February 1966, in response to the onset of the mild 
El Niño event in December 1965. From then until 1982, when the first large acoustical evaluation 
cruise was undertaken, 59 operations were carried out. As shown in Figure 5, the number of EUREKA 
cruises increased in frequency during El Niño 1972–1973, as well as the monitoring effort, shown in 
this case by the number of vessels taking part. Since 1982, monitoring of anchovy stocks and 
conditions at sea has been carried out by an annual program of acoustic surveys and one 
ichtyoplankton survey, supplemented by at least two annual oceanographic cruises. However, when 
necessary EUREKA cruises are still implemented; the most recent one was undertaken in April 2010. 
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Figure 5. EUREKA cruises and number of fishing vessels participating between February 
1976 and September 1982. 
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3.3.2. Coping Strategy 6: Rapid Management and Flexible Legal Instruments 
Rapid management of the Peruvian anchovy fisheries is a response to the impossibility of 
calculating a long term optimal catch and the challenge of coping with rapid and unpredictable 
environmental change. Uncertainty arrives with every El Niño, since no two El Niño events are exactly 
alike [60] and each El Niño always behaves different from its predecessor. For example, it forms more 
quickly, or at a different time of the year, and has different impacts on marine species; so researchers 
and forecasters are surprised once again [61]. “Loose” or flexible management rules are a response to 
this uncertainty. 
Management and control of Peruvian fisheries activities is currently regulated according to the most 
recent General Fisheries Act of 1992. This law requires that a management plan for each fishery 
should be applied in accordance with principles of long-term sustainable use and maximum economic 
and social benefits (Chapter 2, Law Decree 25977). Since the enactment of the most recent Fisheries 
Act Implementing Regulations in 2001 (Supreme Decree 029-2001-PE), management plans have been 
established for almost all commercial fisheries. These plans have been implemented for the demersal 
hake fishery since 2003; the giant squid fishery since 2001; highly migratory tuna-like fishery since 
2001 (revised 2003); and even for the pelagic jack and horse mackerel fishery since 2001 (revised 
2007). However there is no management plan in operation for the anchovy fishery. This is not 
accidental or unintended but reflects the intention of the government to avoid the use of legal 
instruments that could restrict or delay a rapid management decision process. Legally, anchovy is 
managed under “Provisional Fishing Regimes”, drawn up in accordance with IMARPEs scientific 
recommendations, and approved by the signature of the Minister of Production. 
An example of rapid management of the anchovy fishery is the provisional closure of landing 
harbors when juveniles account of more than 10% of the catches. According to IMARPE scientists, it 
takes the government less than two days from the delivery of a report by IMARPE of high juvenile 
capture rates, to the resulting closure of the port concerned. The legal department of the Vice-Ministry 
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of fisheries draws up the ministerial resolution one day after the arrival of IMARPE’ S report; the same 
day the minister signs it, and the next day the resolution is published in the daily official Peruvian 
newspaper “El Peruano”. The port is closed on the same day after the publication in the newspaper. 
According to Chavez et al. (2008) [9]: 
Fisheries decisions in Peru are made in quasi real time using the most recent observations. 
It is probably the only place in the world where this rapidly “adaptive” management style 
is possible. Government bureaucracy and slow data analysis usually mean that the 
management decisions are implemented for yesterday’ S conditions and problems. 
3.4. Fourth Impact: Uncertain Changes in Fishmeal Prices 
As in all market-based economic activity, commercial fisheries are beset by both supply side and 
demand side problems [62]. Thus market prices for fishmeal are determined by the interaction of 
delicately sensitive market demand and supply curves; and have fluctuated violently during the entirely 
history of the fishery [47]. When due to El Niño events, fishmeal production supply decreases, prices 
should increase and vice versa. As a result of a drop in catches due to El Niño 1965, fishmeal prices 
went up from an average price of US$ 108.50 per metric ton in 1964 to US$ 207.50 in early 1965 [47]. 
Prices then fell as catches increased and oceanographic conditions returned to normal. This scenario 
changed when prices of other protein feed substitutes like soybean, sunflower, palm kernel, cotton 
seed, entered the market. The existence of substitute products means that if fishmeal harvesting 
inefficiencies become excessive and as a result prices increase, fishmeal is replaced by other products 
from the world protein market [47]. 
Based on monthly data of fishmeal and soybean prices between 1981 and 1999, it was found that 
fishmeal and soybean were strong rich protein meal substitutes [63] and that total supply and demand 
of these two protein meals were determinants of fishmeal prices. Given the vast environmental 
variability exacerbating the supply side for the anchovy industry, it is not surprising that mechanisms 
to cope with the demand side were evolved. Fishing companies developed two strategies to cope with 
unpredictable changes in fishmeal prices. 
3.4.1. Coping Strategy 7: Coordinated Fishmeal Supply 
In 1960 the problem of excessive supply and subsequently lower prices (fishmeal price fell from 
US$ 174 to US$ 60 per metric ton) was met by establishing a system of export quotas for each fishing 
company [40]. This was implemented at a national level by the Peruvian Fisheries Consortium [55,64], 
which represented at least 80% of fishing companies in Peru and functioned as a sales cooperative; and 
at an international level by the Fishmeal Exporters Organization (FEO) [40,65]. FEO, an association of 
the most important fishmeal exporting countries, was responsible for promoting sales of fishmeal, 
acting as a clearing house for information on fishmeal production and markets and establishing a 
system of export quotas for participating nations [40]. Increasing demand for fishmeal in the 
international market some years later led to the abandonment of the quota system [40]. The 
Consortium’ S operation ended in 1970, when the Peruvian government, prior to nationalizing the 
industry, set up the Empresa Publica de comercialización de Harina y Aceite de Pescado or EPCHAP 
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(State Company for Fishmeal and Fish-oil Marketing) and any unauthorized, independent sale of 
fishmeal was banned. EPCHAP ceased operations in 1978, leaving fishmeal marketing once again in 
hands of the producers. FEO is still functioning nowadays under the name of International Fishmeal 
and Fish-oil Organization, or IFFO. 
3.4.2. Coping Strategy 8: Reducing Linkage of Fishmeal Price with Soybean Production 
The second measure to combat market price uncertainty by the Peruvian industry was the decoupling 
of the fishmeal price from dependence on prices of soybean meal. Kristofersson and Andersen [66] 
found that the historically strong price relationship between fishmeal and soybean meal has weakened 
since the late 1990s (Figure 6). For these authors, the most likely reason for this change was increased 
demand for specialty uses of fishmeal, not only from aquaculture but also from the pork and poultry 
industries. The study however did not take account of the fact that during the 1990s, Peruvian fishmeal 
producers took the risk of investing in new technologies to improve fishmeal protein quality and 
digestibility. By offering a better quality product, which could not be substituted with soybean meal, 
high fishmeal prices would no longer be dependant on soybean crops levels. The period between 1992 
and before the onset of the 1997–1998 event, known by the anchovy fishmeal sector as the period of 
“industrial re-conversion” was characterized by an increase of special high-protein meal production 
from 40,000 metric tons in 1992 to 366,000 metric tons in 1994 [67]. “Special or high protein 
fishmeal” is an improved quality fishmeal used to principally supply the aquaculture market. This 
fishmeal, commercially known as prime meal, super prime meal or LT-94 (low temperature, 94% 
digestibility), is made from fresh anchovies, and dried using indirect steam or vacuum dryers. It has 
protein contents between 68% and 72% and digestibility values between 92% and 94%. The name was 
given to distinguish them from the conventional or standard fishmeal „Fair Average Quality” or FAQ 
fishmeal, which is dried using hot air and has protein contents between 65% and 67%. 
Figure 6. Fishmeal and soybean prices between 1986 and 2010 showing a decoupling 
around 1992. 
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During the same period a decrease in the conversion rate, that is, tons of anchovy needed for the 
production of one ton of fishmeal, took place. This conversion rate fell from the standard historic 
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average of 5.11 in 1992 to 4.7 in 1996. This change was only possible as a result of private investment 
in fleet and processing equipment estimated at US$ 400 million between 1991 and 1995 [68]. The 
investment decision was also taken partly in response to a promising increase in demand for good 
quality fishmeal from the aquaculture sector, mainly from China. 
4. Recent Trends 
Anchovy landings collapsed after the El Niño 1972–1973 and reached their lower historical records 
after the 1982–1983 event, however the fishery recovered rapidly after the extreme event of  
1997–1998 (Figure 1a). Several factors contributed to this rapid recovery. On the anchovy stock or 
resource side, a healthier anchovy population fished much more carefully and under improved 
management together with appropriate cooler oceanographic conditions reduced the minimal impact of 
the 1997–1998 extreme event. On the resource users and resource management or governance  
side [36,37]; the availability of coping strategies developed since the onset of the fishery also played 
an important role, as discussed bellow: 
 
4.1. Adaptation to Changes in Anchovy Fishing Grounds 
After the 1972–1973 and 1982–1983 El Niño events, the southerly migration by anchovy during the 
first months following the onset of a strong El Niño episode was recognized as a predictable  
pattern [35]. El Niño 1997–1998 arrived around March 1997 and low catches of anchovy in the north 
started to be reported on June (Figure 7). Catches in the north-central area did not recover until the end 
of the warm SST anomalies in August 1998. During the first semester of 1998 it was only the landings 
in southern Peru that sustained the fishery; and 70% of the catches were registered south of latitude 
14° S. This behavior was largely expected and facilitated by fishing fleet migration and the availability 
of 10 fishmeal plants located south of latitude 14° S at that time [69]. 
Figure 7. Anchovy landings during the 1997–1998 extreme ENSO warm event. 
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Recent data indicates that there are currently 142 fishmeal processing plants at 24 locations along 
the Peruvian coast [70]. In 2008, 40 fishing companies with authorization for fishmeal reduction were 
officially registered, of which seven were responsible for 68% of total fishmeal production [71]. These 
most productive companies owned 281 fishing vessels and 72 processing factories equivalent to 54% 
of total Peruvian fishing vessels holding capacity and 66% of processing capacity, respectively [71]. 
Each company works with their own chatas. Table 3 shows the currently spatial distribution and 
reduction capacity of fishmeal factories belonging to the principal fishing companies.  
Geographical distribution of fishmeal plants shows a processing power concentration between 
latitudes 9° S and 11° S and 8% of their processing capacity located south of latitude 14° S. This 
distribution of processing capacity enables the industry to adapt to drastic changes in distribution of 
anchovy fishing grounds.  
Table 3. Latitudinal distribution of fishmeal processing capacity (tons/hour) from the 
largest fishing companies along the Peruvian coast in 2010 (Source: PRODUCE). 
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Total 
percentage  
(%) 
5° S 150 170   70 138  528 (9%) 
6° S         
7° S 352 259 60 80  180  931 (15%) 
8° S         
9° S 374 407 90 164 125 100 80 1,340 (22%) 
10° S 80 142  76 80 60 113 551 (9%) 
11° S 391 80 134 80 202 120 100 1,107 (18%) 
12° S         
13° S 249  100 40 178 80 120 767 (13%) 
14° S         
15° S 140       140 (2%) 
16° S 141   145 80   366 (6%) 
17° S 131 90    78 100 399 (7%) 
 
4.2. Adaptation to Changes in Abundances of Fish Stocks 
Before 1997, heavy lobbying from the fishmeal industry had given rise to a series of government 
regulations that allowed the use of sardines for fishmeal reduction, whatever its capture size 
(Ministerial Resolutions No. 678, 772 and 798-97-PE). However this practice was politically 
unpopular in a country where human food insecurity is still a problem. In 1998, when Ministerial 
Resolution 409-98-PE issued permits for sardine fishing, but exclusively for the canning industry, 
these permits were illegally used to supply the fishmeal industry, concerned by the scarcity of 
anchovies. A more general ban on the use of edible fish species like sardines and mackerel for 
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fishmeal reduction was introduced in 2002. The ban aims to support the canning industry for local 
consumption (Supreme Decree 001-2002). 
In response to these politically motivated changes, the anchovy industry has two options. Firstly, 
they can supply their processing plants with other anchovy-like fish species that arrive during ENSO 
warm events. The use of the long-nose anchovy during 1997–1998 (Table 2) shows that to some extent 
this is already happening. Secondly, the industry can diversify to reduce its reliance on fishmeal 
production. Again this process is already underway. During the last decade, the most productive 
fishing companies in Peru have started to invest in equipment to process canned and frozen fish. 
4.3. Adaptation by Improved Monitoring and Flexible Management 
The 1982–1983 El Niño focused international attention on the study of the origin, prediction and 
impacts of the El Niño around the world [61]. During 1997–98, international agencies provided 
support for research projects by IMARPE, under the umbrella of “El Niño research”. In 2000, the 
Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank financed a project to locate four 
oceanographic buoys to monitor oceanographic conditions along the Peruvian coast; and two Fish 
Aggregating Devices attached to oceanographic detection equipment. These installations send  
real-time oceanographic information to El Niño research institutes in Peru. A further project finances 
the salaries of scientific personnel for the expanded ENSO monitoring program that has been 
underway since 1998. 
During the last decade, the Peruvian government has enforced the law to use revenues from the 
anchovy fishery to cover the overall costs of fisheries management [72], regardless of the fishery 
involved. This applies to revenues from the auction of fishing rights for other species to international 
fishing fleets. These auctions are held when, for example, large biomasses of giant squids or tunas are 
detected within the Peruvian Economic Exclusive Zone, for which the country does not possess the 
appropriate fleet and processing facilities. As in the case of the fishmeal production, which is no longer 
dependent on only one fish species, here again there is opportunistic behavior, in this case by the 
government management agency. This helps to ensure a steady income to cover fishery management 
costs, even during periods of drastic environmental change.  
At the height of the 1997–1998 El Niño, the number of ministerial resolutions related to quotas and 
fishing closures in the anchovy fishery recorded its historical peak of 28 [18], reflecting a rapid 
response in changes in management regulations according to environmental conditions.  
4.4. Adaptation to Changes in Fishmeal Prices 
When the 1997–1998 El Niño arrived, high-protein fishmeal accounted for 45% of total exports 
compared to standard fishmeal. Fishmeal prices reached their peak of US$ 700 per metric ton between 
the end of 1997 and beginning of 1998, a price that had not been recorded since 1973 [73]. Landings 
after El Niño 1997–1998 recovered rapidly to 7.8 million metric tons in 1999 and 9.9 million metric 
tons in 2000; and the economic impact on the industry was notable moderate. According to Santivañez 
and Santivañez (2003) [67], it was the improvement in conversion rate and export price increment of 
high protein fishmeal that gave the industry capacity to mitigate the economically impact of the last 
extreme El Niño. 
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The conversion rate between 2001 and 2005 has been reported to be at 4.45 [74]. In 2008, Peruvian 
fishing companies placed on the market 625,400 metric tons (44%) of fishmeal quality FAQ and 
783,100 metric tons (56%) of high-protein fishmeal [70], and prices have risen their historical records 
at about US$ 1500 per metric ton. China is the major customer accounting for more than half of total 
Peruvian fishmeal exports. [75]. 
4. Conclusions 
The development of coping strategies to deal with environmental variability and extreme events in 
the Peruvian anchovy fishery has been a long and dynamic process with strategies emerging or 
receding during different phases of the fishery. The process has not been a painless one, and strategies 
have sometimes led to conflicts between the fishery sector and Peruvian fishery policies. Conflicts in 
the fishery sector have arisen for instance with governmental attempts to promote fisheries of edible 
species to improve local fish consumption; or to reduce overcapitalization of fishmeal factories due to 
both uncontrollable growth of processing capacity and the importance of having the capacity to move 
south during an El Nino event. In these cases a trade-off between the resource users and the 
governance subsystems appears to offer a resolution. It will be very difficult for the anchovy fishery to 
use edible fish for fishmeal production with the arrival of the next El Niño; however, the Peruvian 
government will probably not interfere with the dilemma of overcapitalization of fishmeal factories. 
It is also clear that the strategies presented here have developed to cope with short term 
perturbations like El Niño and may be less efficient to deal with variability at larger scales of 
environmental change. For research and policies in the commercial fishery sector, there are however 
some important lessons to be learned from this experience. The first one concerns the advantages of a 
“division of labor” in the development of coping strategies to deal with extreme events. Some 
resources will be more robust or resilient to new environmental conditions. In our case study, anchovy 
stocks have evolved diverse adaptations to cope with El Niño effects which include opportunistic 
feeding [76] and migration to coastal, deeper and southern cooler waters [77]. On top of these 
adaptations, resource users and management authorities have evolved their own coping strategies. 
Although our list of strategies is most likely not exhaustive, it shows that the process was clearly 
system-wide, sometimes reactive, sometimes bottom-up; and included high levels of information 
transfer between the resource, the resource users and the resource management subsystems. New 
technologies like the investment for high protein fishmeal processing equipment or the use of acoustic 
equipment to evaluate anchovy populations; and innovative ideas like low cost uploading barges have 
also played an important role. 
Second, fishermen have always adapted to changes in their environment by using their knowledge 
accumulated through past experiences and have been force to react to surprises. Fishermen’ S past 
experience alone will no longer be a reliable guide to the extent of change predicted by climate change. 
This case study suggests that it was prior experience of adaptation that prepared the Peruvian fishery to 
cope relatively successfully with the three extreme events that took within a period of 15 years 
between each event, forcing the evolution of coping strategies in a relative short period compared with 
the life-history of the fishery. The strategies continue to diminish the effects of minor events like the 
2002–2003 El Niño. However as is commonly stated in Peru: “the only thing we know about El Niño 
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is that sooner or later it is going to come”. The same could be stated for climate change and the only 
aspect that we can be sure is that it is going to come and we should prepare ourselves for that time. A 
culture of preparedness is tangible in the Peruvian society and the challenge will be to foster this way 
of life to prepare societies for climate change. 
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Annex 1. 
List of interviewees: 
From The Vice-Ministry of Fisheries 
1. Director General de Extracción y Procesamiento Pesquero 
2. Subdirector de Consumo Humano  
3. Subdirector de Consumo Humano Indirecto 
4. Jefe de Oficina de Base de Datos 
5. Ex-director General de Extracción y Procesamiento Pesquero 
6. Director General de Seguimiento Control y Vigilancia 
7. Director de Inspección y Fiscalización 
8. Director de Seguimiento, Vigilancia y Sanciones 
9. Jefe oficina de Sistema de Seguimiento Satelital 
10. Asesor Programa de Control y Vigilancia para la Pesca Marítima 
From the Instituto del Mar del Perú (IMARPE) 
1. Director Ejecutivo 
2. Asesor Director Ejecutivo 
3. Director Científico 
4. Asesor Director Científico 
5. Director de Investigaciones de Recursos Pelágicos, Neríticos y Oceánicos 
6. Jefe de Unidad de Investigaciones en Recursos Transzonales y Altamente Migratorios 
7. Jefe de Unidad de Investigaciones en Dinámica de Poblaciones 
8. Jefe de Laboratorios Costeros 
From the fishing private sector 
1. Gerente General de la Sociedad Nacional de Pesquería (SNP) 
2. Jefe de la Oficina de Economía y Estadística Pesquera (SNP) 
3. Jefe de Oficina de Asuntos Ambientales (SNP) 
4. Representante de la SNP en Consejo Directivo del IMARPE  
5. Ex-gerente de PESCA PERU 
6. Director de Flota y Abastecimiento – Pesquera Hayduk S.A. 
7. Director de Investigación, Planificación y Desarrollo – Pesquera Diamante S.A. 
8. Jefe del Departamento de Flota – CFG Investment S.A.C. 
9. Departamento de Flota - Pesquera Austral 
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Uncommon among the Commons? Disentangling the Sustainability of the
Peruvian Anchovy Fishery
Milena Arias Schreiber 1 and Andrew Halliday 2
ABSTRACT. The term "commons" refers to collectively exploited resources and their systems of usage; a synonymous term
is common pool resources. Fisheries are typical common pool resources and also one of the most conspicuous examples of
unsustainable use of natural resources. We examine one of the few globally important fisheries that is held to be sustainable,
the Peruvian anchovy fishery, and considers the extent to which the institutional characteristics of the fishery conform to design
principles that are considered prerequisites for long-term, successful, community-based common pool resources. Results showed
that greater conformity to the principles was found in the sustainable phase of the fishery, compared to its unsustainable phase.
For this case study, the conditions that supported the transition towards sustainability were: clearly defined resource boundaries,
monitoring of rule enforcement, and conflict resolution mechanisms among users and management authorities. On the other
hand, clearly defined user boundaries, collective choice arrangements, and nested enterprises were not required to achieve
sustainability. The study concludes that the design principles are a valuable tool for analysis and understanding of large-scale
common pool resource systems. At the same time it suggests that the application of the principles to a wider range of systems
can generate new insights into what is required for successful management of common pool resources.
RESUMEN. Los "bienes comunes" se refieren colectivamente a los recursos explotados y sus sistemas de uso, y también se
conocen como recursos de propiedad común (CPR). Los recursos marinos han sido considerados tradicionalmente como CPR
y como uno de los ejemplos más conocidos de uso no sostenible de los recursos naturales. Este trabajo examina una de las
escasas pesquerías importantes a nivel mundial que se considera sostenible -la pesquería de la Anchoveta peruana (Engraulis
ringens), considerando el grado en que las características institucionales de esta pesquería se ajustan a los principios de diseño
de gobernanza de recursos comunes que se consideran requisitos previos para el éxito a largo plazo en la gestión de CPR. Los
resultados obtenidos mostraron que una mayor observancia y conformidad con los principios de diseño durante la fase sostenible
de la pesquería, en comparación con su etapa insostenible. Para este caso de estudio cabe destacar que una clara definición de
los límites de uso del recurso, la aplicación de reglas de supervisión y mecanismos de resolución de conflictos entre los usuarios
y las autoridades de gestión, han sido todos ellos factores que han apoyado la transición hacia la sostenibilidad de la pesquería.
Por otro lado, una clara definición de los límites de uso por parte de los usuarios, la elección de acuerdos colectivos y la unión
entre empresas no han sido requisitos para lograr la sostenibilidad de la pesquería. Concluimos que el diseño de principios
constituye una valiosa herramienta para el análisis y la comprensión de los grandes sistemas de CPR. Al mismo tiempo, este
estudio sugiere que la aplicación de los principios a una gama más amplia de sistemas puede generar nuevos conocimientos que
permitirán una gestión exitosa de los CPR.
Key Words: anchovy fishery; common pool resources; design principles; Peru; sustainability
anchoveta peruana; recursos comunes; diseño de principios; Perú; sostenibilidad
INTRODUCTION
Global fisheries are one of the most conspicuous examples of
unsustainable use of natural resources. Despite the
considerable scientific attention devoted to marine resource
management, many of the world’s fisheries are still in a
deplorable state (Beddington et al. 2007). Nearly one in four
fisheries collapsed during the period 1950–2000 (Mullon et
al. 2005), where collapse is defined as a 90% reduction of a
wild fish stock. There has been a continuous decline in global
catches since the late 1980s (Pauly et al. 2003).  
Most wild fisheries are based on the exploitation of common
pool resources. Fisheries are a typical common pool resource
(Feeny et al. 1990, Neiland 2006, Cox et al. 2010), showing
the attributes of costly exclusion of potential users and
substractability, i.e., when exploitation by one user reduces
the resource availability for others (Ostrom et al. 1999). This
paper examines one of the few globally important fisheries
that is held to be sustainable, the Peruvian anchovy fishery
(Mondoux et al. 2008), and considers the extent to which the
institutional characteristics of the fishery conform to
principles that are considered prerequisites for the
sustainability of common pool resources. 
Until the 1980s, research into common pool resources was
under the sway of the paradigm of the “tragedy of the
commons”. This holds that multiple individuals, acting
independently, and rationally consulting their own self-
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interest, will ultimately deplete a shared limited resource even
when it is clear that this is not in anyone's long-term interest
(Hardin 1968). However, from the mid 1980s, this view was
increasingly challenged. Evidence that some common pool
resource systems were robust over long periods of time while
others failed stimulated the search to identify the features that
distinguished successful from unsuccessful efforts (Ostrom
1990).  
In 1990, Elinor Ostrom proposed a set of eight “design
principles” of common pool resources management regimes
that are long-lasting (Ostrom 1990); these are “general
institutional regularities” that can be observed among common
pool resource systems “that were sustained over a long period
of time” (Ostrom 2009a). Since then, the validity of these
principles has been the subject of intense scrutiny, both from
a theoretical and an empirical perspective (Ostrom 2009a, Cox
et al. 2010). In a review of 91 studies, Cox et al. (2010) found
that empirical evidence was broadly supportive of the
principles. Some minor modifications to the principles were
also proposed as a result of the review (see Table 4 in Cox et
al. 2010). However, empirical evidence considered to date
relates almost exclusively to small-scale common pool
resource systems, where the “community of users” is often a
local community such as a village or a cooperative. Cox et al.
(2010) conclude “we remain uncertain as to whether the
principles may apply to systems at a variety of scales”. 
Thus there is clearly the need for empirical studies to assess
the extent to which the design principles are applicable to
large-scale common pool resource systems. The Peruvian
anchovy provides an excellent opportunity to do so. Firstly, it
is undeniably a large scale enterprise. This fishery represents
almost 10% of worldwide marine fisheries landings (FAO
2010) and has been described as the largest monospecific
fishery that has ever existed on Earth (Bakun and Weeks 2008,
Aranda 2009b). Anchovy fishing takes place over an area of
approximately 14,000 km2 in the coastal waters of north and
central Peru between 4° and 15° S, where around 1300 purse
seiners target only one fish species: the Peruvian anchovy
Engraulis ringens. Secondly, the social and institutional
characteristics of the fishery are clearly distinct from those of
more widely studied small-scale common pool resource
systems. The “community of users” consists not of village
residents but of wealthy capitalists who have direct access to
the highest levels of government and operate out of fortified
compounds equipped with state-of-the-art manufacturing and
communications technology. The link to local livelihoods that
is considered a key feature of sustainable small-scale common
pool resource systems (Cox et al. 2010) is entirely lacking:
99% of anchovy catches are converted to fishmeal in Peru to
be exported to international markets for aquaculture and
animal food. Thirdly, the fishery is currently considered to be
sustainable. Indeed it has been described as the most intense
and successful fishery worldwide (Chavez et al. 2008), and
was recently placed first in a report ranking 53 marine
countries by the sustainability of their fisheries (Mondoux et
al. 2008).
Table 1. Design principles of robust, long-term, common pool
resources during the unsustainable growth phase (1960–1972)
and the sustainable phase (1994–2009) of the Peruvian
anchovy fishery.
Design principle Unsustainable
phase
Sustainable
phase
Clearly defined
User boundaries No No†
Resource boundaries No Yes
Congruence
Between rules and local conditions Yes Yes
Proportional equivalence between costs
and benefits
Yes Yes
Collective choice arrangements No No
Monitoring
Rule enforcement No Yes‡
Resources Yes Yes
Graduated sanctions No Yes
Conflict resolution mechanisms
Among users Yes Yes
Among users and management authorities No Yes
Minimal recognition of rights to organize Yes Yes
Nested enterprises
Users Yes Yes
Management authorities No No
† Only at national levels, i.e., if foreign multinational or only national
companies are allowed to participate in the fishery. (For details see Arias
Schreiber 2012.)
‡ Since 2003.
Finally, the fishery has not always been set on a sustainable
landings course, and various different phases of the fishery
can be identified for the purposes of comparative analysis.
Based on landings statistics, four distinct phases of the
Peruvian anchovy fishery can be identified (Arias Schreiber
2012). Following its establishment in the mid 1950s, the
anchovy fishery soon entered a phase of explosive and
uncontrolled growth, which by the end of the 1960s was clearly
unsustainable. This “unsustainable growth phase” culminated
in a collapse in 1972, triggered by the extreme El Niño event
of 1972–73. After the collapse, a second phase from 1973 to
1984 was characterized by unfavorable oceanic conditions for
anchovies and low catches. A third phase, from 1985 to the
present, can be further divided into a second growth period
from 1985 to 1993 and a sustainable landings period from
1994 to the present (Fig. 1). During the sustainable phase
annual anchovy catches have stabilized at between 5 and 9
million tonnes in years with propitious oceanographic
conditions, and have recovered quickly from perturbations
caused by climatic variations, including the extreme El Niño
event of 1997-98 (Arias Schreiber 2012). In 2009 a new
management system for the fishery was introduced, based on
quotas for individual fishing vessels, which substantially
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altered some key, long-standing, institutional features of the
fishery (Aranda 2009a, Arias Schreiber 2012). In institutional
terms, this represents the beginning of a further new phase for
the fishery, although it is too early to assess its impacts, if any,
on the sustainability of landings. 
This article reviews the design principles proposed by Ostrom
(1990), as modified by Cox et al. (2010), for the successful
long-term management of common pool resources in the light
of experiences during both the unsustainable and sustainable
phases of the Peruvian anchovy fishery. Specifically, we
address the following questions: (1) whether the design
principles can explain the recent sustainability of the fishery;
(2) whether institutional differences between the
unsustainable and sustainable phases of the fishery provide
evidence to support the design principles; and (3) whether the
Peruvian experience suggests further modifications to the
design principles that would enhance their applicability to
large-scale common pool resources.
Fig. 1. Historical Peruvian anchovy landing, major El Niño
events, and phases of the fishery.
METHODS
This article is the result of semistructured interviews carried
out at Peruvian fishery institutions between October and
November 2009. Ten key informants were interviewed at the
Vice-Ministry of Fisheries, eight from the Peruvian Marine
Research Institute (IMARPE), and nine from the private
fishery sector. Interviewees were selected on the basis of
length of experience and period of time in post, in order to
obtain as much information as possible from the beginning of
the fishery to the present (see list of interviewees in Appendix
1). Three interviewees had been involved with the anchovy
fishery since the 1960s (two from IMARPE and one from the
industry), two since the 1970s, ten since the 1980s, five since
the 1990s and seven since the start of this century. The article
also draws on the experience of the first author as a scientific
officer at IMARPE from 1994 to 2001. The questionnaire used
during the interviews is shown in Appendix 2. 
Interviews were triangulated with intensive documentary
analysis from published material and other sources including
internal reports, yearbooks, fishery magazines, and legal
databases. Historical statistical data including anchovy
landings, number of fishing vessels, fishing effort expressed
in fishing days per year, fishmeal prices, and anchovy exports
were obtained from the Pelagic Resources Department of
IMARPE.
RESULTS
The compliance by the Peruvian anchovy fishery with
Ostrom’s design principles for long-lasting governance
regimes of common pool resources (as modified by Cox et al.
2010) across the sustainable and unsustainable phases of the
fishery is shown in Table 1.
Principle one: clearly defined boundaries
This principle contains two components: 1A User Boundaries,
understood as clear boundaries between legitimate users and
nonusers, and 1B Resource Boundaries, i.e., boundaries that
define the resource system and separate it from the larger
biophysical environment (see Table 4 in Cox et al. 2010). In
summary, user boundaries of the Peruvian anchovy fishery
have been permeable, although perhaps decreasingly so in
recent years; resource boundaries have been increasingly
clearly defined. 
In relation to user boundaries, exclusion of outsiders in marine
fisheries is difficult to achieve and this fishery has been no
exception. However, different conditions have governed entry
into the two activities that make up the Peruvian anchovy
fishery: fishing and processing. Within the community of
users, two distinct groups can be recognized: firstly the large
fishing companies, which operate the processing plants and
also own fishing fleets that directly supply these plants; and
secondly, independent boat owners who sell anchovy to the
processing plants under informal contracts. Along the history
of the fishery, there has been no effective limitation on access
to the fishery resource. As a consequence, the number of
fishing vessels in this fishery has broadly followed changes in
the abundances of anchovies rather than being a response to
management regulations to exclude outsiders (Fig. 2). Entry
to the processing industry has followed the same dynamics,
leading to a historical overcapitalization of both fishing vessels
and processing factories (Ibarra et al. 2000, Thorpe et al. 2000,
Fréon et al. 2008, Aranda 2009a). In both sectors, the response
to the problem of "free riders" has been to incorporate them
into the formal sector, rather than to attempt to enforce
exclusion. 
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Although attempts were made to limit access to the fishery
through a system of fishing licenses as early as 1956, these
served only to increase corruption and speculation and the
system was abandoned in 1962 (Thorp and Bertran 1978).
Thus, during the unsustainable phase, any person with enough
financial capital to build and put a fishing vessel to sea was
allowed to do so. The availability of apparently inexhaustible
stocks of anchovy fuelled a frenzy of shipbuilding that
persisted throughout the 1960s and early 1970s (Aranda
2009b). Vessels were constructed, with or without qualified
labor, in empty lots and in the streets of Callao, Peru’s major
port (Roemer 1970). Expansion was further fuelled by foreign
investment. Capital assets in the fishery coming from foreign
companies increased from 12% in 1960 to more than 40% in
1967 (Thorp and Bertran 1978). The size of the fleet increased
spectacularly from 52 registered vessels in 1953 to 1309 in
1972, although even this was down from the maximum of 1744
boats in 1964 (Aranda 2009b).
Fig. 2. Historical evolution of Peruvian anchovy landings,
anchovy fishing vessels, and fishmeal factories between
1960 and 2008. Anchovy landings (shaded area) correspond
to landings presented in Fig. 1.
Subsequent efforts, to set limits on the number of vessels and
processing plants also had limited success in avoiding a de
facto open access fishery (Thorpe et al. 2000). Following the
collapse of the fishery in 1972, the anchovy fishing fleet was
nationalized and large numbers of vessels were
decommissioned. However the fishery was returned to private
ownership just four years later. The number of fishing vessels
grew moderately during the sustainable period and the fleet's
total holding capacity increased from around 150,000 m3 in
1994 to 220,000 m3 in 2008. This increase was partially a
consequence of a measure (Law 26920; Congreso de la
República del Perú 1998) by which wooden vessels with
holding capacities between 30 and 110 tonnes were officially
recognized as part of the anchovy fishing fleet from January
1998 (Aranda 2009b). This incorporated an important group
of ‘free-riders’ into the formal fishery, by legalizing the
activities of the small-scale fleet which, before then, had been
fishing anchovy illegally (Bermejo 2004).  
During the unsustainable phase, user boundaries to the
processing industry were indirectly restricted by market
forces. A sharp decline in fishmeal prices in 1959–60, due to
excessive supply of fishmeal on the international market,
prompted the private sectors of the principal fishmeal-
producing countries to establish an international arrangement
aimed at stabilizing the market, which is known as the “Paris
Agreement” (Roemer 1970). This established national quotas
for fishmeal sales, which were to be organized through export
licenses for fishing companies issued by the respective
governments (Hammergren 1981). The Peruvian government
recognized fishing companies associated under the National
Fisheries Society (Sociedad Nacional de Pesquería, SNP), and
Supreme Decree 18 empowers this organization to act as the
government's agent in assigning export licenses in conformity
with world market quotas (“Perú ratifica ...” 1961). Within the
SNP, the Peruvian Fishing Consortium was established for
this purpose. However, between 1961 and 1963 export quotas
for Peruvian fishmeal were regularly exceeded (Roemer 1970)
due to the activities of unassociated fishing companies, which
accounted for between 15 and 20% of the total (“Número
equivocado ...” 1962a). These "free riders" took advantage of
improved prices to sell their fishmeal through channels that
bypassed the Consortium. In response, the Peruvian
government required every company, by Law-Decree 14228,
to join the Consortium as the only channel for export of
fishmeal from Peru (“Número equivocado ...” 1962a). After
1963, international fishmeal prices stabilized and the country
quota system was soon abandoned. However, the Consortium
continued in exclusive charge of Peruvian fishmeal marketing
until 1966, when three other organizations were also legally
permitted to engage in marketing (Roemer 1970, Hammergren
1981).  
Since then, in practice, entry into the processing industry has
been limited by the ongoing consolidation process in this
fishery sector (Garcia 2007) that has led to the current situation
where seven large companies own more than 50% of fishing
vessels’ holding capacity and at least 50% (72 units) of the
processing factories (Bendezú 2008). 
The boundaries of the resource, i.e., the anchovy stock, have
been progressively defined since 1970, when the first tagging
experiments were carried out by IMARPE to determine the
habitat and distribution of this resource (“Marcación ...”
1970a). Since 1973, two anchovy populations units have been
recognized off Peru: the north central stock from 04°30’ to
15° S, and the southern stock from 15° S to the southern limit
of the Peruvian maritime domain. To the west, anchovy
populations extend up to 100 nm offshore (Checkley et al.
2009). Since Chile, Peru, and Ecuador declared their
respective 200 nm Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) as early
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as 1953, the north central stock is defined by natural
boundaries and is contained entirely within Peruvian waters.
Under normal oceanographic conditions, fishing targets this
stock, which is also by far the most productive (Barange et al.
2009). The southern stock, by contrast, is defined partly by
natural and partly by political boundaries, i.e., the maritime
border with Chile. Catch quotas and closed seasons have been
given separately for each population stock since 1983 (Ganoza
et al. 2000).
Principle two: congruence
Congruence refers to the harmonious fit between rules for
resource use and local conditions—cultural or ecological. This
principle also contains two components: 2A Congruence with
local conditions, in the sense that appropriation and provision
rules are congruent with local social and environmental
conditions, and 2B Proportional equivalence between costs
and benefits, the former being determined by provision rules
and the latter by appropriation rules. The Peruvian anchovy
fishery has complied, since its inception, with the principle of
congruence in both senses of the term. 
Congruence between rules and local environmental conditions
of the resource has always been an important feature of the
Peruvian anchovy fishery. The first closed season was declared
by ministerial resolution in 1965 and lasted for one month
(“Agosto ...” 1965), i.e., during the spawning peak of the
anchovy population (Checkley et al. 2009). Simultaneously,
measures were taken to prohibit the landing of catches if 50%
or more of the catch consisted of fish of 12 cm or less, and a
ban on weekend fishing was introduced. In 1966 the closed
season was extended to three consecutive months from June
to August (Tsukayama and Palomares 1987). In 1967 the
government imposed another 6-week closed season during the
height of the fishing season in February and March (Roemer
1970) with the aim of protecting juvenile anchovy in the
recruitment phase. In these years, catch quota limits were also
imposed, with annual limits of between 8 and 9 million tonnes,
in line with IMARPE’s assessments of sustainable yields
(Clark 1976, Chavez et al. 2008). These practices have
continued in the sustainable phase. In general management
measures, such as the closure of the fishery or quota
regulations, are adjusted on an ad hoc basis in response to
information from monitoring data and recommendations from
IMARPE. Since 1994, any management measure has had to
be backed up by a written recommendation from IMARPE.
Agreement exists between scientists and politicians that
dynamic changes in anchovy stocks call for an equally
dynamic response. A recommendation by IMARPE, for
example to suspend fishing at one or more ports, can be
implemented in a matter of days (Arias Schreiber et al. 2011).
Moreover, numbers of ministerial resolutions enacted to
regulate the fishery tend to increase during El Niño events,
which initiate periods of stress and instability for the resource,
providing evidence of adaptive governance capacity in
response to local environmental conditions (Arias Schreiber
2012). 
Congruence between costs and benefits for resource users
during both phases of the fishery has been always high since
taxes, fishing licenses, and funds to cover management,
monitoring, and scientific research have generally been
calculated based on tonnes of landed anchovy, or tonnes of
fishmeal exported. As an example, Law-Decree 14265 of
December 1962 established a tax of 25 Peruvian Soles (around
US$1)/t of anchovy landed (“Regalo de Pascua ...” 1962b).
The same principle is used nowadays, for example to calculate
the cost of fishing rights. According to Supreme Decree
024-2006-PRODUCE of November 2006 (Gobierno del Perú,
Ministerio de la Producción 2006a), fishing rights are valued
at 0.25% of the export FOB price of fishmeal per tonne of
anchovy landed. These straightforward practices have enabled
the fishery to maintain the equivalence between costs and
benefits in a way that can be perceived to be fair by the resource
users.
Principle three: collective choice arrangements
Collective choice arrangements authorize resource users to
participate in making and modifying their rules. The extent to
which this principle has applied to the Peruvian anchovy
fishery is open to interpretation. 
Collective choice arrangements are considered to favor
effective resource management by drawing on local
knowledge of the resource. In the context of the Peruvian
anchovy fishery, “local” has a somewhat different meaning
and a national organization, the SNP, has been the principal
channel for user participation in decision making. The SNP
was created in 1952 as a nonprofit civil cooperative
association. During the 1960s, it engaged in intensive lobbying
on behalf of the industry around the two major areas of dispute
between the government and the fishing companies: taxation
and credit policy (Hammergren 1981). It exerted considerable
political influence over the development of the anchovy
fishery during the 1970s (Caravedo 1979), and this influence
has continued during the sustainable phase, although more
subtly.  
The SNP defines itself as a civil association representing the
Peruvian private fishery sector and counts on around 70% of
the anchovy fishing companies being among its members.
However, in practice, the SNP provides limited representation
of users in rule making. It does not represent independent boat
owners, who are grouped in other associations. Moreover, the
way the SNP functions excludes most members from
participating in modifying the operational rules. Decisions
inside the SNP are based on a proportional voting system, in
which the number of votes per fishing company depends on
its fishmeal production in the previous 15 months (Roemer
1970). This voting system invests decision-making power in
a small number of large companies. The influence of these
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powerful companies is further increased by the existence of
informal networks that provide close links between them and
key personnel in government decision-making agencies (see
Principle seven below).
Principle four: monitoring
This principle contains two components: 4A Monitoring to
ensure rule enforcement, and 4B Monitoring the resource. In
summary, monitoring of both rule compliance and resources
has become more extensive, intensive, and effective during
the sustainable phase, compared to the unsustainable phase.  
With regard to rule enforcement, during the unsustainable
phase monitoring of landings was undertaken by personnel
from IMARPE who had no authority to enforce compliance.
Resources were inadequate to monitor the large number of
vessels involved and the high number of permitted fishing
days, i.e., on average 223 days/year (Fig. 3). Controlling
fishermen’s behavior was also difficult, because tracking
technology to follow fishermen at sea was not available and
monitoring of landings was ineffective, resulting in an
underestimation of at least 20% in official landings statistics
for the period 1952 to 1982 (Castillo and Mendo 1987).
Fig. 3. Annual number of anchovy fishing days and value of
Peruvian fishmeal exports, 1959–2008.
Following the establishment of the Ministry of Fisheries in
1970, a Department for Monitoring, Control, and Surveillance
was set up; however, the lack of proper financial support and
appropriate technology resulted in poor performance. In the
sustainable phase of the fishery, the number of vessels was
somewhat reduced, and the average annual number of fishing
days was also reduced to 141 days (Fig. 3). However,
monitoring such a large industry still posed considerable
challenges, and in response to these challenges new
regulations were introduced to facilitate monitoring and
reduce costs. Since 1999, each fishing vessel has been obliged
to pay fishing rights (“derechos de pesca”) equivalent to
around US$3/t of anchovy landed. The funds generated are
used to finance the operation of the Vice-Ministry of Fisheries
and its associated institutions, including IMARPE. Sanctions
for nonpayment include the confiscation of the fishing license.
In addition, the use of Vessel Monitoring System with satellite
tracking systems in each fishing vessel has been required by
law since 2000 (Supreme Decree 001-2000-PE; Gobierno del
Perú, Ministerio de Pesquería, 2000); costs (around US$200
monthly for equipment and services) are covered by the ship
owners. Likewise, landings at all ports are simultaneously
monitored by IMARPE and inspectors from the Fishing and
Landing Monitoring and Surveillance Program. This program,
launched in 2003, transferred surveillance of compliance with
anchovy fishery regulations to an independent international
company financed by the fishing companies. Annual costs of
the program are capped at US$7 million, and these funds are
raised by a levy of US$1.40/t of landed anchovy. The Swiss
company Société Générale de Surveillance (SGS) and a
Peruvian company Certificaciones del Perú (CERPER) are
currently employed to undertake this independent monitoring.
 
Monitoring of the anchovy population (resources) started as
early as the end of the 1950s (Castillo and Mendo 1987) and
intensified after 1960 with the establishment of the Peruvian
Research Institute for Marine Resources, which in 1964 was
renamed IMARPE (Barange et al. 2009). Collection of
anchovy landing data started in 1959 (Doucet et al. 1962), and
collection of size structure data of landed fish started in 1961
(IMARPE 1965). In 1966, in response to the high costs
involved in monitoring the resource at sea, IMARPE initiated
the so-called Eureka cruises (Arias Schreiber et al. 2011).
These were established by legal agreements by which the
fishing companies allowed IMARPE to use their fleet as
scientific vessels in order to monitor anchovy populations in
real time (Barange et al. 2009). Scientific and technical
personnel from IMARPE were sent to the main fishing ports,
from where anchovy fishing vessels set sail, to perform
experimental fishing and oceanographic sampling. The fishing
companies involved were allowed to process the anchovy
catches to recover some of the associated financial costs (Arias
Schreiber et al. 2011).  
During the 1970s, new acoustic techniques were developed
based on echo-integration of data from digital echosounders
to estimate fish populations. Since 1982, the Peruvian
government via IMARPE has monitored anchovy populations
using these techniques through twice-yearly hydro-acoustical
cruises along the geographical range of the anchovy
population (Ganoza et al. 2000). The results of these cruises
are used to calculate the catch quotas for the two annual
anchovy fishing seasons. Thus the adoption of new technology
has made monitoring relatively easier during the current,
sustainable phase of the fishery. Current annual expenses of
IMARPE are around US$15 million (De La Puente et al. 2011),
from which about 60% is used to monitor anchovy populations
(M. Ñiquen, personal communication). However these
apparently very high monitoring costs represent less than 1%
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of annual export values of the anchovy industry, which are
estimated at US$1000 to 1500 million over the last decade
(Fig. 3).
Principle five: graduated sanctions
Effective graduated sanctions are seen as a mechanism for
ensuring rule compliance by ensuring transparency and
building trust between resource users (Ostrom 2009a).
Sanctions were not applied during the unsustainable phase of
the Peruvian anchovy fishery. In the sustainable phase,
graduated sanctions have been introduced, but their
application has been only partially effective. 
Sanctions were neither clearly identified nor enforced during
the unsustainable phase of the fishery. By-laws of the First
Peruvian Fisheries Act from 1971 (Gobierno del Perú 1971a)
established graduated sanctions for different fishing
infractions for the first time; these ranged from fines between
1000 and 1 million Peruvian Soles, to the permanent
confiscation of fishing licenses (Supreme Decree 011-71-PE,
Art. 273; Gobierno del Perú 1971b). More recently, in the
sustainable phase of the fishery, legal sanctions have been
imposed according to: (1) the type or nature of infraction, (2)
the offender’s intention, (3) the degree of damage caused to
the marine environment or amount of benefits illegally
obtained, and (4) records of previous offenses (Supreme
Decree 012-2001-PE, Art. 149; Gobierno del Perú, Ministerio
de Pesquería 2001). However, even with legally graduated
sanctions during the sustainable phase, users in this period
regularly avoided being sanctioned by appealing sentences
and transferring their cases to the Peruvian judicial system
where corruption is still quite widespread (De La Puente et al.
2011). In 2008, five judges were removed from their positions
for having allocated illegal fishing licenses (R. Rey; quoted
in Gobierno del Perú, Ministerio de la Producción 2008).
Principle six: conflict resolution mechanisms
Management of common pool resources is considered to be
an inherently conflictive activity; rapid, low-cost local arenas
for resolution of conflicts among users are necessary to prevent
conflicts from spiraling out of control (Ostrom 2009a).
Moreover successful resolution of conflicts can spark learning
and change (Dietz et al. 2003). In the Peruvian anchovy
fishery, formal arenas for resolving conflict have long existed,
and these have further developed in the sustainable period.  
Since 1952, the SNP has been the institution responsible for
providing facilities for resolution of conflicts between
resource users. Procedures for resolving conflicts between
users and government agencies have been available since the
establishment of the Ministry of Fisheries in 1970. By contrast,
they were absent during the unsustainable period. Throughout
the 1960s, government decisions affecting the fishing sector
were made by a variety of agencies for which fishing policy
was not a primary concern (Hammergren 1981). Consequently
the most important decisions affecting the fishery were not
made by any of these agencies, but came out of the Ministry
of Finance and the Congress. As a result, resolution
mechanisms were difficult to implement when conflicts of
interest arose. 
Since the Ministry of Fisheries was set up in 1970, it has been
the practice of the Peruvian government and diverse members
of the fishing sector to establish so-called “Sectorial Working
Commissions” to discuss and give advice to the authorities
when conflicts arise or the fishery enters a crisis period, i.e.,
during extreme El Niño conditions. For example, by Supreme
Resolution 005-70-PE-ODP of February 1970, the Ministry
of Fisheries set up a Commission to perform a feasibility study
for the establishment of a quota system for the supply of
anchovy to processing factories (“Comisión estudiara ...”
1970b). The Commission, composed of members of the
Ministries of Fisheries and the Treasury, and one member of
the SNP, had one month to present its results. A similar
commission was set up in 2006 to evaluate the problem of
overcapacity of the anchovy fishing fleet (Ministerial
Resolution 215-2006-PRODUCE; Gobierno del Perú,
Ministerio de la Producción 2006b). Although the impact of
such commissions in the decision-making process is varied,
these practices could have reinforced networking and learning
processes, particularly during the sustainable phase.
Principle seven: minimal recognition of rights to
organize
This principle refers to rights, granted by governments to
resource users, to organize to manage the resource
independently of government (Cox et al. 2010). It appears to
presuppose a conflict of interest, or at least of perspective,
between local users and external government agencies
operating at a larger scale. These conditions apply only
partially to the Peruvian anchovy fishery, which operates at a
national level—the same as government—and where the
dividing line between government and resource users has
sometimes become blurred. 
The organization of users of the anchovy fishery under the
auspices of the SNP has always been recognized by Peruvian
authorities. Indeed, the government’s official recognition of
the Society as being responsible for setting fishmeal export
quotas in the 1960s has even been described as a delegation
of the state's policy-making functions to the fishing companies
(Hammergren 1981). As mentioned above, throughout the
sustainable period, intensive lobbying by the SNP has
continued. The SNP does not have an official role in deciding
on rules for the management of the fishery. However, one of
the seven members of IMARPE’s Board of Directors is by law
a representative of the Society, and there is also one member
of the SNP in the governmental Committee for Monitoring the
Fishing and Landing Surveillance Program. The real influence
of the SNP is greater than this modest official representation
suggests, and over the years numerous directive personnel at
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IMARPE and the Fisheries Ministry, up to the highest level,
have been selected because of their strong relations to the SNP.
This influence can be seen in specific policy decisions, such
as the establishment of the Individual Quota System in 2008,
which has been widely attributed to be a response of the
Society’s demands.
Principle eight: nested enterprises
This design principle relates to the arrangement of governance
activities in multiple layers of small-scale organizations nested
in ever larger organizations. The reliance of the Peruvian
anchovy industry on industrial-scale fish processing means
that it is an inherently large-scale enterprise. Moreover, as
users are private companies, the dominant paradigm is of
competition on the market rather than cooperation. Thus the
opportunities for nesting are limited. 
In the unsustainable phase, fishing companies were associated
only within the SNP, which comprised around 60% of users
and which in 1960 became a member of the International
Fishmeal and Fish oil Organization (IFFO). During the
sustainable phase, there has been some “nesting” at larger
scales: fishing companies associated in the SNP are also part
of the Peruvian Exporters Association (ADEX) and the
Peruvian National Confederation of Private Business
Associations (CONFIEP) which is member of the
International Organization of Employers (IOE). The
management organization, the Ministry of Fisheries, has been
a single and centralized institution since its establishment in
1971. This situation has continued throughout the sustainable
phase, although formally, since 2001, the Vice-Ministry of
Fisheries has operated as one of the two divisions within
Ministry of Production. Although the Peruvian government
has undergone a process of decentralization since 2002 and
Regional Fishery Directorates have been established, with
some role in the management of other fisheries, anchovy
fisheries management remains the sole responsibility of the
central Vice-Ministry of Fisheries.
DISCUSSION
Although the conditions and principles for long-lasting,
successful, common pool resources, as described by Ostrom,
have been mainly applied to management undertaken by
traditional communities with almost no intervention from the
government, they offer an excellent point of departure for
analysis of institutional settings of larger common pool
resource systems and, specifically, commercial fisheries. This
is confirmed by the results of our study, which demonstrate
that the design principles can be usefully applied to inform the
analysis of a large-scale common pool resource. Most of the
principles were found to be relevant for a study of the Peruvian
anchovy fishery. Moreover, the validity of the principles as
indicators of the sustainability of common pool resource
management is at least partially confirmed by the fact that
greater conformity to the principles was found in the
sustainable phase of the fishery, compared to the unsustainable
phase (Table 1).  
It is recognized that the principles do not offer a recipe for
success and cannot be applied in a mechanical way (Ostrom
et al. 1999, Bruns 2007, Ostrom 2009b). Like previous
empirical studies (Cox et al., 2010), this one has suggested
some ways in which the principles could be modified or
expanded. Our study suggests that controls on catches can be
an effective alternative to restricting the number of users. A
dynamic decision-making system is necessary to respond
effectively to variations in resource availability. Finally,
management rules need to be adapted to the specific biological
characteristics of the resource being managed. On the other
hand, the design principles alone are insufficient for analysis
of the rich experience of more than half a century of common
pool resources considered in this study. At times it was difficult
to constrain our account within the (self-imposed) analytical
structure, based around “testing the design principles”. 
One of the main challenges in applying the design principles
to asses our case study fishery was the difficulty of showing
causality between institutional characteristics and the
sustainability of resource use. While the design principles
suggest a set of institutional features that favor sustainability,
they do not provide a procedure for analyzing their role within
the wider, complex social-ecological system. Specifically they
do not take explicit account of the role played by the physical
and ecological settings, and/or distinctive characteristics of
the resource involved. A number of commentators have
signaled the need to give more consideration to the properties
of the resource itself (Cox et al. 2010). This certainly applies
in our case, given that Peruvian anchovy stock fluctuations,
like other pelagic fish stocks, are highly driven by
environmental oceanographic conditions. In addition to
improved management institutions, the phase of sustainable
landings of the fishery has also coincided with medium-term
favorable oceanographic conditions for anchovy stocks.
Furthermore, a natural resource may be inherently more or
less susceptible to sustainable use. The Peruvian anchovy, as
an abundant, fast-breeding, and highly mobile species, adapted
to living in a highly unpredictable biophysical environment,
might appear to be innately resilient to bad management,
particularly as alternative resources, such as sardine and other
pelagic fish, are often available to sustain the fishing industry
when anchovy stocks are low. 
Our results showed that for this case study, clearly defined
user boundaries, collective choice arrangements, and nested
enterprises were not required to achieve sustainability. It can
be argued here that the choice of the Peruvian government has
been to relax user boundaries while clearly defining the
amount of resources that the users are allowed to withdraw.
This has been achieved through a quota system that guarantees
the natural replenishment of the resource. Catch quotas that
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were not complied with during the unsustainable phase, are
currently enforced by not only closing the fishing season when
the quota is attained but also by simultaneously banning
fishmeal processing. The clearly identifiable smell of burning
fish, detectable even some miles away from the factories,
makes it impossible for illegal fishmeal reduction to go
unnoticed, and supports compliance (Arias Schreiber 2012). 
A criticism that has been made of the design principles from
the perspective of community-based management of common
pool resources is that they appear, incorrectly, to assume
resource users are “coherent wholes without internal conflict
or heterogeneity” (Cox et al. 2010). This study provides
evidence that this criticism is also valid at larger scales. In the
Peruvian anchovy fishery, power relations among the resource
users are important and arguably play a key role in determining
patterns of resource use. Regarding collective choice
arrangements, it is probably not surprising that for common
pool resources at larger scales, the right to define and modify
rules is limited to the most important and powerful users. The
anchovy fishery represents at least 7% of Peru’s total foreign
exchange earnings; and in 2010 fishmeal and fish oil exports
reached 1 million tonnes, valued at US$1.9 billion (SNP 2010).
In this context is it hardly surprising that government fishing
policies are respectful of the fishing industry elite’s demands,
and pay less regard to internal power relations and potential
conflicts with other users. 
The experience of the Peruvian anchovy fishery also confirms
the importance of "fit" between administrative boundaries of
a common pool resource system and natural ecological
boundaries. Peruvian authorities have had a greater degree of
control over the north central stock, which is wholly within
Peruvian waters, than over the southern stock, which is shared
with Chile. For example, closed seasons for the southern
anchovy stock implemented in Peru have not been
reciprocated by Chilean authorities, leading to complaints by
Peruvian fishermen that they were “leaving the anchovies in
the water for the Chileans to catch”. Consequently, although
some efforts have been made in the past to coordinate the
management the southern anchovy stock in cooperation with
Chilean authorities, usually no catch quota is applied and the
fishing season is open all year around (Arias Schreiber 2012).
This is a further dimension of "congruence" whose importance
has been noted by other authors (Hanna et al. 1995, Anderies
et al. 2004), but not explicitly recognized in the design
principles as currently formulated. 
It can be argued that a further feature of the Peruvian anchovy
fishery favoring its persistence has been the speed of decision
making based on intense resource monitoring. Speed and
flexibility of responses to changing conditions are likely to be
key attributes of sustainable systems for managing common
pool resources, particularly when the resource itself is
inherently dynamic and unpredictable as in the case of the
Peruvian anchovy. On the other hand, when monitoring results
are not regarded as legitimate, or are not transmitted to
management authorities in a timely manner, this can hinder
the fishery's sustainability. Waters in northern Peru are
perhaps the best-monitored large ecosystem in the world,
allowing for unusually effective management of fisheries in
spite of internal (economic) and external (environmental)
challenges (Chavez et al. 2008). It is probably the only place
in the world were management authorities are informed on
fishing landings on a daily basis (M. Espino, personal
communication) and where management decisions have, by
law, to be backed up by a scientific report.  
On the other hand, rapid decision making is inevitably "top-
down" in nature, so this might well contradict the principle of
"collective choice agreements", as it is generally understood,
at least in specific instances. This highlights the fact that not
all the principles have to be complied with for common pool
resource management to be successful. It also suggests that
compliance with the principles might be achieved through a
number of possibly quite different institutional arrangements.
As mentioned before, in the Peruvian case, a notable feature
of collective choice arrangements was the dominance of
powerful stakeholders within the user group, with close links
with officials who were invested with decision-making
capacity in the responsible government agencies. This raises
the interesting question of whether this kind of "top-down"
decision making could also provide a viable model at a
community level. 
External markets have been identified as another key driver
of change in common pool resource systems. The demand for
products from common pool resource systems and how
resource users respond to this demand can be expected to have
large impacts on determining patterns of resource use. Market
forces are often considered as a destabilizing influence when
they affect hitherto self-sufficient community-based common
pool resource systems (Cox et al. 2010). Relations between
the Peruvian anchovy fishery and the global market for
fishmeal are complex and suggest that such clear-cut
conclusions regarding the role of market forces are not
applicable in this case (Arias Schreiber et al. 2011). However,
this is also outside the scope of the present study. 
Coming back to our initial question: is the case of the Peruvian
anchovy fishery “uncommon” among “the commons”? The
answer is no. The history of this fishery tells us that lack of
proper institutions, including regulations, results in
overexploitation and collapse. However, as in Ostrom’s cases,
the history of this fishery (until now) has not ended up in a
“tragedy”. Our results show that Ostrom’s eight design
principles only partially explain the success of the anchovy
fishery. This result is perhaps not unexpected, given that this
study was dealing with a large-scale fishery governed at the
national level. At this level, scientifically recognized and
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controlled boundaries of resource use, congruence or
institutional fit with ecological and cultural conditions,
managed participation, careful monitoring, and frequent
interaction between resource users and governmental
management authorities can be considered as key principles
of sustainable common pool resource systems. 
The study of the Peruvian anchovy fishery confirms the design
principles as a valuable tool for analysis and understanding of
large-scale common pool resource systems. At the same time
it suggests that application of the principles to a wider range
of systems can generate new insights into what is required for
successful common pool resource management. At present it
appears that interest is focused on local-level common pool
resources and, secondarily, on global issues such as climate
change. Our study suggests that there is also much to be learned
from investigating common pool resource management that
takes place at the level of nations. After all, in a world of nation
states, this is still the scale at which many, if not most, key
decisions are taken.
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
php/5319
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APPENDIX 1. List of interviewees: 
From The Vice-Ministry of Fisheries: 
1. Director General of Fish Extraction and Processing 
2. Sub director of Fish for Human Consumption  
3. Sub director of indirect Human Consumption  
4. Head of the Vice -Ministry Data Base Office 
5. Ex-Director General of Fish Extraction and Processing 
6. Director General of Monitoring, Control and Surveillance 
7. Director of Inspection and Auditing 
8. Director of Monitoring, Infringements and Penalties 
9. Head of Satellite Tracking System Office 
10. Advisor to the Marine Fisheries Control and Surveillance Program 
From the Peruvian Marine Research Institute (IMARPE): 
1. Executive Director 
2. Advisor to the Executive Director 
3. Scientific Director 
4. Advisor to the Scientific Director 
5. Director de of Pelagic Resources, Neritic and Oceanic Resources Research 
Department 
6. Head of Trans-zonal and Highly Migratory Resources Research Unit 
7. Head of the Population Dynamics Research Unit 
8. Head of IMARPE’s Coastal Laboratories 
From the fishing private sector 
1. General Manager of the National Fisheries Society (SNP) 
2. Head of the Office of Economics and Fisheries Statistics (SNP) 
3. Head of Office of Environmental Affairs (SNP) 
4. SNP’s member at IMARPE’s Directorate Council  
5. Ex-President of PESCA PERU 
6. Director of Fleet and Supplies – Fishing Company Pesquera Hayduk S.A. 
7. Director of Research Planning and Development – Fishing Company Pesquera 
Diamante S.A. 
8. Head of Fleet Department – Fishing Company CFG Investment S.A.C. 
9. Fleet operator -  Fishing Company Pesquera Austral 
APPENDIX 2. Format of semi-structured interviews (page 1 of 2) 
Date:
Name: 
Current position/job: 
Previous positions/jobs: 
How long have you been involved with Peruvian fisheries management/ research/ industry/ 
business? 
How long with the anchovy fishery? 
Can you tell me which major differences do you remember regarding the following topics 
(see below) between the 1960s (if applicable), 70s (if applicable), 80s (if applicable), 90s (if 
applicable) and nowadays?  
When and why you think that the things (related to each topic) changed?   
Topics:
! Formal and informal difficulties for new companies to join the fishery 
! Formal and informal difficulties for the entrance of new vessels to the fishery 
! Anchovy fishery licenses 
! Knowledge of anchovy fishing stocks, monitoring and survey techniques 
! Geographical distribution of the northern-central anchovy stock 
! Rule enforcement and sanctions 
! Payments of fishing licenses, permits, taxes, other. 
! Relations between the fishing industry, the government and the Peruvian Marine 
Research Institute (IMARPE) 
Which were the main sources of conflicts among the fishing companies during the 1960s (if 
applicable), 70s (if applicable), 80s (if applicable), 90s (if applicable)? How were these 
conflicts resolved or not? 
Which are the main sources of conflicts among the fishing companies nowadays? How are 
these conflicts resolved or not? 
APPENDIX 2. Format of semi-structured interviews (page 2 of 2) 
Which were the main sources of conflicts between the fishing companies and the government 
(including IMARPE) during the 1960s (if applicable), 70s (if applicable), 80s (if applicable), 
90s (if applicable)? How were these conflicts resolved or not? 
Which are the main sources of conflicts between the fishing companies and the government 
(including IMARPE) nowadays? How are these conflicts resolved or not? 
Why do you think that anchovy landings have been relatively stable during the last two 
decades? Why has the anchovy fishery not collapsed like it happened during the early 70s? 

